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ABSTRACT
The first and second laws of thermodynamics, stating respectively
the conservation and the dissipation of energy, are considered by many
writers to be the two most fundamental laws of the universe. Both laws
are held to be empirically derived. Yet, upon reflection, it does not
seem possible to state, from the limited empiric evidence available,
either proposition as a universal law. A further element appears to be
involved in such statement: philosophical and religious belief. In this
paper the conservation law is traced to its origins in Greek philosophy.
The second law is traced to its origins in the traditional Christian out
look. Traditional Christian concepts appear to have deeply influenced
many of the scientists who stated and developed the second law as a uni
versal principle. To cite Lord Kelvin (William Thomson), one of the orig
inators of the second law, the law meant that ”. . . all motion except
that of heat must have an end, unless it please God to restore by an act
of new creative power the dissipation of mechanical effect that always
goes on."
The conceptual development of the second law is followed from
the works of Newton through the treatments of Laplace, Whewell, Kelvin,
Clausius, Maxwell, Tyndall, Stewart and Tait, Clifford, Boltzmann, Planck,
Jeans, Eddington, Whitehead, and a number of other wirters. The view of
these writers on the objective truth or falsity of the second law as a
universal principle is found to vary less with empiric evidence than with
philosophical and religious belief.
Prom the thoughts of certain of these men, it is suggested that
the physical evidence taken as supporting the second law (which states
that entropy can remain constant or increase, but can never decrease)
may, when considered with Newton’s third law of motion (for every action
there is an equal and opposite reaction) suggest the probable presence of
generically different, and counterbalancing phenomena, yet to be dis
covered. A full statement of the second law may turn out to be entropysymmetrical.
This theoretical possibility holds strong implications for
technology. For over a hundred years, we have employed a dissipative
technology of low efficiency, which embodies our understanding of the
second law. We have, as a result, an ecological and energy crisis. If
entropy changes turn out to be symmetrical for the universe as a whole,
there may well be no ultimate barrier to the development of a technology
which closely approaches unity in its efficiency. Re-examination of the
second law, with a view to obtaining higher technological efficiency, is
urged. The thoughts of many of the writers, particularly the physicists,
appear seminal in this regard.
viii
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Would you that spangle of Existence spend
Ah out TEE SECRET — quick ahout it, Friend!
A Hair, they say, divides the False and True —
And upon what, prithee, does Life depend?
A Hair, they say, divides the False and True;
Yes; and a single Alif were the clue —
Could you “
but find it, to the Treasure-house,
And peradventure to THE MASTER too;
Whose secret Presence, through Creation's veins
Running, Quicksilver-like eludes your pains;
Taking all shapes from Mah to Mahi; and
They change and perish all — but He remains;
A moment guess'd — then back behind the Fold
Immerst. of Darkness round the Drama roll'd
Which, for the Pastime of Eternity,
He does Himself contrive, enact, behold.
— Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an historically oriented essay in the sociology
of scientific

knowledge.

It examines the growth and cosmological

application of the second law of thermodynamics from the nineteenth cen
tury to the present time, through the study of the thoughts of twelve men^
who have contributed to the dialogue which shaped the second law.

The

nineteenth century is the primary period of focus.
A number of factors underlie the development of the second law.
Many of them may be grouped under the three following categories:
ic, theoretic, and social (philosophic and religious).

empir

Let us consider,

in an introductory way, each category in turn.
Empiric Factors

The second law was derived, empirically, from a macroscopic study
of energy transformations.

In the 181^.0's particular attention had been

focused on the convertibility of one form of energy into another, and the
first law of thermodynamics, postulating the conservation of energy, was
publicly announced by Meyer, J.P. Joule, Colding and Helmholtz.
second law was developed very soon thereafter.

The

In the study of conver

sion processes, it was observed that electrical, chemical, mechanical and
other forms of energy tended to become transformed into the type of
■^William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), L. Boltzmann, J.C. Maxwell, J.
Tyndall, W.K. Clifford, the Rev. Win. Whewell, P.G. Tait, B. Stewart, Max
Planck, Sir James Jeans, Sir Arthur Eddington, and Phillip Frank. The
thoughts of a number of other men are considered less centrally.
3
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energy known as heat.

Heat in turn tended to flow spontaneously from

hotter to colder bodies in thermal contact, but the reverse process, a
flow of heat from a colder to a hotter body, was not observed to occur
of itself.

As Max Planck (191+9:17) has noted:

"Clausius deduced his

proof of the second law of thermodynamics from the hypothesis that 'heat
will not pass spontaneously from a colder to a hotter body.'"

A heat

flow from a hotter to a colder body continues until all parts of the
thermal system are at the same temperature.

At such time observable

heat flow ceases and, if the system is isolated from other influences,
it becomes thermodynamically quiescent.

A similar process is displayed

in gas and liquid diffusion, and pressure equalization.
state of a system is termed thermodynamic equilibrium.

The quiescent
All isolated sys

tems observed to date move toward equilibrium, and classical thermodynamics assumes that all systems will exemplify this tendency (Callen, i9 6 0 ).
The above elements provide the basis for the second law as an
engineering principle.

Sadi Carnot (1796-1832) developed, from an analy

sis of the flow of heat, a conceptual model wherein the upper limit of
efficiency of an ideal, cyclical heat engine could be calculated.

The

engine was composed of an ideal cylinder and piston, with a gas inside
which expanded when heated and contracted when cooled, moving the piston
in the process.

To extract mechanical work from heat, the cyclically

operating working fluid or gas within the engine had to be alternately
placed in thermal contact with (a) a heat source at some temperature Tq,
^With respect to the movement of an isolated system to thermo
dynamic equilibrium, Callen (1960:21+) comments: "The basic problem of
thermodynamics is the determination of the equilibrium state that even
tually results after the removal of internal constraints in a closed
composite system."

which it took heat energy from, and then, (b) a heat sink at some lower
temperature T2 , to which it exhausted heat energy not transformed to work.
The Carnot relationship indicates that a heat engine will not operate in
a continuous cyclical fashion when the heat source and the sink are at
the same temperature.

Conversely, given a heat source at any temperature

above absolute zero and a sink at absolute zero, thermodynamic efficiency
may in the ideal case approach unity.

As a matter of experience, a

corollary was added to the effect that a heat sink at absolute zero (-2 7 3
degrees centigrade) was unobtainable.

Thus no heat engine, even in the

ideal case, could be completely efficient, and could not be a perpetual
motion machine of the second category (cf. Feynman, Leighton, and Sands,
1963).3

In the l8£0 fs William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) in England and
Rudolph Clausius in Germany, developing upon the lines of thought and
evidence mentioned above, independently announced statements of the
second law of thermodynamics.^

Theoretically, the second law was stated

in terms of macroscopic parameters such as temperature, pressure, volume,
and so forth.

This form of the law has come to be called the classical

statement of the second law.

The gist of Kelvin’s statement is that

energy tends to become dissipated, or unavailable in transformations;
Clausius gave the concept (and term) entropy as a measure of the
^On page I4I+—10 Feynman comments, while considering the efficiency
of the Carnot heat engine, ’’The efficiency cannot be greater than unity
and the absolute temperature cannot be less than zero, absolute zero.
So, since T2 must be positive, the efficiency is always less than unity.
That is our first conclusion."
^I-In "The Dynamic Theory of Heat," (R. S. Edinburgh, March 17,
l8 $l, xx p. 265) Kelvin stated, "It is impossible, by means of inanimate
physical agency, to derive mechanical effect from any portion of matter
by cooling it below the temperature of the coldest of the surrounding
objects." Clausius’ statements were of a similar import.
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•unavailable energy in a system.

In the formulations of both men, avail

able energy tended to become unavailable, while unavailable energy never
tended of itself to become available again.

“
When applied to the universe,

these ideas lead to the presumption that the universe, like Carnot1s
heat engine, can never be ai 'perpetuum mobile* of the second category.
Theoretic Factors
Theoretically, two major approaches may be taken to the phenomena
which empirically underlie the second law.

The route which deals with

macroscopic variables is the first that historically developed; as noted,
it is called the classical approach.

The second route involves applica

tion of statistical and mechanical assumptions to a kinetic-atomic model
of the macroscopic phenomena.

In the kinetic-atomic model the large-

scale phenomena such as temperature, pressure, etc., are related to the
mass, number, velocity, and other "workings” of molecules or atoms.

The

kinetic approach may be characterized as the explanation of visible
phenomena from the standpoint of microscopic matter in motion.

This lat

ter approach was proposed and developed at a time when atoms were not yet
empirically known to exist.

Kelvin, Clausius, Maxwell, Tait, Boltzmann,

Loschmidt, and a number of others developed this approach throughout the
second half of the nineteenth century.
The kinetic, statistical-mechanical approach suggests somewhat
different conclusions about entropy and thermodynamic equilibrium than
the conslusions suggested by the classical approach (of. Frank, 19i|6:193 b)• In "the classical approach, entropy should not, assuming the absence
of a source of heat generation other than heat itself, ever decrease; and
isolated or contained systems, once in thermodynamic equilibrium, should
not of themselves leave that state to become once again active.

On the

7
other hand, the reversible assumptions of the statistical-mechanical
kinetic approach do not rule this possibility out.

They further contain

the definite, calculable (and verified) prediction that the microscopic
parts, or molecules of a gas in macroscopic equilibrium at a single tem
perature, are continually departing from and returning to the average
values reflective of the macroscopic equilibrium.

Kinetic theory carried

with it, in addition, certain of the presumptions of atomistic philosophy,
specifically, that the atoms of which observable phenomena were comprised
remain indestructible, unbroken and unworn.
served.

In a word, atoms were con

Today we know that matter can be transformed into energy.

How

ever, the principle of the conservation of energy continues in a more
general form the old assumption of the conservation or indestructibility
of atoms.
In brief, two distinct views arise from the two theoretical out
looks.

In the classical view isolated systems always tend to evolve

toward thermodynamic inertia or ’death1; in the kinetic view such a sys
tem may, given sufficient time, spring to action once again, even though
the statistical odds against its doing so may be multitillions to one
(Eddington, 1959:62).

Just give it time.

Time brings us to the domain of cosmology.

Cosmology is a study

of the universe as a whole, and such study involves great magnitudes of
matter, space, and time.

There does not exist as yet, and there may

never exist, a body of physical knowledge sufficient to construct a
definitive model of the universe.

What was the universe like in the very

distant past? what will it be like in the far future?
is it uncreated? is it eternal, or not?

Was it created, or

Is its order inherent and perma

nent, or has that order been impressed from without by an unknown agent

8
or process?
order —

If the latter is the case, is the universe now losing its

its' organization?

These and like questions have occurred to men

since the time of the Greek philosophers.

They are scientifically fas

cinating and still far from being answered.

Modem cosmology embodies

these and more recent questions in its models of the universe.
speaking the m o d e m models are of two different types.
there are steady-state, oscillating and cyclical models.

Generally

On the one hand
These models

suggest that the universe may be uncreated, temporally eternal, with its
order inherent and permanent.

On the other hand, there are the cne^fcire ’big

bang” and expanding universe theories.

These contain the presumption

that the "bang" and the expansion are one-shot, linear, and neverrecurring.

These theories imply that the universe was either created or

had its initial order impressed upon it by an agent or process from with
out, or at least not now acting.
These two general types of models were advanced by nineteenth
century thermodynamics as follows:

(l) In the classical thermodynamic

view, the universe had an "origin" in a state of minimal entropy at a not
infinitely remote time past.

It has been proceeding ever since to "run

down" toward a time in the remote future when it shall, like all other
isolated systems, come to rest in final thermodynamic equilibrium.
Speaking from the standpoint of statistical mechanics, it shall have lost
its large-scale organization, its order.

And thus the universe shall sit,

its energy undestroyed but self-cancelling, throughout all future eter
nity —

in what is termed the "heat death."

(2) On the other hand, the

assumptions of kinetic theory do not rule out the possibility that the
universe might, after a sufficient number of eons in the "heat death"
phase, undergo in whole or in part a fluctuation that would render it

9
active again.

Ludwig Boltzmann suggested such a ’fluctuating' model of

the universe.

Kelvin and others suggested the one-way, entropy increas

ing, ultimately ’dying’ model of the universe.

Each model has its

strengths and weaknesses; neither is finally conclusive.

The model

based on classical thermodynamics and extended to the universe has had
the benefit of much supporting evidence insofar as processes on earth
go, and more recent discoveries also appear supportive.

Two of the more

recent discoveries are (a) that the universe appears to be expanding, and
(b) that m a s s can be converted to energy.

"While both processes may

be reversible, they have been looked upon by certain writers as irre
versible, and presented as further evidence tending to confirm the clas
sical ’heat death’ model of the universe.

The cosmological models of

Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, which we shall look at in
Chapter 2, are examples of this interpretation.
questions remain quite unsettled.

Still, the cosmological

Oscillating and steady-state models

of the universe have kept theoretic pace with the model of the universe
based on classical thermodynamics,

and these models remain most consis

tent with the assumptions of kinetic theory.
From the l850’s until quite recently, the proponents of kinetic
theory have been in a peculiar position with respect to the cyclical or
oscillating models of the universe which appear possible under the
assumption of kinetic theory.

The kinetic approach, which envisions mat

ter and energy in an eternal and untiring interplay between states of
potential and states of motion, characterized by unbroken continuity and
overall symmetry, offers logically taut and consistent assumptions, but
^For a good recent discussion of the present state of oscillating,
steady-state and one-shot ’big bang' models of the universe, see Nigel
Calder's Violent Universe (1969)* Chapters III and IV.
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■until recently, no commanding evidence to point to with respect to its
possible predictions about a self-sustaining universe.
Several interpretations of relativity theory have been made which
are consistent with the assumptions of kinetic theory.

Sir William C.

hampier (191+9 :U3?l) has commented:

It has been suggested that our present thermodynamics may be a
peculiarity of an expanding universe; indeed Tolman has formulated
a scheme of relativistic thermodynamics in which the second law is
reversed in a contracting universe. Energy would then become more
and more available, and the re-formulation of matter from radia
tion would be possible. On these lines we may speculate about a
pulsating universe, in which we chance to be living in a phase of
expansion, and need not contemplate a beginning or an end.
Still, such lines of thought have remained theoretical, in Dampier's
wording, 11speculative."

The fluctuation predictions of kinetic and sta

tistical theory have needed some large-scale evidence, for although small
statistical fluctuations from maximum entropy and 'dead-levelf equilib
rium in small systems have been observed, no one has observed anything
remotely like a fluctuation which could affect the state of the universe.
That is, until recently.
Within the past few years, John Wheeler (1973)> Remo Ruffini
(l97l) 9 and others (Penrose, 1972), starting from certain of the predic
tions of relativity theory, have developed a theory of what is termed a
'black hole.'

A black hole is rather like a star running in reverse.

Instead of giving out radiant energy and a certain amount of mass, it
'sucks up' radiant energy and mass, and concentrates it to a state of
unbelievably high density, squeezing out even the space between the sub
atomic particles inside it.

In their description of the black hole,

Ruffini and Wheeler (1971:32-33) comment:
. . . How the physics of a black hole looks depends more upon an
act of choice by the observer himself than anything else. Suppose
he decides to follow the collapsing matter through its collapse
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down the black hole. Then he will see it crushed to indefinitely
high density, and he himself will be t o m apart eventually by in
definitely increasing tidal forces. No restraining force whatso
ever has the power to hold him away from this catastrophe, once he
crossed a certain critical surface known as the "horizon." The
final collapse occurs a finite time after the passage of this sur
face, but it is inevitable. Time and space are interchanged in
side a black hole in an unusual way; the direction of increasing
proper time for the observer is the direction of decreasing values
of the coordinate r. . . .
Suppose the observer decides instead to observe the collapse
from far away. Then, as the price for his own safety, he is de
prived of any chance to see more than the first steps on the way
to collapse. All signals and all information from the later
phases of collapse never escape; they are caught up in the col
lapse of the geometry itself . . . a spherical system appears black
from outside; no light can escape. Light shot at it falls in. A
particle shot at it falls in. A "meter stick" would be let down in
vain to measure the dimensions of the object. The stick is pulled
to pieces by tidal forces, and the broken-off pieces fall in with
out a trace. In these
senses the system is a black hole. . . .
The black holeis black because nothing radiates out from
does, however, exert gravitational force on distant objects.

it.

It

It is known

that gravity attracts light, and a mass with sufficient gravitational
force to attract and keep light —

is "black".

A mechanism for the re-

emergence of matter and energy from a black hole is not as yet known,
but the black hole may constitute a macroscopic, de-entropizing force,
re concentrating both mass and radiant energy, whose presence in the
reaches of space will be significant for the predictions of kinetic
theory.

Considering the Carnot relationship, the matter may be expressed

in the following

way. The

Carnot relation states, in strictness, the

conditions under

whichthe

efficiency of an ideal heat engine may vary

between zero and unity.

It is the additional assumption that one cannot

obtain a heat sink at absolute zero which, together with the Carnot rela
tion, appears to forbid an ideal efficiency of unity.
that the black hole may meet this latter criterion.

It would appear
From the outside,

the black hole is equivalent to a sink at absolute zero.

Might the

12
universe as a whole turn out to he an ’ideal heat engine’ —
mobile of the second category?

a perpetuum

It might, if the ’black hole' re-expands

under appropriate conditions.

A black hole appears to have been located
c
in the double-star system Cygnus XI (The Daily Press, Nov. 29, 1973•25) >

and a good deal of theoretical consideration is going on, consideration
which reflects back on the classical statement of the second law.

As

Nigel Calder (l969:13U) has commented:
For a hundred years physicists have believed, on very strong
evidence, that the universe must always tend to become increas
ingly disordered. Whatever its overall architecture may be, the
principle in question is the second law of thermodynamics which
says the universe must grow tepid. Yet an oscillating universe is
reheated and reorganized; it seems to have a fresh start every 80
billion years or so, when the accumulated debt of disorder is can
celled.
These recent developments in astrophysics are relevant to and
reopen the earlier cosmological debates upon which this paper focuses.
Out of the early thoughts on the second .law expressed by Kelvin, Maxwell,
Clifford, Boltzmann and others came the two types of models of the uni
verse —

the cyclical or oscillating universe, eternal in time, and the

temporally finite universe, with its past 'creation', and linear approach
to thermodynamic 'heat death.' Only, the 'heat death' model was almost
completely dominant.

The other model sat on the shelf.

Now matters

appear to be taking on a different hue.
Even before the rapid development of 'black hole' theory in the
latter part of the 6 0 's, a shift away from the classical thermodynamic
model appears evident in the thought of some writers.

Reflecting on a

science of thermodynamics seen by many writers in the first part of the
^The article begins: "Three teams of scientists report firm
evidence on the revolutionary theory that distant space contains ’black
holes.'"
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twentieth century to be complete in its major formulations, Percy W.
Bridgman (1961:6) commented:
Thermodynamics gives me two strong impressions: first of a sub
ject not yet complete or at least of one whose ultimate possibili
ties have not yet been explored, so that perhaps there may be
still further generalizations awaiting discovery; and secondly
and even more strongly as a subject whose fundamental and elemen
tary operations have never been subject to an adequate analysis.
Social Factors
In his biographical sketch of Clausius (196 I4.), Isaac Asimov (19614.:
2 9 0 ) comments on the 'heat death' model in cosmology in the following way:

This dramatic picture of the end of all things has been called
"the heat-death of the universe." It was a scientific analog of
the Last Judgment but its validity is less certain now than it was
a century ago. Though the laws of thermodynamics stand as firmly
as ever, cosmologists are far less certain that the laws, as de
duced in this small segment of the universe, necessarily apply to
the universe as a whole and there is a certain willingness to sus
pend judgment on the matter of the heat-death.
Asimov's comment that the 'heat-death' theory "was a scientific analog of
the Last Judgment" is particularly suggestive of the major question which
we shall ask in this study.

Asimov's point brings us to the social fac

tors mentioned earlier and poses a question — ■was the widespread accept
ance of the heat-death hypothesis generated by facts and logic alone,
or was its acceptance also aided by motivational and conceptual sets de
riving from philosophy and religion?
More specifically, with respect to the social factors, the focal
question of this study is, Bid prior religious and philosophical convic
tion, deriving from traditional Christian cosmology, play _a role in the
generalization of the classical statement of the second law of thermo
dynamics from an engineering principle applying to certain phenomena, into
§1 0 .
0 smological principle applying to the entire universe?

In light of the portrait of science as an activity which is given
by most m o d e m textbooks, this may seem at first blush to be 'merely* an
historical question.

The typical textbook image of science is that of a

predominantly cumulative body of factual knowledge produced by men shar
ing a similar goal —
no more, and no less.

the theoretical description of natural processes —
Nothing but "evidence" counts.

Philosophical and

religious elements are usually presented as historical 'sidelights' if
they are presented at all.
pletely accurate.

Yet, this portrait of science may not be com

Commenting on the textbook image of science, Thomas

Kuhn (1970:l) states:
That image has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves,
mainly from the study of finished scientific achievements as these
are recorded in the classics, and more recently, in the textbooks
from which each new scientific generation learns to practice its
trade. Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive
and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more
likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a
national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text.
A . . . quite different concept of science . . . can emerge from
the historical record of the research activity itself.

The historical records read in connection with research on this thesis do
not fit the textbook portrait of science.
of science —

Rather, they suggest a model

at least the science of the period we shall look at —

best

characterized as 'doing one's damdest with one's mind, no holds barred;'
the holds employed being full-bloodedly philosophical and religious as
well as empiric.

Virtually all the men whose thought we shall consider

received a classical education, which focused upon the ideas of the Greek
philosophers, medieval churchmen, and scholars.

The historically exis

tent dialogue of the past between religion, philosophy and "natural philo
sophy" was to these men a living and vital tradition.
chew the union of physics and metaphysics.

They did not es

Certain of our men worked

within the outlook of the parson-naturalists of England, which "held that

the study of nature enables a fuller appreciation of His works and thus
leads us to admire the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God manifested in
His Creation" (Merton, 1 9 6 8 :631+).

Lord Kelvin’s work was to him "a kind

of worship" (King, 1925:30); indeed, he began each of his physics
classes with a prayer (King, 1925:29).

James Clerk Maxwell saw the phy

sical world, and man, as "Truth in form arrayed" (Campbell and Garnet,
1882:591?) worthy of worship.

"Worship?" he asked, "Yes, what worship

better. . ." (Campbell and Garnet, 1882:617).
Tait can only be described as pious.

The Physics of Stewart and

Tyndall was deeply committed to the

philosophical ideas of the atomists, and felt that it was " . . . not a
matter of indifference whether they . . .(were) . . . introduced with
reverence or irreverence" (l87 l+:3 l8 ).
It is, of course, possible, and sometimes advantageous, to make
empiric statements without reference to religion and philosophy, just as
it is possible to make philosophical and religious statements without
reference to empirics.

Proceeding in this way, one is perhaps less like

ly to turn an enthusiasm into a dogma.

However, building a wall between

the different areas of inquiry also has drawbacks; one is more likely to
give uncritical acceptance to propositions whose broader implications
have not been given attention.

On the whole, as Whitehead has suggested,

physics and metaphysics benefit each other, while their separation
"ruins" (l962 b:5 6 ) philosophy and leads to a "natural science . . . (of)
. . . no importance" (1962a:51+).

Further, as E. A. Burtt (195!+*227) kas

commented, " . . . there is no escape from metaphysics.

That is, from the

final implications of any proposition or set of propositions."
The work of the men we shall consider must be viewed in the above
light.

Their work certainly involved enthusiasm, and ran the danger of
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dogmatic endorsement.

But their wholistic discourses were also suited to

Bring these dangers to light, and further allowed play to the deeper in
tuitions.

Modern science textbooks, being both pedagogic and parsimoni

ous, do not (and perhaps cannot) bring the full interplay of these ele
ments out.

As a result, the student of physics is sometimes left unaware

of many of the final implications of what he is taught.

For example,

thermodynamics texts teach the first and second laws as being part of the
same analytical system; as being compatible with each other.

Are they?

In the historical record we find men who have challenged this position.
Again, in the textbook tradition, the current understanding of
the natural "laws", or theoretic generalizations, the selected evidence
supporting these generalizations, and brief reference to the discoverers
all tend to produce a vision of the knowledge taught as being ultimately
correct; in Kuhn’s wording, "finished.”

The further impression that all

this work has been cumulative is suggestive of the idea that the stu
dent’s own contribution in science should be to build further on these
current generalizations.

But are these current generalizations really

the product of cumulatively dovetailing thought, leading in the one cor
rect direction for future research?

Thomas Kuhn (1970*2) comments:

The more carefully . . . (recent historians of science) . . . study,
say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermo
dynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views
of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the
product of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these
out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be pro
duced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of
reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the other
hand, they are to be called science, then science has included
bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today.
The typical thermodynamics text of today gives the impression
that m o d e m thermodynamics grew from certain foundations discovered,
agreed upon, and laid down in the nineteenth century.

While this is in a
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sense true, historical examination of nineteenth century thought indicates
far less agreement than most textbooks imply on what we call the funda
mental assumptions.

Rather the different contributors to the development

of thermodynamics held frequently differing views.

Kelvin, for example,

excepted life as an example of the operation of the second law (Thompson,
1910:1093).

His view is far closer to the ideas of certain modem biolo

gists (Oparin, 1 9 6 8 ; Trincher, 1965; P.G. Kuznetsov, 1965; Auerbach, 1936)
than to the current "orthodox" position in physics, which is that the
second law applies equally and without exception to all processes, in
cluding life (Allis, Herlin, 1952; Bent, 1962; Angrist, Holper, 1967;
and Young, I9 6 I4.).

Similarly, Ludwig Boltzmann’s work is usually seen as

quite supportative of the Clausius interpretation of the second law, which
is that entropy can only increase (Feynman, 1963; Bent, 1 9 6 5 ).

Boltz

mann’s views are actually different; he proposed an entropy-symmetrical
universe (Boltzmann, 1 8 9 8 ; Brush, I96 I1.). In distinction to the textbook
tradition, historical study brings all of these differences out.

In this

sense it serves to reopen the discourse on fundamental concepts engaged
in by the founders of thermodynamics, and in this way can be seen as com
plementary to the textbook type of presentation.

But, it may be asked,

is not methodology a sufficient guide to scientific conclusion?
History?

Why then

Kuhn (1970:1*), at least, comments as follows:

First . . . is the insufficiency of methodological directives, by
themselves, to dictate a unique substantive conclusion to many
sorts of scientific questions. . . . Instructed to examine electric
cal or chemical phenomena, the man who is ignorant of these fields
but who knows what it is to be scientific may legitimately reach
any one of a number of incompatible conclusions. Among those legi
timate possibilities, the particular conclusions he does arrive at
are probably determined by his prior experience in other fields, by
the accidents of his investigation, and by his own individual make
up. . . . Observation and experience can and must drastically re
strict the range of admissible scientific belief. But they alone
cannot determine a particular body of such belief. An apparently
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arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical accident,
is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given
scientific community at a given time.
If this statement of Kuhn's is true, then possibly the 'orthodox' posi
tion in modern physics on the second law has an arbitrary element.

It

may be asked, is this 'orthodox' position the only, or only one of sever
al equally legitimate possibilities?
light on such questions.

The historical records tend to shed

For example, is the black hole hypothesis only

something that could develop in terms of modem theory and methodology —
or could it have come much sooner?

On this point John Wheeler (1973:80)

comments:
The idea of a black hole is very old. In 1798, French
Pierre Simon Laplace noted that a star as dense as the
tending out more than twice as far as the earth, could
light. A year later, Laplace published the details of
that led him to this conclusion. 7

mathematician
sun, but ex
not give off
the reasoning

Could this idea have lain fallow, so to speak, for almost two hundred
years, because philosophic and religious perspectives suggested other
paths of research and thought?

History, at any rate, suggests that we

look at the past concord and conflict of thought in the open marketplace
of ideas, particularly at the early stages of their development.
such stages, Thomas Kuhn (1970*U) comments:

On

". . . the early developmen

tal stages of most sciences have been characterized by continual competi
tion between a number of distinct views of nature, each partially derived
from and all roughly compatible with, the dictates of scientific observa
tion and method."

It is on such a period in thermodynamics that we focus,

7Wheeler (1973:80) continues: "To escape from the moon, Laplace
explained, a projectile needs a speed of li=r miles per second. To escape
from the Earth, it must start at 7 miles per second; or from the Sun at
383 miles per second. Laplace asked how, big an object would have to be
so that a projectile starting off with the maximum known velocity, the
speed of light itself, would fall back defeated. This was the first men
tion of what investigators later began to call a black hole."

and we will find a number of very different views emergent.
Let us approach again our question as to whether elements of tra
ditional Christian cosmology played a role in the development of the cos
mological model of the second law.

In regard to this question, it is

relevant to ask also whether philosophical elements played a part in the
development of the first law —

the conservation of energy.

As stated

earlier, physical evidence alone has been (and remains) incomplete with
respect to the construction of a definitive model of the universe.
conceptual leap from partial evidence is required.

A

Such a leap seems

more or less needed for the attribution of any characterizing law to the
universe as a whole.

Apparently, such leaps were made by most of the

early discoverers of the conservation principle.
Thomas Kuhn, in his article, "Energy Conservation as Simultaneous
Discovery (Clagget, 1959021-356)> cites conceptual leaps from partial
evidence on the part of Colding, Helmholtz, Liebig, Mayer, Mohr, and Segain, and goes on to note that "Put bluntly, these pioneers seem to have
held an idea capable of becoming conservation of energy for some time
before they found evidence for it."

Kuhn continues:

Mohr jumped without warning from a defense of the dynamical theory
of heat to the statement that there is only one force in nature and
that it is quantitatively unalterable. Liebig made a similar leap
from the duty of electric motors to the statement that the chemical
equivalents of the elements determine the work retrievable from
chemical processes by either electrical or thermal means. Colding
tells us that he got the idea of conservation in 1 8 3 9 j while still
a student, but withheld announcement until 181+3 so that he might
gather evidence. The biography of Helmholtz outlines a similar
story. Seguin confidently applied his concept of the convertibility
of heat and motion to steam engine calculations, even though his
single attempt to confirm the idea had been totally fruitless.
Kuhn goes on to say that " . . . The persistent occurrence of mental jumps
like these . . . suggests that many of the discoverers of energy conserva
tion were deeply predisposed to see a single indestructible force at the
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root of all natural phenomena."

Kuhn found the concepts of "Naturphilo-

sophie" (Natural Philosophy) were both (a) conceptually congruent to and
suggestive of conservation as a fundamental law of the universe, and (h)
available to many of the men whose work he considered.

Kuhn concludes

that "Naturphilosophie could, therefore, have provided an appropriate
philosophical background for the discovery of energy conservation"
(Clagget, 1959:338).
Conceptual leaps from partial evidence are sometimes fruitful,
sometimes not.

It may be said that energy conservation has been fruitful

as a hypothesis, but should not be received as a dogma. Nor has it been
g
by certain researchers.
Let us look at a conceptual leap from partial
evidence to the generalization of the second law to the universe as a
whole.

R. Clausius made such a leap on the basis of heat flows; Richard

Feynman continues this procedure while considering the universal conse
quences of heat flows between hot rocks and cold water.

Feynman (1 9 6 3 :

1*2*-1 2 ) comments as follows:

If we put together two objects that are at different temperatures,
say Ti and T2 , -a certain amount of heat will flow from one to the
other by itself. Suppose, for instance, we put a hot stone in cold
water. Then when a certain heat
Q is transferred from T]_ to T2 ,
how much does the entropy of the hot stone change? It decreases by
Q/T2 . The heat will, of course, flow only from the higher tempera
ture Ti to the lower temperature T2 , so that
Q, is positive if Tq is
greater than T2 . So the change in entropy of the whole world is posi
tive /emphasis added/, and it is the difference of the two fractions:
The Physical Science Study Committee (Physics, 1960:1*37) com
ments: "This assumption, that the total energy of the universe is con
stant, is the basis of most cosmological theories. But that is a daring
generalization from our limited experience. We live in a small comer
of the universe, and we have tested the validity of our physical laws
over a very limited period of time. It is conceivable that these laws,
including the law of the conservation of energy, are not rigorously cor
rect . . . Here is one of the live scientific questions of today. Cosmologists are working hard to find out whether energy ii3 completely conserved
over the whole universe. And just now, for the first time, there is the
possibility of actual experiments to decide between the rival theories.”
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Feynman has made a considerable jump from stones in water to the "whole
world".

Of course, his statement is pedagogic, andhas been "elegantly"

whittled down for simplicity.

Still, the jimp exists and is maintained

throughout the text, and it is regarding this type of jump that Clifford
(whose comments we shall examine later) criticized the cosmological ap
plication of the second law in the l880's.

A more careful position is

taken by Kenneth ¥. Ford (1972:6^3 )> who comments:
The logical terminus of the universe, assuming it to be a system
obeying the same laws as the macroscopic systems accessible to exper
iment, is known as the "heat death," a universal soup of uniform den
sity and uniform temperature, devoid of available energy, incapable
of further change, a perfect and featurelessfinal disorder. If this
is where the universe is headed, we have had no hints of it as yet.
Over a time span of ten billion years or more, the universe has been
a vigorously active place, with new stars still being b o m as old
ones are dying. It is quite possible that the long-range fate of the
universe will be settled within science and need not remain forever a
topic of pure speculation. At present, however, we have no evidence
at all to confirm or contradict the applicability of thermodynamics
to the universe as a whole.
As between Feynman's and Ford's generalization, Ford's is the
more descriptively accurate.

It also provides the foundation for the

view that where the evidence is as yet indecisive, philosophical convic
tions may lead thought.

Most frequently is this true when the model of

the universe to be proposed holds profound implications in philosophy and
religion.

The traditional Christian, for example, adheres to a "Creation"

model of the universe which is roughly compatible with revelation as
given in the Bible.

Adherents to other outlooks hold to very different

models of the universe, and these beliefs are in many cases not a matter
of indifference to the respective believers.

A change in or challenge

to such belief can produce a crisis for the believer, and the physicist
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is no less vulnerable in this regard than any other man.

Suppose, for

example, that a devout physicist is confronted by the newly forged prin
ciple of the conservation- of energy.

A devoted materialist then cites

this law as tending to confirm the view that there has never been a
"creation” of the world at all -- rather, nature has an unbroken material
continuity.

(We shall later see certain writers, either directly or by

implication, take just such a stance.) This can produce a crisis for the
believer; where is the "evidence” for Creation?

Such confrontation was

afoot in Kelvin's time, and had been augmented by the development and
popular dissemination of Laplace's 'nebular hypothesis,' which assumed
the material universe to be self-sufficient.

On scientific crises, Kuhn

(1970:88) has commented, "It is, I think, particularly in periods of
acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis
as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field."
Let us turn at this point to a more specific historical overview
of the elements of our study.

In the nineteenth century there was active

debate over the Creation versus the material eternity of the world, and
the second law came to be pivotally involved in the matter.

But the

debate existed far earlier, and the men whose thought we shall study
were by their classical education probably more aware of it than we are
today.

Let us look at the early ideas, and trace their effects.

CHAPTER

COSMOLOGY

IN

I

PHILOSOPHY
AN

AND

RELIGION:

OVERVIEW

This chapter focuses upon the definition of three religious and
philosophical outlooks which appear significant in regard to nineteenth
century thought on the cosmological application of the second law.

All

three outlooks are of ancient origin, and each has posited a distinctive
and historically unchanging cosmological model of the universe.

These

cosmological models in turn appear to be consistent with several differ
ent nineteenth-century interpretations of the second law.

Let us define

these three outlooks and then turn to consider their historical posi
tions in cosmology.
The first of these outlooks is scientific materialism, which has
been defined in part by Whitehead (l962b:23) as ". • . the fixed scienti
fic cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute
matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations.
In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless.
does what it does do, following a fixed routine. . . . "

It just

Materialism

holds that not only is the Deity absent from the world; he was never
there.

In this vein, Becker (cf. Brown and Perrin, ed., 191+0:ij.$3) com

ments,
Edit and interpret the conclusions of modem science as tenderly as
we like, it is still quite impossible for us to regard man as the
child of God for whom the earth was created as a temporary habita
tion. Rather must we regard him as little more than a chance deposit
23
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on the surface of the world, carelessly thrown up between two ice
ages by the same forces that rust iron and ripen c o m . . . The ul
timate cause of this cosmic process of which man is a part . . . we
know not. Whatever it may be, it appears in its effects as neither
benevolent nor malevolent, as neither kind nor unkind, but merely
as indifferent to us.
The remaining two outlooks are both religious, but differ in
important ways from each other.

Both conceive the material world to be

in some sense the product of, and dependent upon, a higher, metaphysical
reality which is not indifferent to life.

As between the two religious

outlooks, however, the perceived relationship between the material and
the metaphysical worlds differs.

In the traditional Christian view, as

well as in early Iranian and Hebraic outlooks (Eliade, 1965:101;, 125) the
original, unitary relationship between the physical and the metaphysical
world at the time of creation has since been partly broken by sin.

The

now existing material world is hence to a degree imperfect, fallen, evil,
while the metaphysical world remains perfect.

In the other religious

view, the relationship between the physical and the metaphysical worlds
remains unbroken.

The physical world remains essentially unfallen be

cause it continuously partakes of, and reflects the goodness of, the metar
physical world.

Examples of this latter outlook are to be found in

optimistic strains of Hermetism and Neoplatonism (Yates, 1961+:22; de
Santillana, 1970:306 ) which influenced certain optimist variants of
Christianity.

In The, Varieties of Religious Experience (first given as

the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Edinburgh in 19011902) William James characterized both the traditional, and the more
optimistic variants of the religious outlook.

James' characterizations

may be apt for the focus of this paper, as they were drawn from nine
teenth century observations and addressed at Edinburgh to that ScotchIrish-English religious tradition which Kelvin, Maxwell and Tait in

particular grew up within and partook of.
Describing two kinds of Christians, the "once-born" or "healthyminded" and the "twice-bonf (which in this paper is termed the 'tradi
tional'), James gives the following characterizations:

The healthy-

minded is
. . . the temperament which has a constitutional incapacity for pro
longed suffering, and in which the tendency to see things optimis
tically is like a. water of crystallization in which the individual's
character is set. . . . This temperament may become the basis for a
peculiar type of religion, a religion in which good, even the good
of this world's life, is regarded as the essential thing for a
rational being to attend to. This religion directs him to settle
his scores with the more evil aspects of the universe by systematic
ally declining to lay them to heart or make much of them, by ignor
ing them in his reflective calculations, or even, on occasion, by
denying outright that they exist (1 9 6 3 :1 2 7 ).
Now in contrast with such healthy-minded views . . . stands a
radically opposite view, a way of maximizing evil, if you please so
to call it, based on the persuasion that the evil aspects of our life
are of its very essence, and that the world's meaning most comes home
to us when we lay them most to heart . . . All natural goods perish.
Riches take wings; fame is a breath; love is a cheat; youth and
health and pleasure vanish. Can things whose end is always dust and
disappointment be the real goods which our souls require? . . . We
need a life not correlated with death, a health not liable to ill
ness, a kind of good in fact that flies beyond the Goods of nature

( 1963: 130- 40).
It is to the ideal of this life beyond nature that the soul of the "twiceborn" Christian turns.
We have, then, in summary three outlooks:

the materialistic,

which sees the world as material, morally neutral fact; the traditional
religious, which sees this world as imperfect and in certain ways evil;
and the optimistic religious, which sees this world as partaking of the
goodness of the divinity.

We have said as yet nothing of the particular

cosmological model which each view has produced and adhered to in history,
and we turn next to a brief historical outline of the cosmology propounded
within each outlook.

To consider certain views which had an influence on
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nineteenth-century thought we must go "back to the Greek philosophers of
pre-Christian antiquity.

We will follow certain of their thoughts into

the rise of Christianity, consider the Christian position, and conclude
with three m o d e m restatements of the three positions.
The Greek Outlook and Cosmology
The popular cosmology of Greek antiquity varied.

At first there

were almost as many particular beliefs as there were separate social
groups.

Out of these early beliefs Greek mythology arose.

Kitto (1 9 6 7 :

1 9 5 ) notes

The primitive Greek seems to have thought about the gods much as
other primitive people do. Our life is in fact subject to exter
nal powers that we cannot control — the weather, for example —
and these powers are 'theoi', gods. All we can do is try to keep
on good terms with them. . . . To all the gods sacrifice must be
offered in the prescribed form; any irregularity may be irritating
to them. . . .
In general, creation is the prerogative of the god or gods.

With respect

to early cosmogony, Eliade (1965:18) notes that " . . . the act of the
Creation realizes the passage from the non-manifest to the manifest or,
to speak cosmologically, from chaos to cosmos. . . ."

The gods enter a

pre-existing chaos and either create or order the world, transforming it
through their powers and their sacrifices into a 'cosmos' which in the
original Greek means 'a well-ordered community'.

The creation has a

tendency to decay, and requires periodic regeneration by the deities, a
regeneration in which man participates by sacrificial ceremony.
Primitive cosmogonic myths and practices were the heritage of the
earliest Greeks.

"But," as Kitto (1967:202) relates, "the future of

Greek religious thought lay neither with mythology nor with the Olympian
gods nor yet with the more personal 'mystery' religions. . . .
with the philosophers."

It lay
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Democritus of Abdera (UlO B.C.)
Democritus of Abdera is the first of the Greek philosophers whom
we shall consider.
among others.)

(His views were to influence Maxwell and Tyndall,

Recoiling from superstitious and sacrificial religion,

and the popular view that both man and nature were subject to the arbi
trary acts of the gods, he rejected all divinities and posed a material
world whose operations were the embodiment of reason and law.

De Santil-

lana (1 9 7 0 :1 4 4 ) gives certain of the surviving fragments of his thoughts
Nothing comes about perchance, but all through reason and by neces
sity.
Nothing can be created out of nothing, nor can it be destroyed and
returned to nothing.
There is no end to the universe, since it was not created by any
outside power.
By convention color, by convention sweet, by convention bitter; in
reality nothing but atoms and the void.
The second fragment above is an early statement of the conservation
principle.
as a whole.

Matter is uncreated and imperishable.

So too is the cosmos

Arrangements of atoms produce the visible world and its

changes, and will continue to do so forever.

The Roman poet T. Lucretius

Carus (c. 99 B.C.) was to give an account of this doctrine (which was a
forerunner of Laplace’s ’nebular hypothesis').

We quote from the trans

lation of W. E, Leonard (1957:204-208,4-6):
Neither by counsel did the primal germs
’Stablish themselves, as by keen act of mind,
Each in its proper place; nor did they make,
Forsooth, a compact how each germ should move;
. . . It comes to pass that these px*imordials,
Diffused far and wide through mighty aeons,
The while they unions try, and motions too,
of every kind, meet at the last amain,
And so become oft the commencements fit
Of mighty things — earth, sea, and sky, and race
Of living creatures.
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"Whence, Nature all creates, and multiplies
And fosters all, and whither she resolves
Each in the end when each is overthrown.
This ultimate stock we have devised to name
Procreant atoms, matter, seeds of things,
Or primal bodies, as primal to the world.
As Brinton (l96l:5l) comments, this view is "austerely ’mater
ialistic, 1 God or gods strikingly absent; but the (view) is somehow con
solingly orderly in its final results, presenting a cosmology, inhuman
indeed, but happily understandable by enlightened human beings."

And

de Santillana (1970:291) states, "Of all the doctrines of antiquity,
Democritus’ atomism is the only one which re-emerges practically intact
in our era."

It had a considerable effect on nineteenth-century thought.

The other two Greek philosophers we shall consider did not re
ject the realm of the metaphysical as Democritus did, but in the most
typical of their thoughts, the metaphysical appears as a realm of preexistant rational relationships.
Aristotle of Stagira (381+-322 B.C.)
Between the thought of Democritus and that of Aristotle, de
Santillana (1970:1^8) relates, there was a difference.

Democritus had

held, "Of that which ever is and has been (the material universe) there
is no reason to inquire for the cause."

But Aristotle does, in fact,

deny assent:
Democritus does not think fit to seek for a first principle to ex
plain this "ever"; so while his theory is right insofar as it is
applied . . . he is wrong in making it of universal application.
Thus, a triangle has its angles always equal to two right angles,
but there is nevertheless an ulterior cause of the eternity of this
truth, whereas first principles are eternal and have no ulterior
cause. • . ♦ The metaphysician is showing his teeth. The issue is
one of first and last things, and has not been settled to this day.
However, Aristotle along with Democritus viewed the universe as eternal
in time.

He perceived it as the "Unlimited", and also (after the
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biological model) to be in a sense alive, purposeful, teleological.

His

views are important to us in regard to the position which the Catholic
church later took on them.

Recognizing both his own views and those of

a more materialistic outlook, Aristotle held
Everything either _is an origin or has an origin: the Unlimited
has no origin, for that would be a limit of it. Moreover being an
origin ]_or source or principle: Greek arche7 it isungenerated and
imperishable. . . . Therefore as I say, there is no origin for it,
but it appears to be the origin of other things, and to encompass
all things and direct all things, as those philosophers say who do
not posit besides the Unlimited other causes such as Mind or Love;
and this they say is the divine, for it is immortal and imperish
able, as Anaximander and most of the writers on nature call it
(cf. Phys. 203b6 UK 12 A 15).
With respect to time, matter and motion, Aristotle’s views have
been summarized by Vollert (.1961|:8) as follows:
• . . time is inconceivable apart from the moment, which is the
beginning of future time and the end of past time. Hence, there
must always be time before and after any moment. And if time is
limitless, motion, too, must be eternal, because time is the mea
sure of motion and is itself a kind of motion. Moreover, motion
necessarily implies the existence of things that are movable, in
deed, of things that are moving. Therefore, things in actual mo
tion have existed eternally (Timaeus, 27 U - 29B; 29 E - 30 C;
37 C - 38 B; Phys., VIII, 1, 2£lb 10-28; 2£la 9_b 9).
". . . things in actual motion have existed eternally.”

In

m o d e m terms, Aristotle has described the universe as a ’’perpetuum
mobile" of the second category.

The Catholic church will later brand

this view as a heresy, while accepting and re-interpreting Aristotle's
teleology.
Plato of Athens (c. 320 B.C.)
The Platonic outlook is complex, and contains what de Santillana
(1970:309) sees as two different paths of development:

"Out of the

Platonic complex, one way led to a thoroughgoing mathematization of the
universe, open and speculative, such as the Pythagoreans had attempted;
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the other, which was the choice of Plato’s old age, concentrated upon an
enclosed and rigid world order, dominated "by an astral theology.” With
respect to the first direction of Plato’s thought, Paul Friedlander
(196 )4 :2 7 ) comments:
The cosmos of numbers, the harmony and proportion of musical strings
and, on a larger canvas, the cosmos of the starry sky were replicas
of perfect being; they pointed upward to a place beyond the heavens.
It is, therefore, the sciences of this order, and above all their
unity and integration in the Pythagorean system, that moved Plato....
Thus the world of forms, the realm of perfection, cannot be anything
but a world of ’unchanging and harmonious order, where nothing can
do or suffer wrong, where all is in order according to reason'
(Republic £00c).
Immobile, -unchanging, perfectly rational forms (might we, today, call
them formulas?) stood within the metaphysical center and summit of real
ity.

The physical world partook of and reflected them in its cyclical,

and likewise eternal transformations.

This idea came to exert a tremen

dous influence in the Greek philosophical outlook.

Henri-Charles Puech

(1 957 s1+0 —JL4I) comments:

Dominated by an ideal of intelligibility which finds authentic and
full being only in that which is in itself and remains identical
with itself, in the eternal and immutable, the Greeks regarded move
ment and change as inferior degrees of reality, in which, at best,
identity can be apprehended in the form of permanence and perpetuity,
hence of recurrence. The circular movement which assures the survi
val of the same things by repeating them, by bringing about their
continuous return, is the perfect and most immediate expression
(hence that which is closest to the divine) of the absolute immobil
ity at the summit of the hierarchy. . . . According to the famous
Platonic definition, the time which is determined and measured by
the revolution of the celestial spheres is the mobile image of im
mobile eternity which it imitates by moving in a circle. Conse
quently both the entire cosmic process and the time of our world of
generation and decay develop in a circle or according to an indefi
nite succession of cycles, in the course of which the same reality
is made, unmade, and remade, in conformity with an immutable law and
determinate alternations. The same sum of being is preserved;
nothing is created and nothing lost; moreover, certain thinkers of
dying antiquity — Pythagoreans, Stoics, Platonists — went so far
as to maintain that within each of these cycles of time, of these
aiones, these aeva, the same situations recur that have already
occurred in the preceding cycles and will occur in subsequent cycles—
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and so ad infinitum. No event is unique, nothing is enacted but
once (for example the condemnation of Socrates); every event has
been enacted, is enacted, and will be enacted perpetually; the same
individuals have appeared, appear, and will appear at every turn of
the circle. Cosmic time is repetition and anakuklosis, eternal
return.
In the above view, we again see the conservation theme expressed:
"The same sum of being is preserved; nothing is created and nothing
lost."

Plato's views, at their purest, may provide the basis for both a

mathematical science of the world and a transcendent religion.

And, as

Kitto (1967:203) remarked, "Plato's conception of the absolute, eternal
deity . . . prepared the world for the reception of a universal religion."
In fact, Plato's ideas influenced two very different religious
outlooks.

In his more optimistic ideas, the phenomenal or material

world "participated in" and reflected the rationality of the forms.
There was a dualistic but close union between the physical and the meta
physical.

This view influenced the optimistic strains of Neoplatonism

and Hermetism, which in turn influenced certain Christian thinkers and
early scientists from the Renaissance onward.

We will look briefly at

one source of Neoplatonism which influenced Bruno, Fludd and among
others, quite possibly Newton.
tion of gnostic sacred writings.

It is the Corpus Hermeticum, a collec
On the writings contained in the Corpus

Hermeticum, Francis A. Yates (196 !;:2 ) comments:
The works which inspired the Renaissance Magus, and which he believed
to be of profound antiquity, were really written in the second to the
third centuries A.D. He was not returning to an Egyptian wisdom, not
much later than the wisdom of the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets, and
much earlier than Plato and the other philosophers of Greek antiquity,
who had all — so the Renaissance Magus firmly believed — drunk from
its sacred fountain. He is returning to the pagan background of
early Christianity, to that religion of the world . . . which was the
gnostic version of Greek philosophy. . . . Though cast in a pseudoEgyptian framework, these works have been thought by many scholars to
contain very few genuine Egyptian elements . . . they were certainly
not written in remotest antiquity by an all-wise Egyptian priest
(Hermes Trismegistus) . . . but by various unknown authors, all
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probably Greeks, and they contain popular Greek philosophy of the
period, a mixture of Platonism and Stoicism, combined with some Jew
ish and probably some Persian influences. They are very diverse,
but they all breathe an atmosphere of intense piety.
There are two outlooks in them, one a "pessimist gnosis," the
other an "optimist gnosis."

Yates (l961+:22) comments:

For the pessimist (or dualist) gnostic, the material world heavily
impregnated with the fatal influence of the stars is in itself evil;
it must be escaped from by an ascetic way of life which avoids as
much as possible all contact with matter, until the lightened soul
rises . • . ascends, to its true home in the immaterial divine
world.
This outlook conforms, in rough character, to the traditional Christian
view of this world as fallen, degraded, with the true Christian being a
pilgrim to the 1City of God.f The optimist gnosis takes a quite differ
ent view.

Yates continues, "For the optimist gnostic, matter is impreg

nated with the divine, the earth lives, moves with a divine life, the
stars are living, divine animals, the sun bums with a divine power,
there is no part of Nature which is not good for all are parts of God."
The following excerpts from the Corpus Hermeticum (cf. Yates: 19 6 I4 :31-31+)
render the elements of the optimist gnosis which are of interest in this
study:
Eternity is the Power of God, and the work of Eternity is the
world, which has no beginning, but is constantly becoming by the
action of Eternity. Therefore nothing that is in the world will
ever perish or be destroyed, for Eternity is imperishable.
And all this great body of the world is a soul, full of intel
lect and of God, who fills it within and without and vivifies the
All.
Is God then in matter, 0 Father?
Where could matter be placed if it existed apart from God?
Would it not be a confused mass, unless it were put to work? And
if it is put to work by whom is that done? The energies which
operate in it are parts of God. Whether you speak of matter, or
bodies or substance, know that these things are energies of God who
is the All. In the All there is nothing which is not God. Adore
this word, my child, and render it a cult.

Yates (1961+: 1+1+7££) has suggested that the Platonic elements of
this optimist gnosis helped to emotionally fire the scientific imagina
tion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

E. A. Burtt notes the

influence of Neo-Platonism on Bruno, Kepler, Copernicus, Nicholas of
Cusa, and others.

In that view, "The world is an infinite harmony, in

which all things have their mathematical proportions" (Burtt, 195U:£2ff).
Of Newton, Giorgio de Santillana (1968:28) writes:

". . .it was the

Hermetic mysteries that he was after . . . The subject of the Hermetic
Philosophy (so named after the mythical master, Hermes the ThriceGreatest) was the cosmos itself and its interlocking forces • . . now
lost to modem consciousness but deeply studied by Newton in a multitude
of texts that no one can even read now, or cares to."

Considering Neo

platonism as a form of "scientific religion," de Santillana (1970:313)
relates:

". . . the ideas of the Platonic lineage find their way back

into astronomy, and physics, and live on in our universe of periodicities
electromagnetism, and relativistic space-time."
The other views of Plato —

the views of his old age —

Santillana commented, led in a different direction.
simistic one.

as de

It was a more pes

The political strife in Greece which he lived through

brought him finally to the view that this world was far from the "good."
He felt himself to be in the last and worst —
cycle.

the ’iron1 age of a cosmic

His despair was exemplified in the Republic (cf. Comford, 1967:

320) where he has Socrates, who had been speaking of the just state, say
dispiritedly to Glaucon, " . . . perhaps there is a pattern set up in the
heavens for one who desires to see it and, seeing it, found one in him
self.

But whether it exists anywhere or ever will exist is no matter;

for this is the only commonwealth in whose politics he can ever take part

3b
C o m f o r d has added, " . . .

this passage inspired both Stoics and Chris

tians with the idea of the City of God."
Plato’s speculative account of "creation" in the Timaeus, which
was more an amalgam of the popular myths of his day than his own deepest
thought, also came to inspire later theological imaginations.

In that

tale a demiurge, acting in the name of God, descended to a chaotic world
and ordered it.

This view was maintained and elaborated upon in certain

pessimist gnostic cults,

he Santillana (1970:311) comments:

It is a strange but not unnatural outcome of Plato’s astral theo
logy . . . His fantasy of a demiurge or divine craftsman compounding
and shaping the universe in imitation of the world of Ideas is now
seized upon with eager pessimism. Maybe the world is_ the work of a
fallen intelligence, separated from the upper realm of light. . • .
The initial duality between spirit and matter set by Plato is pushed
here to its extreme limits, the whole of the material world having
become pure darkness and evil, the consequences of cosmic sinfulness.
The more theological side of Plato's thought came to be influen
tial in shaping the traditional Christian outlook.

With certain changes,

it roughly transforms into traditional Christian dualism, tinged with
pessimism for this world.

Eschatologically, however, the Platonic con

cepts never themselves made the radical break, both qualitative and tem
poral, between the Deity and the world that Christian theology later
posited.

Let us turn now to the rise of the Christian outlook.

Christian Beliefs
It was against what it perceived as a pagan outlook that early
Christian belief developed, and there was confrontation.

As Claude

Tresmontant (1957:132) has commented:
By declaring, in the very heart of Athens, that God created the cos
mos, St. Paul made a frontal attack on the fundamental principle of
all the philosophy of antiquity. According to that philosophy, the
cosmos is. God, uncreated, existing from eternity; it has no need of
a creator, it is all-sufficient, necessary, it is consistency itself.
At most, it requires a demiurge to put it in order, for order is
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preceded by chaos . . . /time/ was said to by cyclic, recurring:
time chases its own tail. This is the ’endless returning* of the
metaphysics, cosmogonies and mythologies of pagan antiquity.
Between the philosophy of antiquity and the Christian outlook,
there was utter confrontation.

Christian belief was not secured on the

basis of argument; it demanded nothing less than conversion, conversion
based on revelation.

Yollert (l961j.:x) comments:

”0n the basis of revela

tion, as conveyed in the scriptures and an undeviating tradition, the
Church has repeatedly taught, in the face of error, that God alone lacks
a beginning and is eternal, and that He created the universe in a condi
tion of successive duration following on a first moment.” And Lynn
White, Jr. (1 9 6 8 :3 7 ) states:
Naturally to the early Christians, the pagan belief in purposeless
temporal undulation was entirely unacceptable, and the idea of cos
mic repetitive cycles was the worst of blasphemies. From such a
theory it follows, writes Origen, that ’’Adam and Eve will do once
more exactly what they have already done; the same deluge will be
repeated; the same Moses will bring the same six-hundred thousand
people out of Egypt; Judas will again betray his Lord; and Paul a
second time will hold the coats of those who stone Stephen." Ob
viously no such notion could be held by a Christian. "God forbid,"
cries St. Augustine, "that we should believe this. For Christ died
once for our sins, and, rising again, dies no more." The axiom of
the uniqueness of the Incarnation required a belief that history is
a straight-line sequence guided by God. And as the Church became
the exclusive cult of the Roman Empire, the doctrines of undulation
and recurrent cycles vanished from the Mediterranean world. No
more radical revolution has ever taken place in the world outlook
of a large area.
Pitrim Sorokin (1937068-369), writing on the development of
Christianity in Volume II of his Social and Cultural Dynamics, gives the
following portrait:
So far as the complete history of the world and of mankind is con
cerned, the Christian conception of it assumed a specific form.
First, the empirical world and its duration in time, as well as time
itself, was regarded as finite, having a beginning (Tertullian* s
natum et factum) and destined to have an end. Second, the initial
point of this history and the final terminal point were both viewed
as perfect: the Eden of Adam and Eve at the beginning and the City
of God at the end, after the Last Judgment. The intermediate link,
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that is, practically the whole of human history, that lasts between
the Fall and the Last Judgment, was viewed as something infinitely
more degraded than the initial and the final terminal points.
This whole history of Mthe City of Man" is purely temporary.
True Christians in this world are but pilgrims. Their permanent
place is "the City of God."
The reaction of the Catholic church to the re-introduction of
Aristotle's works in thirteenth-century Europe provided further opportune
l y for affirmation of its dogma.

In 1215 > the Fourth Council of the

Lateran defined that
God alone has no beginning but always is and always will be; the
eternal God is the one and only principle of all things, 'Creator
of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; by
His almighty power, at the beginning of time He created both orders
of creation alike out of nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal
world, the angelic and the material (cf. Vollert, 1961^:3)•
Against this statement came Aristotle's thought.

Vollert (l961|:xi) re

lates it:
How the theologian-philosophers of Paris were being confronted with
something 'new, ' the moving cause, the eternal motion and eternally
moved world of Aristotle's physics. .' . . The suspicion of and hos
tile reaction to this new naturalistic Greek world-view /Ted/ to the
condemnations of 1210, 1215» a^d 1270. . . . St. Bonaventure led
what Gilson has aptly termed the "theological reaction" that even
tually culminated in the condemnation of 1277 •
While Aristotle's teleological views were acceptable, even welcomed by
the Church, the churchmen clearly separated God and his prerogatives
from the material world, which remained inferior to the Deity.
Specifically, how does the above view, which has been maintained
by the church to the present time, affect the research stance of the
scientist who is a devout Christian?

Vollert and others (196Ij.:1|.-5) state:

The Vatican Council, in its teaching about God the Creator, opposed
pantheism, which fosters two heresies about creation: the eternity
of the world, and the necessity of . . . emanation. To overthrow
the basic error of pantheism in all its manifestations, the Council
proclaims that creation was effected in time, and stresses God's com
plete freedom in creating. . . . Consequently the doctrine that the
universe has a temporal duration is defined as a dogma of faith. • . .
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This dogma of faith is no obstacle to scientific exploration. Reve
lation teaches that the world began, but does not date that begin
ning; science has unimpeded liberty to search for the initial state
from which the universe took its origin" /Emphasis added/ ”
The thoughts of Whewell, Kelvin, Stewart, Tait and others, whose
work we shall come to examine, appear to be harmonious with the above
mandate.

More recently, in the 19^0’s the one-shot "big-bang" theory of

the origin of the present universe proposed by the Catholic theologianastronomer Lemaitre, is consistent with the Church’s position.

On this

model Nigel Calder (1971*136) comments;
The evidence grows that everything after the creation of our
galaxy — including the origin of the Earth and of life — - are ex
plicable as a chancy but not mysterious series of physical and chemi
cal processes. Any opportunity for supernatural explanations of the
material world is, therefore, driven right back to the creation of
the matter of the universe. . . . Is there a constructional job for
God, so far away, so long ago? Monseigneur Lemaitre certainly
thought so. . . . In propounding his theory of the Primaeval Atom,
the Belgian astro-priest explicitly sought to modernize the opening
verses of the Bible without contradicting them.
In his address of 1951 to the Vatican Academy of Science, Pope
Pius XII made the following remarks on the Lemaitre model of the universe;
If we look back into the past at the time required for this pro
cess of the "Expanding Universe", it follows that, from one to ten
thousand million years ago, the matter of the spiral nebulae
/galaxies/ were compressed into a relatively restricted space at the
time the cosmic processes had their beginning. . . .
If the scientist turns his attention from the present state of
the universe to the future, even the very remote future, he finds
himself constrained to recognize, both in the macrocosm and in the
microcosm, that the world is growing old. In the course of billions
of years, even the apparently inexhaustible quantities of atomic
nuclei lose utilizable energy and, so to speak, matter becomes like
an extinct and scoriform volcano. And the thought comes spontaneous
ly that if this present cosmos, today so pulsating with rhythm and
life is, as we have seen, insufficient to explain itself, with still
less reason, will any such explanation be forthcoming from the cos
mos over which, in its own way, the shadow of death will have
passed. . . . (cf. Shapley, 1958;92-93)*
The church has in actuality had what may, be called a quasi
empiric precursor of the second law, and its application to the universe,
since 258 A.D.

An almost poetic rendition of it has been given by
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Saint Cyprian:
The world itself now hears witness to its approaching end by the
evidence of its failing powers. There is not so much rain in winter
for fertilizing the seeds, nor in summer is there so much warmth for
ripening them. The springtime is no longer so mild, not the autumn
so rich in fruit. Less marble is quarried from the exhausted moun
tains, and the dwindling supplies of gold and silver show that the
mines are worked out and the impoverished veins of metal diminish
from day to day. The peasant is failing and disappearing from the
fields, the sailor at sea, the soldier in the camp, uprightness in
the forum, justice in the court, concord in friendships, skill in
the arts, discipline in morals. Can anything that is old preserve
the same powers that it had in the prime and vigour of its youth?
It is inevitable that whatever is tending downwards to decay and
approaches its end must decrease in strength, like the setting sun
and the waning moon, and the dying tree and the failing stream.
This is the sentence passed on the world; this is God's law: that
all that has risen should fall and that all that has grown should
wax old, and that strong things should become weak and great things
should become small, and that when they have been weakened and
diminished they should come to an end.
— ST. CYPRIAN, Ad Demetrianum, c. iii.

God and the Universe
Out of the viewpoints examined in this chapter three models of
the universe emerge.

Each model attributes certain characteristics to

the universe and to God.

We will describe the models and then look at

explicit statements of them.

In the traditional Christian view, both

the posited mutability and temporal decay or "unwinding” of the universe
point to its dependence upon and origin at the hands of a "creator" God.
In the optimistic religious

view,

the

posited beauty, formand flawless

functioning of the universe

imply

its

continuing existencegrounded in

the Divine.

However, on this latter view there is no suggested physical

decay or unwinding pointing back toward a past creation.

In this view

(as St. Thomas Aquinas has held), "Without the aid of revelation it JJ.£J
impossible to know that the

world

had

call, 1957si1+6)«

there

is the materialist position which

Finally,

a beginning in time.. ." (Mas-
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posits a universe of non-degradable physical processes.

The non-degrading

nature of these processes is in turn seen as implying a self-sufficient
universe.

"Creation” and "Creator” alike are seen as superfluous assump

tions.
The materialistic and the optimistic religious outlooks essen
tially agree in positing a non-degrading universe.

As a result, debate

between these outlooks is on this point without substantive empiric dif
ference.

Between these two views and the outlook of traditional Chris

tianity, however, there is substantive difference, and physical evidence
becomes relevant to debate.

The physical evidence in turn involves the

second law, and the outlooks we have seen are not indifferent to its
interpretation.

The traditional Christian view endorses the universal

application of the second law as evidence for creation.

The religious

optimist tends to remain open on or mildly critical toward the universal
application of the second law.

The materialist rejects its application

as a universal law.
Let us look at several relatively modem statements in which
these points are crystallized.
The Traditional Christian View
As noted in the introduction, the second law provided a thermo
dynamic foundation for the theory of the "one-shot" big bang and expand
ing universe.

In his address to the Vatican Academy of Sciences (Novem

ber, 1 9 5 1 ) Pope Pius XII commented as follows on this model of the uni
verse :
With the same clear and critical look with which it examines and
passes judgment on facts (the scientific mind) perceives and recog
nizes the work of creative omnipotence, whose power, set in motion
by the mighty fiat pronounced milliards of years ago by the Creating

ho
Spirit, spread out over the universe, calling into existence with a
gesture of generous love, matter bursting with energy. In fact, it
would seem that present day science, with one sweeping step back
across millions of centuries, has succeeded in bearing witness to
that primordial Fiat Lux uttered at the moment when, along with mat
ter, there burst forth from nothing a sea of light and radiation,
while the particles of chemical elements split and formed into mil
lions of galaxies . . . Thus, with the concreteness which is charac
teristic of physical proofs, it has confirmed the contingency of the
universe and also the well-founded deduction as to the epoch when
the cosmos came forth from the hands of the creator.
Hence, creation took place in time. Therefore, there is a Crea
tor. Therefore, God exists. Although it is neither explicit nor
complete, this is the reply we were awaiting from science, and which
the present human generation is awaiting from it. . . (cf. Mascall,
1957:151-2).
Robert E. D. Clark (l96l:l8ff), speaking as a traditionally
oriented Protestant theologian, affirms the same view while attributing
the "entropy” argument to Newton.

Calling all other positions on the

second law "idle speculation," he states, "Taken as a whole, science
gives the strongest support to the view that entropy does increase: in
addition, if we do not assume this to be so, all science, all rational
thought even, becomes impossible. . . . "
The Optimist Religious View
On the other hand, E. L. Mascall, speaking as a Protestant who
endorses the Thomist position, says, "The first point that needs to be
emphasized is that for Christian theology the notion of creation is not
primarily concerned with a hypothetical act by which God brought the
world into existence at some moment in the past, but with the incessant
act by which he preserves the world in existence so long as he wills
that it shall exist" (1957•133)*

Mascall goes on to explore several

lines of thought which challenge the classical interpretation of the
second law, among them Tolman’s relativistic thermodynamics.

He states:

1+1
The argument /for creation/ is based entirely on the classical or
non-relativistic thermodynamics. Now, relativistic thermodynamics,
which is the true theory, is considerably different from classical
thermodynamics. Thus, in classical thermodynamics, a system which
is in thermal equilibrium must be at a uniform temperature through
out; but in relativistic thermodynamics, a temperature gradient is
necessary to prevent the flow of heat from regions of higher to re
gions of lower gravitational potential which are in thermal equilib
rium. This simple example showsthe needfor caution, and the im
portance of using, in anygeneralargumentregarding
theuniverse,
not the classical laws, but the modified form of them which has been
discovered by Professor Tolman . . . He has shown that in certain
cases a universe expanding or contracting at a finite rate can do
so reversible, without tending to the ultimate "heat death" which
would be predicted by classical thermodynamics (1 9 5 7 :11+1 )*
Thus he concludes, "The Christian may well rejoice in the fact that the
heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handi
work, while adopting an attitude of extreme detachment towards arguments
that attempt to prove the existence of God from the Second Law of Thermo
dynamics or the recession of the extra-galactic nebulae" (1 9 5 7 :1 6 6 ).
Finally, let us look at certain statements of Ernst Haeckel for
the materialist position.
The Materialist Position
Ernst Haeckel (1900:235-214.7), reacting against religious views
on creation and the second law, comments:
According to this creationist theory, then, God has "made the
world out of nothing." It is supposed that God (a rational, but im
material, being) existed by himself for an eternity before he re
solved to create the world. Some supporters of the theory restrict
God’s creative function to one single act; they believe that this
extramundane God (the rest of whose life is shrouded in mystery)
created the substance of the world in a single moment, endowed it
with the faculty of the most extensive evolution, and troubled no
further about it. This view may be found, for instance, in the Eng
lish Deists in many forms. It approaches very close to our monistic
theory of evolution, only abandoning it in the one instant in which
God accomplished the creation. Other creationists contend that God
did not confine himself to the mere creation of matter, but that he
continues to be operative as the "sustainer and ruler of the world."
Different modifications of this belief are found, some approaching
very close to pantheism and others to complete theism. All these*
and similar forms of belief in creation are incompatible with the

law of the persistence of matter and force; that law knows nothing
of a beginning.
In the theory of Clausius . . . All difference of temperature
must ultimately disappear, and the heat must be equally distributed
through one inert mass of motionless matter. All organic life and
movement must cease when this maximum of entropy has been reached.
That would be a real "end of the world."
If this theory of entropy were true, we should have a "begin
ning" corresponding to this assumed "end" of the world — a minimum
of entropy, in which the differences in temperature of the various
parts of the cosmos would be at a maximum. Both ideas are quite un
tenable in the light of our monistic and consistent theory of the
eternal cosmogenetic process; both contradict the law of substance.
There is neither beginning nor end of the world. The universe is
. . . eternally in motion; the conversion of kinetic into potential
energy, and vicissim, goes on uninterruptedly; and the sum of this
actual and potential energy remains constant. The second thesis of
the mechanical theory of heat contradicts the first, and so must be
rejected.
Haeckel’s comments round out the three positions we have been
examining.

Let us sum them up.
Summary

The three philosophical and religious positions which we have
considered are the traditional Christian, the optimistic^ religious, and
the materialistic.

Their positions with regard to what may be called

second law cosmology are respectively, pro, open ranging to negative,
and negative.

As we proceed, we will find that these positions are ad

hered to with considerable consistency by other writers, including those
who participated in the development of the second law in the nineteenth
century.

^The term "optimist" is employed in William James' and Francis
Yates’ usage. It is meant to cover certain variants of Platonism and
Hermetism, Deism, Transcendalism, pantheism and theism.
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In the last chapter we looked at religious and philosophical
positions on the nature of the universe and the second law.

The models

of the universe posited by these outlooks are contradictory at many
points, and are intended to be so, as they offer substantive differ
ences of belief.

The universe cannot be both created and uncreated, sus

tained and not sustained, self-sufficient and not self-sufficient, de
grading and non-degrading, temporal and eternal.

Among the contradic

tions posited between the different outlooks, Ernst Haeckel suggests that
the first and the second laws of thermodynamics are contradictory.

Are

they?
Suppose that we view the religious and philosophical arguments,
with all their contradictions, as peripheral appendages to physics it
self, and banish them.

Will they and all their contradictions disappear,

leaving a body of physical cosmology in which all remaining elements are
congruent and compatible —

or do the contradictions indeed carry right

down into the physical considerations?

In this respect we shall look at

the cosmological models of Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, both
developed in the early part of. the twentieth century and still dominant
today as the general theory of the expanding universe.
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The Cosmology of Sir James Jeans
Let us examine the cosmology of Sir James Jeans with respect to
the predictions of the first and the second laws of thermodynamics for
the past and future states of the observable universe.

Jeans' statements

are taken from the last chapter of his book, The Universe Around Us,
which was written in 1 9 2 9 - By that time the first and second laws of
thermodynamics had been widely accepted as compatible, and together with
subsidiary axioms they comprised the theoretic foundations of classical
thermodynamics.

The universe was seen as having a constant overall sum

of energy, and to be in motion or engaged in transformations the net
direction of which was given by the second law.

The two concepts appear

compatible when applied over short time periods in the present.

But

what happens to their apparent compatibility when we consider the dis
tant future and distant past of the observable universe?

The following

selected quotations give the major points of Jeans' cosmology:
The solid substance of the material universe is continually dis
solving away into intangible radiation. . . The same transformation
of material weight into radiation is in progress in all the stars....
It is natural to ask whether a study of the universe as a whole
reveals these processes as part only of a closed cycle, so that the
wastage which we see in progress in the sun and stars . . . is made
good elsewhere. . . . Is the physical universe a . . . cyclic system,
or ought it rather to be compared to a stream which, having no
source of replenishment, must cease flowing after it has spent it
self? . . .
The second law of thermodynamics rules out any such /cyclic/ pos
sibility. . . . Energy is indestructible as regards its amount, but
it continually changes in form, and generally speaking there are up
ward and downward directions of change. It is the usual story —
the downward journey is easy, while the upward is either hard or im
possible. /For example/ . . . radiative energy tends always to
change into a form of longer wave length, never into a form of
shorter wave length. . . .
Energy cannot run downhill forever, . . . And so the universe
cannot go on forever; sooner or later the time must come when its
last erg of energy has reached the lowest rung on the ladder of des
cending availability, and at this moment the active life of the uni
verse must cease • . . . We are left with a dead, although possibly
a warm, universe — a "heat-death."

Such is the teaching of modem thermodynamics. . . . With uni
verses as with mortals, the only possible life is progress to the
grave.
. . . Perhaps it is as well: it is hard to see what could accrue
from an eternal reiteration of the same theme, or even from endless
variations of it.
The final state of the universe will, then, be attained when
every atom which is capable of annihilation has been annihilated, and
its energy transformed into heat-energy wandering forever round
Sp£lC0 • • • •

Conversely, as we go backwards in time, the total material weight
of the universe must continually increase. . . . It is clear that we
cannot go backward in time . . . so far that this total weight be
comes infinite. . . .
. . . And, wherever we fix it, our next step back in time leads
us to contemplate a definite event, or series of events, or continu
ous process, of creation of matter at some time not infinitely remote.
In some way matter which had not previously existed, came, or was
brought, into being.
• • • UL
want a concrete picture of such a creation, we may
think of the finger of God agitating the ether.
We may avoid this sort of crude imagery by insisting on space,
time and matter being treated together and inseparably as a single
system, so that it becomes meaningless to speak of space and time as
existing at all before matter existed. Such a view is consonant not
only with ancient metaphysical theories, but also with the modem
theory of relativity. . . . This brings us very near to those philo
sophical systems which regard the universe as a thought in the mind
of its creator, thereby reducing all discussion of material creation
to futility.
. . . it is impossible for the human mind to comprehend the full
plan of the universe, . . . (it is for this reason that the plain
man) decides that his own efforts shall stop this side of the crea
tion of matter. This last point of view is perhaps the most justi
fiable of all from the purely philosophic standpoint. . . . There is
no need even to worry overmuch about apparent contradictions. • . .
a contradiction worries us about as much as an unexplained fact, but
hardly more: it may or may not disappear in the progress of science
(Jeans, 1929:305-325).
(Emphasis supplied)
There are a number of statements above.
interest have been underlined.

The ones of most direct

First let us note that as he takes us

backward in time, Jeans posits a "hidden singularity" which contravenes
the first law of thermodynamics —

creation, perhaps over a period of

time, of matter (and hence, energy).

Next, he suggests that the "point

of view" of the "plain" man has the best philosophical justification for
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stopping his efforts to understand the universe "this side of the crea
tion of matter."

He goes on with a statement that "There is no need even

to worry overmuch about apparent contradictions."

What "apparent contra

dictions" does Jeans refer to?
The law of the conservation of energy states that the substance
of the universe, energy, can be neither created nor destroyed, and its
sum total is a constant in all transformations.

If energy can be neither

created nor destroyed, and if the universe now has "X" amount of energy,
it must have existed with "X" amount of energy yesterday, and it will so
exist tomorrow.

Pursuing this line of thought, we see that constancy of

energy implies that the universe has always existed.

It cannot, on this

view, have been created, for creation abridges conservation.
The second law of thermodynamics states that the energy of the
universe is at present undergoing a net directional transformation from
a past state characterized by maximum availability to a future state
characterized by maximum unavailability.

The process is called "increase

of entropy" and an increase of entropy signifies a decrease in the rela
tive availability of energy.
The present observable state of the universe, considered with the
second law, entails the conclusion that at a period not infinitely remote,
the universe must have been in a state of absolutely minimum entropy, or
maximum availability of energy.

By all the criteria of thermodynamics,

such a state is unstable, and tends spontaneously to move to states of
greater entropy and lower availability of energy.

The universe cannot,

therefore, have sat motionless through all prior eternity in this state
of minimal entropy, and then for no reason "blossomed" into its present
state.

2+7
So, we are moved to ask, what caused the universe to assume this
state of minimal entropy?

No entropy-decreasing natural process which

may have occurred before this state came to exist can be invoked as an
explanation, as classical thermodynamics axiomatically holds that it is
impossible for natural energy transformations to occur in such a way that
entropy, in the net, decreases as one goes forward in time; nor can en
tropy continue to decrease forever as one goes backward in time.

In

denying the efficacy of natural causation on net entropy decreases,
classical thermodynamics is driven to assume, if it attempts an explana
tion at all, that an extra-natural force or agent either (l) created the
universe at this time (Jeans1 explanation) or (2) intervened to produce
the state of minimum entropy.

Sir Arthur Eddington, in The Nature of the

Physical World, notes this dilemma:
There is no doubt that the scheme of physics as it has stood for
the last three-quarters of a century postulates a date at which
either the entities of the universe were created in a state of high
organization (low entropy), or pre-existing entities were endowed
with that organization which they have been squandering ever since....
Scientists and theologians alike must regard as somewhat crude
and naive theological doctrine which (suitably disguised) is at pre
sent to be found in every textbook of thermodynamics; namely, that
some billions of years ago God wound up the material universe and
has left it to . . . (run down) . . . ever since. This should be
regarded as the working-hypothesis of thermodynamics rather than its
declaration of faith. It is one of those conclusions from which we
can see no logical escape — only it suffers from the drawback that
it is incredible (1 9 6 3 :8 !;).
The conclusion may or may not be incredible, but there is clearly a prob
lem.

If classical thermodynamics does not invoke God as a creator or

orderer of the world, then it must pose the low-entropy event as a
"singularity", an event not covered by natural laws.
The "Past Creation" postulate of classical thermodynamics, fur
thermore, shifts this problem as far away from empirical attention as
possible by positing the singularity far backward in time, away from
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direct observation.

Fred Hoyle, in The Nature of the Universe, raises

exactly this point about the problem.

He says,

On scientific grounds this big bang assumption. . . is an irrational
process that cannot be described in
scientificterms . . . On philo
sophical grounds too I cannot see any good reason for preferring the
. . . idea. Indeed it seems to me in the philosophical sense to be
a distinctly unsatisfactory notion, since it puts the basic assump
tion out of sight where it can never be challenged by a direct appeal
to observation (l9!?0:1 1 3 ).
Hoyle attempts a bold solution:
of the first law and proposes continuous

he deniesthe present operation
creation.He states:

Where does the created material come from?
It does not come from
anywhere.
Material simply appears — it is created. At one time
the various atoms composing the material do not exist, and at a later
time they do . . . . Some people have argued that continuous creation
introduces a new assumption into science — and a very startling
assumption at that. Now I do not agree that continuous creation is
an additional assumption. It is certainly a new hypothesis, but it
only replaces a hypothesis that lies concealed in the older theories,
which assume . . . that the whole matter in the universe was created
. . . at a particular time in the remote past (1 9 5 0 •112).
Hoyle proposes a universe which appears to our view to have a
constant amount of matter and energy within the limits of our observa
tion, because it is in continuous and eternal expansion, while the velo
city of light plus the red shift limits the distance over which we can
see.

Hoyle sums his model up as follows:
To conclude, I should like to stress that so far as the Universe
as a whole is concerned the essential difference made by the idea of
continuous creation of matter is this: Without continuous creation
the Universe must evolve toward a dead state. . . . The details of
the way this happens are different in the different theories that
have been put forward, but the outcome is always the same. With con
tinuous creation, on the other hand, the Universe has an infinite
future in which all its present very large-scale features will be
preserved (1 9 5 0 *1 1 9 )•

In Hoyle's system, we can maintain the second law, but only at the cost
of denying the first law.

Hoyle's matter comes from nowhere, and his

universe expands forever.

We have replaced one difficulty with two

others•

The proliferation of difficulties which lie in this area of cos
mology are somewhat reminiscent of those which infested the Ptolmaic sys
tem in astronomy long ago.

It can be said that the conservation law and

an entropy-symmetrical second law, as applied to the universe, would be
fully compatible.

Similarly, the classical statement of the second law

and a non-conservation law would be fully compatible with each other,
providing one can put up with the idea that something can come from
nothing.

Or, has God done it?
For the present, let us return to Jeans’ cosmology.

Jeans has

resolved the contradictions which he has noted by saying, in effect,
that God did do it.

What, in turn, does the universe as Jeans portrays

it imply about God?

For one thing, he is not imminent in the universe

in a sustaining way.

Rather, since the time of creation, he has not in

tervened; his creation is running down, like a clock wound only once.
In Jeans’ view, God's universe is dying.

What magnificent pessimism —

the universal process Is an "annihilation!" What place does life have
in such a creation?

Jeans suggests that life is perhaps " . . . Something

of the nature of a disease, which affects matter in its old age when it
has lost the high temperature and capacity for generating high-frequency
radiation with which younger and more vigorous matter would at once
destroy life" (l929:32U)»
the whole creation moves?"

Ox, he asks, "Is it the climax toward which
If it is, it is equally certain that life

shall have no future home in Jeans' universe, for "With universes as with
mortals, the only possible life is progress to the grave" (l9 2 9 :30 ?)»
To sum up Jeans' model of the universe:

it is equivalent to, if more

sophisticated than, the model advanced by St. Demetrian which we pre
sented in Chapter I.

For both men a sentence has been passed on the
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world —

that all things should grow weak: and wax old, and come to an

end.
The Cosmology of Sir Arthur Eddington
In its physical particulars, the universe as seen in Eddington's
cosmology conforms to the model given hy Jeans,

Eddington's cosmologi

cal reflections are found in New Pathways in Science (1959) and The
Nature of the Physical World (1 9 6 3 ), hoth reprints of lectures delivered
in 1927 and 1 9 3 4 j respectively.
We need not repeat the physical considerations.

Let us instead

concentrate on Eddington’s philosophical reflections as furnished in
these two works.

While Eddington notes that the assumptions of classical

thermodynamics, as applied in cosmology, are ’’Incredible" (1958•85)> he
goes on to say that "I can make no suggestion to evade the deadlock."
He does consider the predictions from kinetic theory that the universe
may pull off a chance statistical fluctuation and get going again some
time in the future, but rejects the idea as "absurd" (1958:71+), and goeson to say, "The law that entropy increases —
dynamics —
Nature."

the second law of thermo

holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of

Why does he feel this way about the second law?

philosophical outlook may hold one key here.

Eddington's

While noting that ". . . a

single winding-up (of the universe) at some remote epoch is not really
the kind of relation between God and his world that brings satisfaction
to the mind," he goes on to say, "I see no escape from our dilemma.

One

cannot say definitely that future developments of science will not pro
vide an escape; but . . .
I find no difficulty in accepting the consequences of the present
scientific theory as regards the future — the heat-death of the
universe. It may be billions of years hence, but slowly and

inexorably the sands are running out. I feel no instinctive shrink
ing from this conclusion. Prom a moral standpoint the conception of
a cyclic universe, continually running down and continually rejuven
ating itself, seems to me wholly retrograde. Must Sisyphus for ever
roll his stone up the hill only for it to roll down again every time
it approaches the top? That was a description of Hell. If we have
any conception of progress as a whole reaching deeper than the physi
cal symbols of the external world, the way must, it would seem, lie
in escape from the Wheel of things. It is curious that the doctrine
of the running-down of the physical universe is so often looked upon
as pessimistic and contrary to the aspirations of religion. Since
when has the teaching that "heaven and earth shall pass away" become
ecclesiastically unorthodox (1 9 5 9 s5 9 )?
Whoever wishes for a universe which can continue indefinitely in
activity must lead a crusade against the second law of thermodynamics
the possibility of re-formation of matter from radiation is not cru
cial and we can await conclusions with some indifference (1 9 6 3 :8 6 ).
Surely there is an emotional attitude here, linked in turn to a
philosophical and religious outlook, which is associated with Eddington's
scientific cosmology; endorsement of the second law as "supreme", with a
feeling of "some indifference" expressed toward other alternatives.

In

one respect particularly, the views of Eddington and Jeans are congruent,
for speaking of the heat death, Jeans had said, "Perhaps it is as well;
it is hard to see what advantage could accrue from an eternal reiteration
of the same theme, or even endless variations of it" (1929:3H)«

Both

men have expressed clear distaste for a cosmos of cyclical, eternal
fluctuation.
We are back to the religious and philosophical positions, and
have not succeeded in eliminating the apparent contradiction between the
first and the second laws of thermodynamics.

Can these two laws be seen

as simply the airtight, finished and flawless findings of a philosophyfree physical science?

History, at least, suggests a different picture.

It suggests that both of these "laws" are still unfinished hypotheses
about the fundamental nature of the universe, first developed from a
union of physical, philosophical and religious thought.

These hypotheses
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entailing physical consequences which can be investigated empirically,
embody the fundamental cosmological postulates of differing philosophical
and religious outlooks, and the manner of their final resolution will not
be of indifference in these areas.

Was the universe created, or not?

Is there a "creator" God, or not?

These and allied questions represent

the "final set of implications" of the physical hypotheses involved, and
history again suggests that perhaps these areas of mutual discourse
should not be separated.

Let us turn now to the direct historical roots

of the second law, which start with Newton's work and thoughts, and carry
forward into the nineteenth century.
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William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) announced the second law in England
in the l850's.

Although the form which Kelvin gave to it was unique, the

law was to a degree a systhesis of the work of several other men.

Among

these, Kelvin recognized the previous contributions of Carnot, Fourier,
and Joule as bearing on his formulation.

Carnot had contributed the idea

of an ideal heat engine working cyclically through the "fall" of heat
from a higher to a lower temperature.

However, Carnot had stated his

idea within the framework of the Caloric theory of heat, which maintained
(incorrectly) that heat was a fluid which was conserved.

James P. Joule

had contributed the idea that heat per se was not conserved, rather it
was only a particular form of energy, convertible into mechanical motion
and vice versa (Kelvin: 189^:19)•

Kelvin recast the Carnot relationship

in terms of Joule’s conservation and convertability of energy concepts.
In addition, Kelvin relied upon and made use of the Fourier equations of
heat flow (Thompson: 1910:111) and frequently referred to them when talk
ing of the second law.

All of these ideas formed parts of the puzzle,

fitting together to form the second law as a generalization.
Several other sources of inspiration on the second law existed,
however, which were apparently known to Kelvin.

These sources were the

cosmological speculations of Issac Newton and Richard Bentley in the
53

I69 O Ts and William Whewell in the first third of the nineteenth century."*'
All three were Cambridge men, as was Kelvin; all were influential.

New

ton was the undisputed scientific genius of seventeenth-century Cambridge
his work and thoughts were usually regarded, there and elsewhere, with
reverence.

Bentley,

2

admitted to Cambridge as a child prodigy at the age

of fourteen, became an eminent scholar With scientific interests, and
later was for forty-two years Master of Trinity College at Cambridge.
Whewell, approximately a century later, distinguished himself both as
moral philosopher and physicist at Cambridge.

The recorded thoughts of

these three men are part of the Cambridge tradition in scholarship, and
their religiously inspired speculations in cosmology, which together
strikingly suggest Kelvin’s later statement of the second law, also con
form to the Cambridge outlook in those days of seeing the world as the
handiwork of the Lord.
For example, in his Popular Lectures and Addresses (l89l+:538)
Kelvin cites the correspondence of Newton and Bentley; in that same work
he also has reference to Whewell (l89U:5Uo).
2
Most readers will probably be unfamiliar with Richard Bentley.
In The Correspondence of Issac Newton (l96l:l£6) H. W. Turnbull notes:

Richard Bentley (1662-171+2), scholar and critic, graduated
from St. John’s College, Cambridge, and after holding several
posts became Master of Trinity College, Cambridge (1700-1+2).
He delivered the first course of Boyle Lectures, taking for
his subject ”A Confutation of Atheism’ (1 6 9 2 ); while Keeper of
the King's Library housed at St. James’s Palace he founded a
discussion club that included Wren, Locke, Newton and’Evelyn
(c. 1697)* At Trinity College he had erected on the roof of
the great gate the first observatory in Cambridge and estab
lished a chemical laboratory in the medieval chambers over
looking the Bowling Green. He was a supreme classical scholar,
strong administrator and caustic wit, of whom one of his suc
cessors, two hundred years later, wrote: ’But if ever man was
Master of Trinity, it was he. . . . His fame is ours. And in
the world of scholarship that fame stands higher than that of
any other Trinity man— except immortal Newton’ (G.M. Trevelyan,
Trinity College (l9U3))»
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Kelvin drank deeply of the Cambridge tradition while a student
and later a Peterhouse fellow, and his years there were also those in
which he developed and formulated the second law.

(Kelvin’s announce

ment of the second law, published in a series of articles in the London,
Edinburgh, and Lublin Philosophical Magazine, July through December,
18^2, came in the last year of his Peterhouse fellowship.)

To some

degree, the influence of the thoughts of Newton, Bentley and Whewell upon
Kelvin remains conjectural.

Kelvin did a great deal of independent read

ing and thinking while a student, and was familiar with the works of
these men.

He actively sought to find and develop some great ideas, and

often tended to neglect formal studies in favor of his independent read
ings, which were far-reaching.
a friend, "The
is

He intended to make his mark, saying to

well-taught, well trained, and at the same time

the man for Cambridge" (Thompson: 1910:1;0).

influence in his life.

cleverman

Newton was undoubtedlyan

In this regard, Thompson (1910:1013-15) relates

the following:
He (Kelvin) had, in fact, set before himself very early in
his career an immensely high ideal, a noble ambition of so tre
mendous an import that it would seem as if all his life he had
shrunk from exhibiting it in full panoply. Yet there had assur
edly haunted him day by day the suggestion of an all-embracing,
comprehensive theory of matter. In the preface to Newton’s
Principia, the great philosopher . . . uttered the aspiration:
Utinam caetera Naturae phaenomena ex principiis Mechanicis eodem
argumentandi genere derivare liceret. That pregnant sentence
might well be the symbol of Lord Kelvin’s intellectual career. . . .
To be the Newton of the molecular theory which should afford
a dynamical explanation of all these properties was a noble and
worthy ambition. Such an idea seems to have come to William
Thomson in a partial aspect during the spring of l8 i|6 , while he
was still at Peterhouse. . .
Again, Thompson (l910:lli|5) relates:
. . . Lord Kelvin's mathematical method greatly resembled that
of Newton. . . In this Lord Kelvin belonged essentially to the
school of Newton in which he had been trained. His reverence
for Newton was not merely the veneration felt for an honored
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name; it was a living devotion to the genius of the creator of
the British school of Natural Philosophy.
It is to the thoughts of Whewell, Bentley and Newton, regarding
what has come to he called the second law, that we turn in this chapter.
In these thoughts, particularly those given hy Newton, the entire area
of natural processes now covered hy the second law appears as a continent
yet to he charted, and an area, moreover, where the direct action of the
Lord God might he revealed.

Before examining these thoughts, let us

look at the l8£2 statement of the second law hy Kelvin, as well as one
other comment of his, so that Kelvin's conception may he compared to the
ones we shall he examining.

Kelvin's statement of the second law in the

Philosophical Magazine (l852;30l|-306) is given helow:
XLVII.

On a Universal Tendency in Nature to the Dissipation of
Mechanical Energy.
By Prof. W. Thomson

The object of the present communication is to call attention
to the remarkable consequences which follow from Carnot's propo
sition, that there is an absolute waste of mechanical energy
available to man when heat is allowed to pass from one body to
another at a lower temperature, by any means not fulfilling his
criterion of a "perfect thermo-dynamic engine," established, on
a new foundation, in the dynamical theory of heat. As it is
most certain that Creative Power alone can either call into
existence or annihilate mechanical energy, the "waste" referred
to cannot he annihilation, hut must he some transformation of
energy.
(Some mathematical and physical arguments follow, and then:)
The following general conclusions are drawn from the propo
sitions stated above, and known facts with reference to the
mechanics of animal and vegetable bodies:—
1. There is at present in the material world a universal
tendency to the dissipation of mechanical energy.
2. Any restoration of mechanical energy, without more than
an equivalent of dissipation, is impossible in inanimate mater
ial processes, and is probably never effected by means of organ
ized, matter, either endowed with vegetable life or subjected to
the will of an animated creature.
3. Within a finite period of time past the earth must have
been, and within a finite period of time to come the earth must
again be, unfit for the habitation of man as at present consti
tuted, unless operations have been, or are to be performed,

?7
which are impossible under the laws to which the known opera
tions going on at present in the material world are subject.
The last phrase of this formulation, ". . . unless operations have been,
or are to be performed, which are impossible under the laws. . ."
appears to be open; to imply something more.

What it implied for Kelvin

can be seen in the comment which he added in 1862 to his customary intro
ductory lecture on physics at Glasgow (Thompson: 1910:2l|l):

"The funda

mental subject of Natural Philosophy is Dynamics, or the scienceof
force. ..(which). . .shows that the inanimate world must have had a
beginning, and that all motion except that of heat must have an end, un
less it please God to restore by an act of new creative power the dis
sipation of mechanical effect which always goes on."

The main concept

for comparison with the ideas of Newton, Bentley and Whewell is apparent:
the nature of the physical (inanimate) world requires God's action in
past,

the

andperhaps again in the future, if it is to be (or remain) agoing

mechanical concern.
Newton and Bentley
Cosmological speculation in Newton's time was an unstable mixture ,
of materialistic and theistic assumptions.

The Bemocritean hypothesis of

the eternity of matter was held by a number of thinkers, and something
like a precursor to Laplace's nebular hypothesis had been developed upon
Lucretius' interpretation of atomism.

Supposing a primordial chaos of

atoms spread randomly through space, said Lucretius,
...It comes to pass that those primordials (atoms),
Diffused far and wide through mighty aeons,
The while they unions try, and motions too,
Of every kind, meet at the last amain,
And so become oft the commencements fit
Of mighty things— earth, sea, and sky, and race
Of living creatures.
(Brinton, 1961:52)
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Against this naturalistic approach the theological outlook held that even
if matter was supposed to he eternal, it could in no way set itself in
motion, nor could it order itself through ’fortuitous concorse of atoms,’
Motion, order, design, were impressed hy the deity; such action was in
fact His prerogative alone.

In Newton’s words (Newton to Bentley, 25

February I692 /3 , from Turnbull, Vol. Ill, 1961:253) matter was "inanimate
brute matter," incapable "without ye mediation of something else wch is
not material," of producing the visible world.

The letters between New

ton and Bentley in 1 6 9 2 /3 were initiated by Bentley, who was at that time
chaplain and prebendary to the Bishop of Worcester, and who was preparing
to deliver a series of lectures entitled "A Confutation of Atheism. ”

The

lectures, established at the bequest of Robert Boyle, dwelt heavily on
physical science as a source of evidence for the theological outlook;
Bentley turned to Newton for advice in their preparation.

The thrust of

these lectures turned, not on the eternity of matter per se but rather
upon whether matter alone could have produced the present system of the
world.

Along this line of thought Bentley had written to Newton (Turn

bull, Vol. Ill, 196l:2U6ff):
Proved, in ye 6 sermon That ye present System of ye world can
not have been eternal. So yt matter being eternal (according
to ye Atheists) All was once a Chaos, yt is, all matter was
evenly or nearly upon evenly diffused in the mundane spaces.
I proceed therefore . . . to shew, yt matter in such a chaos
could never naturally convene into this or a like System. . . .
Mechanism or power of inanimate Matter . . . must proceed
from a higher principle and a divine energy and impression.
Newton’s replies to Bentley’s questions are of considerable interest, as
he frankly sets forth views restrained in his own published works.

Newton’s unique position as supreme scientist in the England of
his day is relevant to his position in the above letters.
work had

immensely

Newton’s own

enlarged the domain of natural causation; indeed, the
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’Newtonian world-machine’ was later to become hard currency for material
ism.

Yet Newton himself was deeply religious; nothing could be further

from his desires than such an outcome.

In the words of Burtt (195>U:286)

Newton ’’approached the world of science under the necessity of seeing it
cloaked by a divine glory and suffused with the religious significance
that followed from the conviction that it had been created and ordered
by the hands of the God who had been worshipped from his youth as Father
of the Christian Saviour and infallible Author of the Christian Scrip
tures.”
And so, Newton replied to Bentley’s request for advice, saying
(Turnbull, Vol. Ill, 1961:233):

’’Sir; When I wrote my treatise about

our Systeme I had an eye upon such Principles as might work with consi
dering men for the beleife of a Deity & nothing can rejoyce me more than
to find it usefull for that purpose."

The correspondence which ensued

covered a number of physical concepts, including the question as to
whether Gravity is ’innate' to matter and whether the planets could have
been placed in their orbits by natural processes, whether "old systems
cannot gradually wast & pass into new ones . . . from ye exhaling matter
of former decaying systems. . .", and so forth.

On this last idea, New

ton commented (Turnbull, Vol. Ill, 1961:253)> "• • • ye growth of new
systems out of old ones without ye mediation of a divine power seems to
me apparently absurd."

On the motions of the planets, he commented

(Turnbull, Vol. Ill, 1961:21+4) > "• • • the transverse motions by wch they
revolve in their several orbs required the divine Arm to impress them
according to ye tangents of their orbs."

He went on to say, "I would now

add that the Hypothesis of matter being at first evenly spread through
the heavens is, in my opinion, inconsistent wth ye Hypothesis of innate
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gravity, without a supernatural power to reconcile them, & therefore it
infers a Deity.11 Further, Newton appears to have seen gravity as not in
nate to matter,

"but rather as "ye mediation of something

material. .

In Newton’s thought, God had a very present role of con

tinuing action in the universe.

else wch isnot

Considering the works of Newton, Burtt

(195>U:2 9 3 ) reaches the same conclusion:
Now from Newton’s writings, as from Boyle's, it is possible
to pick passage after passage in which it seems to be assumed
that after its first construction the world of nature has been
quite independent of God for its continued existence and motion.
But when we investigate more thoroughly we find that he, no
more than Boyle, had any intention of really divorcing God from
present control of, and occasional interference with, his vast
engine. It is not enough to have the miracles of scripture and
the achievements of spiritual grace to appeal to as evidences
of continued divine contact with the realm of human affairs.
God must also be given a present function in the cosmos at
large; we must not allow him to abandon his toils after six
days of constructive labour and leave the world of matter to
its own devices. Newton’s religious prejudices and his
aesthetico-scientific assumptions alike arose in rebellion
against such an indeterminate vacation for the Deity.
It is along the above lines of discovering work for the Deity in
the physical world that R. E. D. Clark (1961:19) sees in Newton's letters
to Bentley an early statement of the second law.

Clark says:

. . . a recognition of the idea is to be found quite clearly
expressed in the writings of Newton. In his well-known Let
ters to Bentley, Newton points out that hot objects always
warm cold ones until the two are at the same temperature. But
the universe, he says, contains hot and cold bodies which have
not, apparently, had time to reach thermal equilibrium. It
follows that such a state of affairs cannot have existed for
ever • • • The universe could not, therefore, be explained on
materialistic lines but must have been made by God.
It is curious, but this writer cannot discover such a passage in
the Newton-Bentley correspondence.
Newton (Vol. II, p. 12$ff.)."

Clark footnotes "Brewster's Life of

In summarizing these letters, Brewster

likewise makes no such discovery.

In his letter of 10 December 1692, New

ton does comment on the creation of a radiant sun and opaque (cold)
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planets "but presents this as an argument for creative design ('Turnbull,
Vol. Ill, 1 9 6 1 :2314.),

However, this same letter ends with the following

enigmatic statement:

"There is yet another argument for a Deity wch I

take to be a very strong one, but till ye principles on wch tis grounded
be better received I think it more advisable to let it sleep.
most humble Servant to command, Is. Newton."

I am Your

(— A tantalizing comment.

Is Newton, after all, alluding to the thermodynamic argument?)
It is possible, by going to Newton's Optics (l721:372ff) to place
such a construction on the matter.

There Newton comments:

The vis inertiae is a passive principle by which bodies persist
in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the
force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted.
By this principle alone there never could have been any motion
in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting
bodies into motion; and now they are in, motion, some other
principle is necessary for conserving motion. For from the
various composition of two motions, 'tis very certain that
there is not always the same quantity of motion in the world.
. . . it appears that motion may be got or lost. But by rea
son of the tenacity of fluids, and attrition of their parts,
and the weakness of elasticity in solids, motion is much more
apt to be lost than got, and is always upon the decay.
Seeing therefore the variety of motion which we find in
the world is always decreasing, there is a necessity of con
serving and recruiting it by active principles, such as are
the cause of gravity, by which planets and comets keep their
motions in their orbs, and bodies acquire great motion in
falling; and the cause of fermentation, by which the heart and
blood of animals are kept in perpetual motion and heat; the
inward parts of the earth are constantly warmed, and in some
places grow very hot; bodies b u m and shine, mountains take
fire, the caverns of the earth are blown up, and the sun con
tinues violently hot and lucid, and warms all things by his
light. For we meet with very little motion in the world, be
sides what is owing to these active principles. And if it
were not for these principles the bodies of the earth, planets,
comets, sun, and all things in them would grow cold and freeze,
and become inactive masses; and all putrefaction, generation,
vegetation, and life would cease, and the planets and comets
would not remain in their orbs.
The above passage is a rather striking intimationof
hypothesis.

On it Burtt (l95>U:267) comments:

the 'heat death'

"To his (Newton's) mind,

62
the world of matter appeared a very imperfect machine; motion was every
where on the decay."
If the thermodynamic arguments for divine action do not spring in
fully developed form from Newton’s speculations, still, the format for
such argument is clearly present, and heat and cold are seen to be in
volved.
Newton’s view that God had an active and continuing role, both as
creator and preserver of the universe in the efficient or mechanical
sense, provoked a

rather frank^

commentary from Leibnitz on the Continent,

sent by letter to the princess of Wales in November 1715*

The letter, in

part, follows below (Brewster, Vol. II, 1965:281}.):
Sir Isaac Newton and his followers have also a very odd opin
ion concerning the Work of God. According to their doctrine, God
Almighty wants to wind up his watch from time to time, otherwise
it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient fore
sight to make it a perpetual motion. Nay, the machine of God’s
making is so imperfect according to these gentlemen, that he is
obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse,
and even to mend it as a clockmaker mends his work; who must con
sequently be so much the more unskilful a workman, as he is
oftener obliged to mend his work, and to set it right. According
to my opinion the same force and vigour remains always in the
world, and only passes from one part of matter to another, agree
ably to the laws of nature and the beautiful pre-established
order. And I hold that when God works miracles, he does not do
it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace.
Whoever thinks otherwise, must needs have a very mean notion of
the wisdom and power of God.
The respective positions of Leibnitz and Newton on this point in
cosmology represent well the two religious viewpoints discussed in chapter
^The forthright tone of this letter in part derives from the con
troversy then going on as to who had discovered the Calculus first; New
ton or Leibnitz. In actuality, the discovery was independent and virtu
ally simultaneous as between the two men. The above letter was sent as
a challenge to Newton, and indeed, the Kihg himself requested that Newton
prepare a response. Later, Edward Clarke was substituted as defender of
the English faith, while Newton prepared the defense on his invention of
his form of the calculus. For Clarke’s replies to Leibnitz, see Dr.
Clarke's Works, 1738» Vol. IV, pp. 580-710•
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one.

In Leibnitz1 view, the universe is a ’perfect work’, and hence a

perpetual motion; ’’the same force and vigour” remain always in it.

New

ton's theological view, on the other hand, may be clearly seen in a pas
sage from the Optics (1721:381).

Considering the nature of God, Newton

says:
This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but
as Lord over all; and on account of his domination he is wont to
be called Lord God or Universal ruler . . . a being, however per
fect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God . . . And
from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living,
intelligent, and powerful being . . . and a god without dominion,
providence, and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature.
"Absurd indeed, it would be," comments Burtt

"to

deprive a being so portrayed of present control of his creation; accord
ingly we find Newton assigning to God . • . very important and specific
duties in the daily cosmic economy."

Returning to Kelvin's comment

quoted earlier, "that all motion except that of heat must have an end,
unless it please God to restore by an act of new creative power the dis
sipation of mechanical effect which always goes on," one can see a par
tial parallel of the theological and physical thoughts of Newton which
we have examined.

However, it is not possible to say that the above

thoughts constitute the only path of inspiration from Newton.

If one

considers Newton’s work rather than his theological outlook, one finds
no formal recognition of a natural, irreversible decay; Newtonian mecha
nics is reversible.
motion.

Within its scope the world may well be a perpetual

Recall further that when Newton dwelt upon the action of heat

and cold, he referred to "active principles."

At times he used this

phrase to allude to God’s action, but it may also refer to principles in
the sense of natural laws.

Newton actually speculated upon both natural

and divine replenishment of systems.

On this point, More (193^:663) relates

6

a conversation between Newton and Conduitt in 172lj., near the close of
Newton’s life.

The conversation was related by Conduitt; during its

course Newton conjectured that the heavenly bodies were periodically
subject to decay and replenishment, and that the vapours and light emit
ted by the sun ’’gathered themselves by degrees into body, and attracted
more matter from the planets; and at last became a comet, which after
certain revolutions, by coming nearer and nearer the sun, had all its
volatile parts condensed, and became a matter fit to recruit, and re
plenish the sun, which must waste by the constant heat and light it
emitted."
gravity.

This idea is essentially cyclical replenishment powered by
Yet at the same time Conduitt relates, "He (Newton) seemed to

doubt whether there were not intelligent beings superior to us, who super
intended these revolutions of the heavenly bodies, by the direction of a
Supreme Being."

(This latter idea follows Plato’s Timaeus.)

More re

lates, "The conversation closed by Conduitt wishing to know why he (New
ton) would not, in the Principia, acknowledge that the sun was replen
ished and recruited by comets dropping into it, when he had made a simi
lar statement about the fixed stars.

’He said that concerned us more; and

laughing, added that he had said enough for people to know his meaning. ’
Such were the last recorded thoughts of Newton on the world system, whose
laws he had done so much to discover; and it is well to remember that he
had said of himself:

*1 kept an eye upon such principles as might work

with considering men for the belief of a Deity. . .
Two very different possible lines of development seem to lead
from Newton; on the one hand natural, on the other supernatural regenera
tion of the world.

But in Newton's mind, the "active principle" is pre

sent in the world in either case.

Kelvin may well have been inspired by

h
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him, but one difference is immediately apparent.

Kelvin’s orthodoxy

outstrips Newton's; in Kelvin’s view, God has acted creatively in the
past, and may act again in the future; but the world is now in a pro
cess of energy dissipation, not counterbalanced by present action,
either natural or divine.

Kelvin's views follow from only one (and

that the more orthodox) side of Newton’s thought.
William Whewell

Prom Newton’s century onward into Kelvin's, the association be
tween orthodoxy in British religion and science remained strong, indeed
dominant in strongholds such as Cambridge; that orthodoxy in turn con
tinued to demand that the world be seen as the 'handiwork of the Lord.'
Writing on the early part of this period, Merton (l968:629ff) notes:
The puritan ethic, as an ideal-typical expression of the
value-attitudes basic to ascetic Protestantism generally, so
canalized the interests of seventeenth century Englishmen as
to constitute one important element in the enhanced cultiva
tion of science. The deep-rooted religious interests of the
day demanded in their forceful implications the systematic,
rational and empirical study of nature for the glorification
of God in His works and for the control of the corrupt world
. . . if nature is the manifestation of His power, then noth
ing in nature is too mean for scientific study. . . . Macro
cosm and microcosm alike, are indications of 'divine reason’,
running like ’a Golden Vein through the whole leaden Mine of
Brutal Nature.'
Merton goes on to note another important stronghold of this outlook, the
Royal Society, an association of distinguished scientists which had the
patronage of the king, beginning with its inception in 161+5.

Bentley

and Newton had been members, as well as being Cambridge men; William
Whewell, working in the first third of the nineteenth century and a con
temporary of Kelvin, is another representative of this background.
well championed the more theological side of Newton’s work.

Whe

In his His

tory, and in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (l81±0) as well as
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in his Philosophy of Discovery (l85>6) he argued that all branches of
science pointed to a past Creation at the hands of God.

In his Astronomy

and General Physics contribution to The Bridgewater Treatises (1 8 3 6 ) he
advanced a theory of "the universal law of decay" which appears to be a
close qualitative forerunner to Kelvin's law of "universal "dissipation"
in 18^2.

We shall look at several passages from these works.
To be set in its historical context, however, Whewell’s line of

thought needs to be compared to that given by the materialistic outlook
in science, which since the time of Newton had been gaining ground, and
gaining it, moreover, precisely upon the foundations which Newton had
laid in support of his religious outlook.

As Dampier (l95>0-175) put' it,

"The ’most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets and Comets, ’ which to
Newton could only proceed from a beneficent Creator, was used in the
eighteenth century as the basis for a mechanical philosophy, and replaced
the atomism of the ancients as the starting point of an atheistic mater
ialism.”

This movement gained considerable dominance in France, and

found particular fruition in The System of the World (1 7 9 6 ) &nd the
Mecanique Celeste (1799-l80£) of Pierre Simon Laplace.

Laplace developed

and advanced the Nebular Hypothesis, at the same time fusing it to the
ideas advanced in Newton's Principia (Dampier, 1950:180).
the theological outlook, such fusion was blasphemy.

To those of

The nebular hypo

thesis was "the dull and dangerous heresy of the age" (Brewster, Vol. II,
1965:131).

Yet Laplace had tackled Newton’s theology head on, commenting in
his System of the World ( 1 7 9 Eng. Tr. l830:332ff):
A blind fate, says he (Newton), 'could never make all the planets
to move thus. . .' But could not this arrangement of the planets
be itself an effect of the laws of motion; and could not the
supreme intelligence which Newton makes to interfere, make it
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depend on a more general phenomenon? such as, according to us, a
nebulous matter distributed in various masses throughout the im
mensity of the heavens? . . . If we trace the history of the pro
gress of the human mind, and of its errors, we shall observe
final causes perpetually receding, according as the boundaries
of our knowledge are extended.
Laplace's next words are of interest as reflecting on the difference be
tween the three analytic categories developed in chapter one.

Newton,

he says, believes that there are
. . . some irregularities, hardly perceivable, which may arise
from the mutual action of the planets and of the comets, and
which, probably, in the course of time will become greater, til
in fine the system may require to be restored by its author. • •
Leibnitz, in his controversy with Newton . . . attacks him with
great force on account of his introducing the divinity to restore
order into the solar system. 'It is,' says he, 'to have too con
fined notions of the wisdom and power of the deity.' Newton re
joined by an equally severe critique on the preestablished har
mony of Leibnitz, which he designated a continual miracle. Sub
sequent ages have not admitted these vain hypotheses; they have,
however, rendered the most ample justice to the mathematical
labours of these two great men; the discovery of universal gravi
tation, and the efforts of its author to explain all the heavenly
phenomena by means of it, will for ever secure to him the admira
tion and gratitude of posterity.
Note what has happened here:

Newton has rejected Leibnitz' theology and

Leibnitz, Newton's; Laplace rejects them both and recruits with praise

Newton's work in the advancement of the materialist view.
Laplace's System of the World was a popular rather than a techni
cal work; as Lampier relates (1950:180), "Laplace's analytical discussion
was given in his larger work, the Mecanique Celeste, in which he trans
lated the substance of Newton's Principia into the language of the infini
tesimal calculus, and completed it in many details.

Lampier follows with

a brief account from Rouse Ball of the celebrated meeting between Laplace
and Napoleon after the completion of the Mecanique Celeste:

"Someone had

told Napoleon that the book contained no mention of the name of God;
Napoleon, who was fond of putting embarrassing questions, received It

with the remark, 'M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large
hook on the system of the universe, and have never even mentioned its
Creator. 1 Laplace . . . drew himself up and answered bluntly, 'Je
n'avais pas de besoin de cette hypothese-la. * That phrase has been re
peated sufficiently often by historians of science to stand as the cap
sule position of the materialist; it also constitutes the ultimate in
sult to the scientist convinced with his whole being that his work is
a form of worship.

Thus matters stood in Whewell's time; the devout

style of physics in England remained strong, but materialism had been
gaining much ground; it was 'a present danger.'

Whewell forthrightly

enlisted his view of science to the traditional religious outlook, and
it is to this view that we next turn.
In the following passage from The Philosophy of the Inductive
Sciences (Vol. II, 1814.0:585) Whewell, quoting Newton, expresses the fol
lowing outlook:
And thus, in concluding our long survey of the grounds and
structure of science, and of the lessons which the study of it
teaches us, we find ourselves brought to a point of view in
which we can cordially sympathize . . . We can . . . not only
say with Newton that 'every true step made in philosophy brings
us nearer to the First Cause, and is on that account to be
highly valued;' — and that 'the business of natural philosophy
is to deduce causes from effects, till we come to the very First
Cause, which is certainly not mechanical:' — but we can go much
further, and declare, still with Newton, that 'this beautiful
system could have its origin no other way than by the purpose
and command of an intelligent and powerful Being, who governs
all things, not as the soul of the world, but as the Lord of
the Universe; who is not only God, but Lord and Governor.
This was the conclusion, he said, ". . . t o which our Philosophy points
with trembling finger and shaded eyes."
conclusion physically?

But how to establish such a

Material, causal systems must be seen to converge

to an origin, a Creation, and to lead as in the biblical account to an
end.

Along this line of thought, Whewell gave, in The Bridgewater

Treatises (Treatise III, l836:110ff) his statement of "the universal law
of decay":
. . . The forest tree endures for its centuries and then decays;
the mountains crumble and change, and perhaps subside in some
convulsion of nature; the sea retires, and the shore ceases to
resound with the "everlasting" voice of the ocean: such reflec
tions have already crowded upon the mind of the geologist; and
it now appears that the courses of the heavens themselves are
not exempt from the universal law of decay; that not only the
rocks and the mountains, but the sun and the moon have the sen
tence "to end" stamped upon their foreheads. They enjoy no
privilege beyond man except a longer respite. The ephemeron
perishes in an hour; man endures for his threescore years and
ten; an empire, a nation, numbers its centuries, it may be its
thousands of years; the continents and islands which its domin
ion includes have perhaps their date, as those which preceded
them have had; and the very revolutions of the sky
by which cen
turies are numbered will at last languish andstand still. . . .
The smaller portions of matter which we have near us, and the
larger, which appear as luminaries at a vast distance, differ as
they are in our mode of conceiving them, obey the same laws of
motion; and these laws produce the same results; in both cases
motion is perpetually destroyed, except it be repaired by some
living power; in both cases the relative rest of the parts of a
material system is the conclusion to which its motion tends. . .
To maintain either the past or the future eternity of the world,
does not appear consistent with physical principles, as it cer
tainly does not fall in with the convictions of the religious
man., .in whatever way obtained. We conceive that this state of
things has had a beginning; we conceive that it will have an end.

(emphasis supplied)
Whewell goes on to posit the ether as a resisting medium, which must gra
dually slow and finally stop all motion of the heavenly bodies, and then
turns to confront the Nebular hypothesis:

"Thus the argument which was

before urged against those in particular, who put forwards the Nebular
Hypothesis in opposition to the admission of an Intelligent Creator, of
fers itself again, as cogent in itself, when we adopt the opinion of a
resisting medium, for which the physical proofs have been found to be so
strong."
Yet for all Whewell's argument, the central idea has not been ad
vanced beyond Newton's time.

In The Philosophy of Discovery (l856:382ff),

Whewell takes up

again this line of thought

which hasbeen his constant

theme, and it is

again clearly suggestive but not definitive.

Whewell

comments:
Acknowledging a divine mind which is the foundation and support
of the world as it is, constituting and
upholdingits laws, it
may be asked, Does this view point to a
beginningof the world?
Was there a time when the Divine Mind called into being the
world, before non-existant? Was there a creation of the world?
. . . In point of fact, every part of our knowledge of the
Universe does seem to point to a beginning . . . But we must
allow, on the other hand, that though all such lines of research
point towards a beginning, none of them can be followed up. to a
beginning. All the lines converge, but all melt away before
they reach the point of convergence. • . .
But if our natural reason, aided by all that science can
teach, can tell us nothing respecting the origin and beginning
of this world, still less can reason tell us anything with re
gard to the End of this world . . . (but) . . . it would not be
at all impossible that physical inquiries should present the
prospect of an End, even more clearly than they afford the retro
spect of a Beginning.
These suggestive phrases, uttered by a contemporary of Kelvin's,
who was, moreover, a distinguished professor at Cambridge during Kelvin's
student years, seem clearly to foreshadow both the direction of Kelvin's
thought, and his conclusions.

Let us turn to a consideration of Kelvin.

CHAPTER
KELVIN

AND

THE

IV
SECOND ..LAW

Kelvin’s statement of the second law in the l850's may he viewed
as a purely physical generalization from known facts which holds that
all material transformations are, in the net, leveling processes.
law is so presented in the majority of physics texts.

The

However, seen in

its historical context, the law seems to he less a law and more of a
daring, interpretative extrapolation from selected facts, designed to he
a contender in the running cosmological dehates of its time.

Those

dehates focused around two major positions; the Newtonian-theological
and the Laplacean-materialistic.

Since Newton’s time, the materialistic

position had heen steadily gaining ground.'*' On the other hand, the
1Burtt (195 U:2 9 8 ) summarizes this advance as follows:
Really, the (Newtonian) notion of the divine eye as constant
ly roaming the universe on the search for leaks to mend, or gears
to replace in the mighty machinery would have heen quite laughable,
did not its pitifulness become earlier evident. For to stake the
present existence and activity of God on imperfections in the cos
mic engine was to court rapid disaster for theology. . •
Science moved on, and under the guidance of the less pious hut
more fruitful hypothesis that it would he possible to extend the
mechanical idea over an ever wider realm, Newton’s successors
accounted one by one for the irregularities that to his mind had
appeared essential and increasing if the machine were left to it
self. This process of eliminating the providential elements in
the world-order reached its climax in the work of the great
Laplace, who believed himself to have demonstrated the inherent
stability of the universe by showing that all its irregularities
are periodical, and subject to an eternal law which prevents them
from ever exceeding a stated amount . . . In short, Newton’s cher
ished theology was rapidly peeled off by all the competent hands
that could get at him.
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Newtonian-theological outlook continued to he championed —
in England.

particularly

William Whewell*s comments given in the last chapter typify

that outlook.

Yet there was an essential difference between the scienti

fic-religious concepts of Newton and those propounded by Whewell.
ton's God was an active God.

New

Whewell, retrenching in the face of advanc

ing materialism, emphasized divine activity in the past.

As a result the

universe, that mighty machine of His creation, was now decaying on the
grand scale.

Without plumbery or pluggery its decay pointed backward to

one great beginning.

Whewell had seen "every part of our knowledge of

the universe" as pointing to that beginning.

Yet, he said (1971 •363)

”. . . none of them can be followed u£ to_ a beginning."
Consider now the theoretical effects of Kelvin's statement of
the second law.

It appeared to lead all the way up to that beginning.

It appeared supportative of Newton's theology and was at the same time a
very successful, mathematically quant itIzed synthesis of Newtonian
mechanics and heat flows.

It was a genuine advance; in baseball terms,

a three-bagger, possibly the winning home run.

It was at that time no

more speculative than the nebular hypothesis, and it appeared to throw a
net of ultimate limits around the process of unending material causation
at the heart of that hypothesis.

In short, it drew all lines of causa

tion backward to a single Gordion knot —

Creation.

Whether rightly or wrongly, this is how the second law was per
ceived at that time, and how it was presented by Kelvin.

Let us turn to

the relevant biographical elements surrounding Kelvin's development of
the second law.
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Kelvin's Boyhood
James Thomson, Kelvin's father, was of Scottish extraction, com
ing from a County Down farming family.

During his early years, he

studied for the Established (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland ministry,
but discovered another calling —

mathematics.

As a man he occupied the

chair in mathematics at Glasgow College, and his son William (Kelvin)
grew up in the atmosphere of that old college.

James Thomson, much like

John Stewart Mill's father, took an active interest in the education of
his son, an education which was begun at home at an early age.

As Grey

(1973*8) relates, the father "was a stem disciplinarian, and did not
relax his discipline when he applied it to his children, and yet the aim
of his life was their advancement."

He instilled in his son William a

deep yet simple religious outlook which Kelvin was to make -uniquely his
own.

Thompson (1910:1089) relates that "As a young man he (Kelvin) had

thought things out in his own way, and had come to a faith which . • .
being of personal conviction, was never afterwards shaken.

His faith

was always of a very simple and child-like nature . • . It pained him to
hear crudely atheistic views expressed by young men who had never known
the deeper side of existence."
James Thomson also kindled in William a passion for mathematics
and a deep determination to distinguish himself.

William's father

entered him, at the age of ten, in Glasgow College, where he studied,
excelling particularly in his father's mathematics courses, until at the
age of seventeen he had completed the requirements for an undergraduate
degree.

Then, in 181*0, he made undergraduate application to Cambridge,

not filing for his Glasgow degree so as not to prejudice his admission
to Cambridge.

7

The Cambridge Years
The period l81*0-l8![l witnessed the following events:

Kelvin

completed his Glasgow work, and during a summer vacation with his father
and older "brother in Germany, enthusiastically read Fourier's Theorie
Analytique de la Chaleur, which he considered 'mathematical poetry.'
Upon returning to England, he published, under a pseudonym, an article
in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal vindicating Fourier's work from
the charges of error which had been made by a British mathematician.
This article created a bit of a stir in British mathematical circles,
and when Kelvin entered St. Peter's College, Cambridge, in the fall of
181;1 , he was already viewed as a student of promise.

He brought to Cambridge his talent, ambition, and a religious
and mathematical outlook in certain ways fused.

In later life he ex

pressed in his classes the obiter dicta, "Mathematics is the only true
metaphysics" (Thompson, 1910, "Vol. 11:1121;).

Again, Thompson reports

(19 IO, "Vol. II:lll+0) ". • .he spoke of those who 'have the privilege
which high mathematical attainments confer.'"
In the summer of l81;2 he prepared a paper for the Cambridge
Mathematical Journal entitled, "On the Linear Motion of Heat."

This

seems to have been a germinal paper with regard to the second law, and
Thompson's comments on it are of interest.

Thompson (1 9 1 0 , Vol. II:lj2-

1|3) states that the paper
. . . gave the solution in two different forms of the differen
tial equation which expresses the linear motion of heat in an
infinite solid, by which equation it is sought to find the tem
perature at some point at any distance, x, from a given zeroplane at any time t. This paper was a mathematical development
of some intricacy on the lines of Fourier's work.
Again and again in later years Lord Kelvin would return to
this paper as containing the germs of many of his subsequent
ideas. In its concluding passage it contained a speculation as
to the inference to be drawn if negative values are assigned to

k
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the time t; for obviously the theorems laid down hold good for
negative values of t, as well as for positive values. In gener
al it resulted that the temperature of any plane except the zero
plane will be impossible for negative values of t; since the
initial distribution of heat, assumed in the function, is in
general not of such a form as to constitute any stage, except a
first stage, in a possible system of varying temperatures. In
other words, the state represented cannot be the result of any
possible anterior distribution of temperature. Lord Kelvin
used to declare that it was this mathematical deduction which
convinced him that there must have been an origin to the natural
order of the cosmos; that therefore natural causes could not be
deduced backwards through an infinite time. There must have
been a beginning.
Kelvin's idea that the Fourier equations predicted an "origin to
the natural order of the cosmos" is of interest.

Those equations describe

the change in the distribution of heat in a body as that body cools.
Traced backward to a certain point or original condition of the system
the equations are valid, but carried backward past that point in time
they give "impossible" values.

One may make two decisions in the case:

a) that the equations as given have ceased to be useful in describing
the physical system to which they were applied, or b) that the equations
imply something physically unique.

If one tends to view mathematics as

2
"the only true metaphysics", one might make the latter interpretation.

In the next chapter we shall look at a critique of the "Origin" argument
from the Fourier equations which was given by ¥. K. Clifford, who held
that what was implied by backward extrapolation of the equations was no
more than a probable change of state of the natural system, and our
ignorance of that change of state, unless further empiric information
could be obtained.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that Kelvin

^Merton (1968:633) notes that the Puritan scientific outlook
which Kelvin along with many other Englanders shared, "was suffused with
the rationalism of neo-Platonism." In this neo-Platonic outlook, ration
al, mathematical forms were seen as having metaphysical reality and meta
physical implications.

assumed the metaphysical interpretation and stuck with it.
Luring the years I8I4.I—I4.3 while Kelvin was studing at Cambridge,
he read Laplace's Mecanique Celeste and Lagrange's Mecanique Analytique.
Grey (1973:19) reports that they "made a deep impression on the mind of
the youthful philosopher."

Luring this period Kelvin read widely, and

it seems to have been during these years that he became acquainted with
the correspondence and other works of Newton, as well as with the thoughts
of Whewell, who was teaching at Cambridge at the time.

The English tra

dition of devout science exemplified by Newton, and the materialistic
tradition exemplified by Laplace, must have presented themselves to Kel
vin; providing a choice point for his own developing position.

That posi

tion became, throughout his life, an advocacy of devout science accom
panied by active criticism of materialism.

Kelvin. The Glasgow Professor of Natural Philosophy
By 181+5 > Kelvin had made his mark at Cambridge.

He had published

sixteen papers, mostly in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal, the major-,
ity of which were on the subject of heat.

In 181+5-1+6 he took his gradua

tion examinations, coming out second wrangler and first Smith’s Prizeman.
It was during these last few years at Cambridge that Thompson relates he
began to get the idea of becoming the. Newton of the molecular theory

(1910:1015).
In September 181±6, at the age of twenty-two, Kelvin was elected
to the chair of Natural Philosophy at Glasgow; a position which he re
tained for the rest of his life.

His Inaugural Lissertation,

'Le Motu

Caloris per Terrae Corpus1 (delivered in Latin) set forth the position
which he later maintained toward the theory of geological uniformitarianism; i.e., that it was wrong.

Gray (1973:6$) relates that the paper
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". . . gave a very decisive limitation to the possible age of .the earth
as a habitation for living creatures; and proved the untenability of the
enormous claims for TIME which, uncurbed by physical science, geologists
and biologists had begun to make and to regard as unchallengeable.11
At Glasgow College, Kelvin did his teaching.
relates:

King (1925:29)

"He always began his class in college with prayer, and chose

the third Collect for Grace from the Church of England service . . .
there was something in his humble and quiet reverence which seemed to
strengthen one's own faith and bring one directly into the Presence of
God." We may look at the traditional introductory lecture, which he
delivered to his new physics students for a particularly direct expres
sion of his devotion in science.

He felt that scientific discovery

brought the human mind closest to the Divine, saying (Thompson, 1 9 1 0 :214.6),
"We feel that the power of investigating the laws established by the
Creator for maintaining the harmony and permanence of His works is the
noblest privilege which He has granted to our intellectual state."

He

would conclude the lecture with the statement (Thompson, 1910:250),
. . . we must remember that as the depth of our insight into the
wonderful works of God increases, the stronger are our feelings
of awe and veneration in contemplating them and in endeavouring
to approach their Author. . . . By such feelings the earnest stu
dent of philosophy must always be impressed; so will he by his
studies and successive acquirements be led ’through nature up to
nature's God.'
It seems to have been in such terms that he viewed the Fourier
equations, and his developed statement of what has now come to be called
the second law.

This he gave in a long series of articles to the Royal

Society of Edinburgh, running from l85l to

His statement of the

"dissipation of energy" which we saw in the last chapter came in 1852,
the same year in which Thompson relates that he married Margret Crum,

his childhood sweetheart, and resigned his Cambridge Fellowship (which
he had maintained while teaching at Glasgow) (1908:9).
We are going to look at a summary reminiscence of Kelvin's con
cerning his own interpretation of the second law.

However, a short

groundwork must be set out on his view of the probable nature of the
atom, for he comments on atoms in the same passage.

Dampier (191+9:

295 ff), speaking of nineteenth-century science, has related that "hard

ness" and "persistence in time", qualities perceived in matter and
ascribed to atoms, "strengthened immensely the common-sense view that
matter was an ultimate reality."

Kelvin supported the atomic theory,

but found it philosophically more agreeable to "dematerialize" the atom,
thus rendering it more tractable to creation.

He attempted this from the.

theoretical standpoint, suggesting a "vortex-atom" concept in light of
which the atom was seen to be a vortex-ring, rotating within and made up
of a perfect, non-material fluid, the ether.
the vortexes in motion.

Creation involved setting

(This theory was later to inspire Kelvin's

colleague, Peter G. Tait to his own devout theory of matter, which we
shall see in the next chapter.) With respect to both the second law and
the vortex-atom theory, Thompson (1910:1091) comments:
Again and again, in his public career, from his inaugural
lecture of 181+6 to the end fpfj his life, Lord Kelvin declared
his belief in Creative Power, and in an overruling Providence.
In two points at least his scientific studies brought him to
what he considered a direct demonstration of a definite crea
tion: namely, the Fourier equations for the flow of heat, with
the mathematical inference . . • that there must have been a
beginning; and the vortex-atom conception, according to which
the permanence of the atom proves that no known animate or in
animate physical agency could have originated them.
Thompson (1910:111) relates Kelvin's own views on these ideas, as he ex
pressed them in a personal conversation in 1906.

Kelvin was in a

"chatty" mood, and Thompson had asked him point blank how he had missed
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being Senior Wrangler.

Kelvin replied that Parkinson (who had won over

him) " . . . had won principally on the exercises of the first two days,
which were devoted to text-book work rather than to problems requiring
analytical investigation.11 Kelvin continued, saying:
*1 could have walked over the paper. A very good man Parkinson—
I didn't know him personally at the time— who had devoted him
self to learning how to answer well'in examinations, while I had
had, during previous months, my head in some other subjects not
much examined upon— theory of heat, flow of heat between iso
thermal surfaces, dependence of flow on previous state, and all
the things I was learning from Fourier. 1 Then he went on to ex
plain how he had had his head in these problems before coming to
Cambridge, and told me he wished he could find his note-book of
the Senior Greek lectures of his last year at Glasgow, when he
was supposed to be listening to Lushington on the Hippolytus of
Euripides, for the notes would show that he was all the while
working at his ideas on the uniform motion of heat, and on the
Boscovichian idea of force acting independently of intervening
matter. Then he drifted back to his own early writings on Fourier,
and pulling from the shelf a copy of his Mathematical and Physical
Papers, vol. i., pointed to page 15>, where he gave the mathemati
cal inference, as the result of assigning negative values to the
time t, that there must have been a creation. 'It was,' he con
tinued, 'this argument from Fourier that made me think there must
have been a beginning. All mathematical continuity points to the
necessity of a beginning— this is why I stick to atoms . . . and
they must have been small— smallness is a necessity of the com
plexity. They may have all been created as they were, complexity
and all, as they are now. But we know they have a past. Trace
back the past, and one comes to a beginning— to a time zero,
beyond which the values are impossible. It's all in Fourier.'

Kelvin's Overall Scientific-Religious Outlook
It is clear from Kelvin's comments that he viewed the second law
as an argument for Creation.

His positions on other scientific topics

reveal further facets of his essentially religious outlook.

At every

turn he fought what he considered to be materialism, and advanced instead

ideas consistent with the orthodox Christian position.

3

Kelvin waged his fight with the evolutionary theory (that life
had developed from matter without the intervention of creative design)
throughout his own life.

In denying that life had evolved on Earth, he

was driven to suggest that it had heen home to earth hy meteoric stones
from a period of earlier creation.
ics.

This idea provoked a number of crit

Thompson relates (1910:1103):

^Agnes G. King (l92£:28ff), Kelvin’s niece, has given the follow
ing sketch of Kelvin in this regard:
All through life Lord Kelvin retained a wonderful simplicity of
character, which endeared him to every one. He had a simple,
childlike faith which pervaded his whole being. The deeper he
delved into Science and the more he studied its mysteries, the
greater his veneration for the Maker of all.
'We must pause,1 he said, ’face to face with the mystery and
miracle of creation . . . the relations of matter and life are
infinitely too complex for the human mind to understand. . . .
The opening of a bud, the growth of a leaf, the astonishing
development of beauty in a flower involve physical operations
far beyond our comprehension. . . . A tree contains more mys
tery of creative power than the sun, from which all its mechani
cal energy is borrowed. 'An earth without life, a sun, and count
less stars, contain less wonder than that sprig of mignonette. . • .
Let us not imagine that any hocus-pocus of electricity or viscous
fluid will make a living cell.’ Again he said: ’If you think
strongly enough, you will be forced by Science to a belief in
God, which is the foundation of all religion.’
’In the evening mother read aloud Darwin’s confession of
faith, or rather his confession of want of faith. Uncle William
jKeIvin/ said of his views about the absence of evidence of design,
that he considered such views utterly unscientific. He expressed
himself very vehemently on the subject, and said that our own
power of discussing and speculating about Atheism and Materialism
was enough of itself to disprove such a theory. With regard to
Evolution, he said that it could not in the least degree explain
the great mystery of nature and creation: if all things origin
ated in a single germ, then that g e m contained in it all the mar
vels of creation, physical, intellectual and spiritual to be after
wards developed. It is absolutely impossible that atoms of dead
matter should come together so as to make life.’
His work was to him a kind of worship. His close study of the
phenomena of nature and his constant discovery of new marvels
seemed to bring him nearer and nearer to God, and he could never
understand any one treating Science with any other feeling than
reverence.
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His own suggestion in I87 I of a possible introduction of life
to this globe by meteoric sources, was often misunderstood or mis
stated. To a correspondent who wrote to him on this topic he
replied in 1886:—
The "star germ theory" which I put forward as a possibility
does not in the slightest degree involve or suggest the origina
tion of life without creative power, and is not in any degree
antagonistic to, or out of hamony with, Christian belief.
To another correspondent, in March 1 8 8 7 , he wrote:—
I think you will find nothing contrary to the Bible in the
suggestion that some of the life at present on the earth may have
come from seeds sownby meteoric stones.
I have never thrown it
out as more than a hypothesis that even so much was the case.
But even if some of the living things on the earth did originate
in that way so far as the earth is concerned, the origin of the
species elsewhere in the universe cannot have come about through
the functions of dead matter; and to our merely scientific judg
ment the origin of life anywhere in the universe seems absolutely
to imply creative power. I believe that the more thoroughly
science is studied the further does it take us from anything com
parable to atheism.
In 1903 a letter of Kelvin's appeared in the London Times, re
specting a lecture by one Professor Henslow.

Thompson (1910:1098) gave

a copy, "as corrected by Lord Kelvin's own hand."

The letter reads in

part:
I do not say that, with regard to the origin of life, science
neither affirms nor denies creative power. Science positively
affirms creative power. Science makes every one feel a miracle
in himself. It is not in dead matter that we live and move and
have our being, but in the creating and directive Power which
science compels us to accept as an article of belief . . . We
only know God in his works, but we are absolutely forced by sci
ence to admit and to believe with absolute confidence in a Direc
tive Power. . . .
Clearly Kelvin's scientific concepts were compassed and focused by his
•religious belief.

Further, he definitely held to the ancient dichotomy,

inherent in Newton's ideas, between "dead matter" impotent in itself,
and the creative, ordering power of the Divinity.

Life was an example;

it was a creative miracle, partaking of the divine spark.

These ideas
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are written into his concept of the second law.

Thompson relates (1910:

1093):
He regarded life, however certainly its operations were governed
by chemical and dynamical laws, as essentially outside the range
of physics. He utterly repudiated all idea of the generation of
living matter by force or motion of dead matter alone. "That
life proceeds from life, and from nothing but life," was for him
"true through all space and through all time." He declared that
whereas the fortuitous concourse of atoms was the sole philosophic
foundation for the second law of thermodynamics, the fortuitous
concourse of atoms was powerless to account for the directed
operations of living matter. "The influence of animal or vege
table life on matter is," he declared, "infinitely beyond the
range of any scientific inquiry hitherto entered on. Its power
of directing the motions of moving particles, in the demonstrated
daily miracle of our human free-will, and in the growth of genera
tion after generation of plants from a single seed, are infinite
ly different from any possible result of the fortuitous concourse
of atoms."
The Grand Synthesis
It was Kelvin’s ambition (as it was Einstein’s later) to construct
the comprehensive theory of the universe —
mathematical and physical comers.

correct in all the proper

After fifty years at it, during his

jubilee celebration in Glasgow (attended by over 2,000 friends, profes
sional colleagues, Lords, commoners and family) he announced his "failure"
at the task.

Throughout his life he had tried to unite the character and

the modes of interaction of physical phenomena in a single, logical pat
tern.

The culmination?

"*I know,’ he said on the day of his jubilee,

’no more of electric and magnetic force, or of the relation between ether,
electricity, and ponderable matter, or of chemical affinity, than I knew
and tried to teach to my students in my first lesson’" (Thompson, 1908:
2 3 ).

To a friend he wrote, "I am as firmly convinced as ever of the

absolute truth of the kinetic theory of gases.

What I feel that I have

failed in has been my persevering efforts during £0 years to understand
something more of the luminiferous ether and of the manner in which it is

concerned in electric and magnetic forces. . ." (Thompson, 1910:1013).
But if a unified theory escaped him, there were solid advances.

The vor

tex atom theory he had to abandon, and the discovery of radioactivity at
the turn of the century was to confound all his prior assumptions with
regard to the age of the earth and the possibility of material evolution;
yet his synthesis of mechanics and heat flows stood firm.
In i860, speaking before the Royal Society, he had expressed the
sentiment that " . . . experiment within these walls must lead to a stage
of knowledge in which the laws of inorganic nature will be known in this
sense —

that one will be known as essentially connected with all, and

in which unity of plan, through an inexhaustibly varied execution, will
be recognized as a universally manifested result of creative wisdom"
(Thompson, 1910:1092, emphasis added).

This was his deepest hope, his

great synthesis of science and religion; and in the second law he found
at least partial fulfillment of that hope.
capable of scientific amplification.

At every turn it seemed

Further, to many it "seemed to be

restating the Biblical story of the creation in modem terminology"
(Crowther, 1936:231).

If one is to consider the more religious side of

Newton's thought, Kelvin appears to have become the Newton of the molecu
lar theory.
The import of his statement of the second law has come down to
us virtually unchanged.

Hugh D. Young, for example, in his introductory

text, Fundamentals of Mechanics and Heat (l96i|:51j.6) says:
Generalizing, we make the following statement: It is impossible
to construct a heat engine which operates in a cyclical process
and which has no other effect than to take heat from a reservoir
at one temperature and do an equivalent amount of mechanical work,
without discarding any heat at a lower temperature. This
generalization /y&s/ first stated by Kelvin . . .

BU
Mo d e m technology conforms to and rests upon this principle;

further,

our cosmology has heen for over a hundred years set in its mold.
is influence indeed.

This

Whether the second law turns out to he correct or

incorrect, or better said, complete or incomplete as a cosmological
principle, it remains a very large intellectual achievement.
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THE

SECOND

LAW:

KELVIN, TAIT, CLIFFORD, MAXWELL AND TYNDALL
Kelvin stated the second law in England; it was accepted in most
quarters with enthusiasm.

A number of elements contributed to its suc

cess, not the least of these being Kelvin's own talent and prestige.
Another element, undoubtedly a large one, was the fact that the law pre
sented the immediate prospect of increases in technological efficiency
at a time when Britain was undergoing industrial transformation."*’ No
matter that the law imposed severe restrictions on ultimate efficiency;
no matter that it held the world was dissipative in nature; its first
import was one of physical progress and increased prosperity.
Another element was the religious temper of the time.

The

second law appeared devout, and it attracted the support of the devout.
Support was important.

The scientific movement in England was an infant

promising to become expensive, yet it had the sparest funding.

As P. G.

Tait commented (Nature. July l£, 1875:20l), "The true votary of science,
in this country at least, rarely meets with encouragement and support.
Mole-eyed State!"

Private bequests by wealthy individuals were the

largest single source of funds for scientific studies in the universities
^-The steam engines, generators, etc. then in use had grown
largely from innovative practical engineering without benefit of devel
oped thermodynamic theory, and their efficiencies were lower than the
law predicted to be possible.
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and colleges (Sanderson, 1972:78ff).

The -universities, and usually the

individuals making donations, professed the orthodox devotion.

And as

Lord Derby commented in his address "On the Endowment of Scientific
Research," (Nature, December 23, 18JI?:II4.I) : "Respect the founder’s
object . . .

if you do not, you will have no new endowments."

The

Bridgewater Treatises (1 8 3 6 ) were a product of science within this
social milieu.

Written by distinguished scientists appointed by the

Royal Society, the treatises had been funded through a bequest of Lord
Bridgewater.

He instructed that they should be dedicated both in word

and substance to the "power, wisdom, and Goodness of God," and he left
a lot of money for the purpose.

Simply, orthodoxy in science aided

funding; what Kelvin called "cheap materialism" didn't.
The I87 I meeting of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science offers a curious commingling of three themes; need for fund
ing and support, desire to avoid the charges of heresy, and invocation
of the second law to show that science was orthodox.

Kelvin had been

elected president of the association; his inaugural address put forward
the theme that "Experimental science ought to be made with us an object
of national concern" (Nature, August 3> l871:262ff).

The address ex

plored many avenues to this goal, and wound up on the note that "Over
whelmingly strong proofs of intelligent and benevolent design lie all
around us, teaching us that all living beings depend on one ever-acting
Creator and Ruler.”
Peter G. Tait, Kelvin's close friend and colleague at Glasgow
University, had been elected president of the mathematical and physical
science section of the Association.

In his address, which followed Kel

vin's, he expressed concern for ". . • what has been so often and so
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persistently croaked against the British Association, viz. that it tends
to develop what are called scientific heresies" (Nature, August 3> 1871:
270ff).

Tait continued:

It seems to me, that the proper answer to all such charges will he
very simply and easily given if we merely show that in our reason
ings we invariably confine our physical conclusions strictly to
matter and energy (things which we can weigh and measure). What
ever is neither matter nor energy . . . is not a subject to be
discussed, even by implication . . . Ordinary dead matter, Jp.Q
said/ is strictly and exclusively in the domain of physical sci
ence. /ThenjJ^ A profound lesson may be learned from one of the
earliest papers of our President /SelvinT", published when he was
an undergraduate at Cambridge, where he shows that Fourier’s mag
nificent treatment of the conduction of heat . . . when extended
to time past . . . indicates a state of things which could not
have resulted under known laws from any previous distribution.
The example is now adduced, not for its bearing on heat alone, but
as a simple illustration of the fact that all portions of our sci
ence, and especially that beautiful one the Dissipation of Energy,
point unanimously to a beginning.
Tait had been moved to his comments by public debates of that
period, as to whether evolution, conservation of energy, and other
theories were not heretical.

2

It would seem that social pressures helped

determine the theoretical posture of English science during this period.
Helmholtz, on the continent, commented that English scientists "•
dared not propigate their views openly, for fear of compromising their
social interests" (Nature, August 10, 1871:288).

p

With the exception of evolution, the main charges of heresy
appeared to be directed squarely at physics. Dampier (l9U9:30£) com
ments, "The principles of the conservation of matter and energy, com
bined with atomic theory, were used as the chief basis of materialism."
In an article in the London Quarterly Review, John Moore charged that
the Doctrine of Evolution and the Conservation of Energy were both
Heretical Dogmas. This sparked a reply by Charles Brook in Nature,
June 13f 1872, pp. 122-125. Moore came back with further comment, which
was printed in the July 1|., 1 8 7 2 , issue of Nature, pp. 180-181. Both
writers allude to other comments in the popular literature regarding
science and "heresy."
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However, compromise seemed to "be needed.

Orthodoxy insisted on

God’s continuing presence in the scientific outlook.
a too enthusiastic orthodoxy was a damper.

On the other hand,

Scientific progress demanded.

the discovery and extension of laws pertaining in their pragmatic effects
to matter.

Miraculous action by the Deity, hinted to be just around the
3
comer in Newton’s work, had to be pushed out of the laboratory.
To
the devout but empirical scientist, ’God at a distance' was the thing
needed.

That, Kelvin's second law exactly provided.

Eeally, it was a

brilliant compromise, combining powerful arguments for God’s past action
which could satisfy orthodoxy, while assuring that He would not likely
pop up to confound the empiricist in the lab next morning.

Of this

period in England, Dampier has commented (19^9 *3H) > "If "there was still
need of a Creator, it seemed likely that He had turned away and left the
great machine to spin unheeded down the ringing grooves of change."

The

second law was the quintessential distillate of that outlook.
Kelvin’s Personal Influence As An Element
in the Success of the Second Law
It is given to only a handful of men to become a social force in
their own time; Kelvin became one in England.

Andrew Gray, student,

friend, and later colleague of Kelvin’s at Glasgow, has spoken of "the
inspiration which his work and example gave to others."

He said, "There

was no one, however eminent,- who was not proud to acknowledge his obliga
tions to his genius" (1973*30!?).

Intense veneration developed for Kelvin

in his home country during the latter half of his life.

He seemed a man

^Kelvin himself did some gentle pushing with the comment, "If
a probable solution, consistent with the ordinary course of nature, can
be found, we must not invoke an abnormal act of creative power" (Thomp
son, 1910:1091).
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for all scientific seasons, being teacher, theoretical innovator, practi
cal inventor (over l+O patents), energetic leader of the British Associa
tion for the advancement of science, advisor of public companies and
Royal commissions, arbiter of scientific disputes, most awarded British
scientist of his time, champion of the movement to make science a
national priority, member of the Royal Society, and on top of all this —
defender of the faith.
tions of Britishers.

He became "Mr. Science" to almost three genera
Kelvin’s role as an historical figure goes far

beyond his scientific contributions.

In England, during the most crucial

period of industrial transformation, he was a key figure in making science
itself happen.

English history would not be the same without him.

In person, particularly in debate, Kelvin was something of an
intellectual battering ram.

Possessing strong convictions, charming,

intensely energetic and owning a command over higher mathematics that few
other men had, he was virtually irresistible wherever mathematics counted.
He tended to put every proposition into mathematical form; from that
point he almost always had the advantage.

Gray (1973*309) reflects that

"he was no mere mathematician, but a man who, like the prophets of old,
could divine what is hid from the eyes of ordinary mortals."
Thompson (1910:1123) reprints a letter from one of Kelvin’s stu
dents:
In my time nothing was more characteristic of Sir William than the
thoroughness with which he thrashed out every subject that he took
up. His students were quite persuaded that he knew everything
about a subject that could be known, and they felt that he was
perfectly justified in his sometimes rather unsparing language
about charlatins, "showmen," mere brilliant experimenters who
wished to pose as philosophers. In fact, our faith in him went so
far that I have heard some of the best students say that they were
hardly satisfied with any philosophical theory till it had Sir
William’s imprimatur, and were almost content to accept it as all
right if it got that.
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Kelvin, in short, could sell a viewpoint —

and he was selling the

second law.
Kelvin *s Use of the Second Law
Against Evolutionary Theory

Kelvin utilized the second law to discredit uniformitarian geo
logy, and through it, evolution.
time to he tenable.
denied it.

Evolution required great stretches of

Uniformitarian geology provided that time; Kelvin

His friend and associate Tait joined him.

In Darwin’s Cen

tury (l96l:23l4ikf), Loren C. Eiseley comments, "The attack (on Darwin via
geological theory) had been launched by Lord Kelvin, considered by many
historians of science to be the outstanding physicist of the nineteenth
century.

Whether Lord Kelvin and his Scottish associate, Peter Tait,

saw the inevitable consequence of their thought one cannot but wonder,
since they were devoutly religious men.
advantage hard. . ."

At any rate, they pressed their

In 186£ Kelvin published a paper entitled "The

Doctrine of Uniformity in Geology Briefly Refuted."
cal Time" appeared.

In 1868 "On Geologi

In it Kelvin commented (Vol. II, l89Uillff) '• "A

great reform In geological speculation seems now to have become neces
sary."

He went on to give the view of Playfair and Hutton:

"We discover

no mark either of the commencement or the termination of the present
order."
"Hothing," said Kelvin, "could possibly be further from the truth
than that statement."

He argued, basically, that both the sun and the

earth were cooling, and in terms of the sources of energy known to exist
for each, the rate of cooling given by the Fourier equations indicated
that they had had a relatively brief past history, and would have a simi
larly brief future.

Evolution needed several billions of years; Kelvin
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offered mere millions.

Most physicists fell in with him.

Darwin called

Kelvin an "Odious spectre"; elsewhere he commented, "I am greatly troubled
at the short duration of the world according to Sir W. Thomson for I re
quire for my theoretical views a very long period . . ." (Eiseley, 1961:
23^)*

"Kelvin," comments Eiseley, "pressed his advantage relentlessly.

’We find at every turn something to show . . . the utter futility of
(Darwin’s) philosophy,’ he said in 1873*11 The debate over this issue
separated many physicists, geologists and biologists into two antagonis
tic camps lasting to the end of the century, when the discovery of radio
activity and nuclear energy decided the issue against the physicists.
Eiseley comments (1961:23l+),

• . i n this long controversy extending

well over half a century, the physicists made extended use of mathemati.cal techniques and still were hopelessly and, it must be added, arrogant
ly wrong."
Mathematics alone does not make a science.

Other elements are

.involved, among them the exercise of speculative reason (Whitehead, 1962:

3 8 ), coupled with a ’feel for the go of things' in qualitative as well as

quantitative terms.

Had Kelvin not been consistently antagonistic to the

broader implications of geological and evolutionary theory, he might have
utilized them in conjunction with his own calculations —
selves —

correct in them

to suggest the presence of an "X" factor in the picture; an un

known source of further energy.

How close he came to such a presentiment

may be estimated from his comment in l86 l:

"We may say with . . .

cer

tainty that the inhabitants of the earth cannot continue to enjoy the
light and heat essential to their life for many million years longer, un
less new sources now unknown to us are prepared in the great storehouse
of Creation" (Eiseley, 1961:238).
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John Tyndall and Evolutionary Theory

While Kelvin and many other physicists denied evolution, John
Tyndall welcomed it.

Tyndall, a distinguished fellow physicist and con

temporary of Kelvin's who had studied in Germany and "become an adherent
of materialism there, was elected president of the British Association
in I87 I1.. His inaugural address, delivered in Ulster Hall Before some
1 ,8 0 0 gathered scientists, dignitaries and interested laymen (and carried

by telegraph to the major newspapers), was a frank advocacy of evolution
^
—

and materialism.

Presented with a force and brilliance altogether

equal to Huxley's, it immediately became famous (or scandalous, depend
ing on one's outlook).
In his address (Nature. August 20, l87U:312ff), Tyndall built
from the foundation of Democritean atomism, saying, "What these atoms,
self-moved and self-posited, can and cannot accomplish in relation to
life, is at the present moment the subject of profound scientific
thought."

"The science of ancient Greece," he continued, "cleared the

world of the fantastic images of divinities operating capriciously through
natural phenomena.

What then, stopped its victorious advance?

Chris

tians," he said.
The sufferings of the early Christians, and the extraordinary
exhaltation of mind which enabled them to triumph over the dia
bolical tortures to which they were subjected, must have left
traces not easily effaced. They scorned the earth, in view of
that 'building of God, that house not made with hands, eternal
in the heavens.' The Scriptures which ministered to their spiri
tual needs were also the measure of their science.
Tyndall continued, tracing the slow re-emergence of science into
the mid-nineteenth century.
tists to a watershed.

This progress, he felt, had brought scien

Was science to remain within, or break free of the

mold supplied by religious orthodoxy?

"Two courses, ^stated Tyndall/ and
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two only are possible,11
Either let us open our doors freely to the conception of Creative
acts, or, abandoning them, let us radically change our notions of
matter , . . Taught as we have been to regard , . . /our previous/
definitions of matter as complete, we naturally and rightly reject
the monstrous notion that out of such matter any form of life could
possible arise. But are the definitions complete? Everything de
pends on the answer to be given to this question. Trace the line
of life backward, and see it approaching more and more to what we
call the purely physical condition , . . Can we pause here? . • •
Is there not a temptation to close to some extent with Lucretius,
when he affirms the "Nature is seen to do all things spontaneously
of herself without the meddling of the Gods?” Or with Bruno, when
he declares that matter is not "that mere empty capacity which
philosophers have pictured her to be, but the universal mother who
brings forth all things as the fruit of her womb?" . . • Abandon
ing all disguise, the confession that I feel bound to make before
you is that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of
the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter, which we in
our ignorance, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its
Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and
potency of every form and quality of life (Nature, August 20,

i87U:3l7ff).
Tyndallfs address evoked a storm of public protest.

He afterward

commented (Vol. II, 1902:215):
The world has been frequently informed of late that I have raised
up against myself a host of enemies: and considering, with few
exceptions, the deliverances of the Press, and more particularly
the religious Press, I am forced to admit that the statement is
only too true. . . .
Prom fair and manly argument, from the tenderest and holiest
sympathy on the part of those who desire my eternal good, I pass
by many gradiations, through deliberate unfairness, to a spirit of
bitterness, which desires with a fervor inexpressible in words my
eternal ill.
Kelvin, reported Thompson, quietly wrote to a friend that Tyndall's
address had been "particularly inappropriate."
Yet Tyndall had put his finger on the heart of the matter.

It

is not too much to say he found the lynch-pin upon which evolution, the
second law, and other scientific theories of the time turned in their
interpretation.

Was "Nature, free at once, and rid of her haughty Lords

. . . seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, without the
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meddling of the Gods?" (Mature, August 20, l87l+:310)«

— ’Or was she, as

tradition taught, passive, brute matter, potter’s clay, incapable of
producing structure, order, life —

in Newton's words —

"without ye

mediation of something else wch is not material?" (Turnbull, Vol. Ill,
1961:253)*

If the former, then life, order, and the ongoingness of

things are most likely the product of a self-sufficient, self-sustaining
Nature.

If the latter, we must look to "Creation" as the ultimate

source of these things.
It would appear that most of the biologists got over the water
shed; Kelvin kept himself, and physics, on the side of tradition.
separation appears to have remained to the present day.

The

In its clearest

form, it has been expressed by the Russian biologist A. I. Oparin, who
writes within the framework of dialectical materialism.

Oparin (Moscow,

1960:17) comments that the second law
. . . expresses the statistical tendency of nature to disorder,
to leveling . . . /to/ an increase of entropy . . . In contradis
tinction to this, in organisms not only does there not occur an
increase in entropy, but there is even the possibility of its
decrease. Thus, it is as though one had gathered that the basic
law of physics is the tendency to. disorder, to an increase of en
tropy, but the basic law of biology, on the contrary, is the
growth of orderliness — a decrease in entropy.
P. G. Kuznetsov (in Trincher, Biology and Information, Moscow,
196i+; New York, 1965:87ff) likewise holds that life as an entirety "con
tradicts the Carnot principle in its ordinary formulation."

He goes on

to criticize the principle of Kelvin and Clausius, saying that the
second law ". • . corresponded to a profound human sentiment, with the
ideal anthromorphic representation of nature."^

bit is interesting to compare the above views, given by modern
Russian scientists, with those given by ¥. P. Allis and M. A, Herlin,
physicists at M.I.T.. (1952:93):

Returning to Tyndall, we find that his view of the physical uni
verse contained no hint of the second law as an overarching principle;
indeed, the second law was conspicuously absent.

Concerning the universe

he held that
The parts of the 'stupendous whole' shift and change,'augment and
diminish, appear and disappear, while the total of which they are
a part remains quantitatively immutable. Immutable, because when
change occurs it is always polar — plus accompanies minus, gain
accompanies loss, no item varying in the slightest degree without
an absolutely equal change of some other item in the opposite
direction. Has this uniformity of nature ever been broken? The
reply is: 'Hot to the knowledge of science' (Vol. II, 1902:358ff).
The celebrated Robert Boyle regarded the universe as a machine;
Mr. Carlyle prefers regarding it as a tree . . . A machine may be
defined as an organism with life and direction outside; a tree may
be defined as an organism with life and direction within. In
light of these definitions, I close with the conception of Carlyle.
The order and energy of the universe I hold to be inherent, the
expression of fixed law and not of arbitrary will, exercised by
what Carlyle would call an Almighty Clockmaker (Vol. II, 1902:354)*
The Unseen Universe of Tait and Stewart
If Tyndall propounded materialism and ignored the second law,
Peter G. Tait and Balfour Stewart took the opposite tack, outdoing even
Tait's colleague and friend Kelvin in professed religious devotion, and
advocacy of the second law.

Tait had referred to Kelvin's principle of

dissipation as "beautiful."

He and Stewart went on to make it the key

Even the simplest living organism is very highly organized, which
means that its entropy is abnormally low. At death, rapid irre
versible changes take place and the entropy rises to a more nor
mal value. Are the forces which maintain this low entropy vio
lating the second law? If life could continue in an 'isolated'
body, they would be, but it cannot.
'Life' needs 'dead' surround
ings, and produces order within itself only at the expense of dis
order in its environment, in complete accordance with the Clausius
inequality . . . The irreversibility of life is a good indication
that the disorder it produces in its surroundings is always far
greater than the order produced within itself.
— A profound difference in both philosophy and empiric orientation lies
between the above views; a difference, moreover, unresolved.

concept of a treatise in cosmology wherein, ’’Science . . . instead of
appearing antagonistic to the claims of Christianity, is in reality its
most efficient supporter” (Stewart and Tait, 1890:271).

The book, titled

The Unseen Universe and first published anonymously,^ ”. . .
great sensation" (Knott, 1911:237)*

created a

It went through three subsequent

editions and twelve printings, provoking comment from both the devout
and the otherwise inclined.

The authors held that "As a matter of uni

versal scientific experience . . . the visible universe is not eternal,
and has not the power of originating life" (Stewart and Tait, l890:2l]5).
Argument against the eternity of the world centered around Kelvin’s
dissipation principle.

They inferred from it that, "We have . . . reached

the beginning as well as the end of the present visible universe, and
have come to the conclusion that it began in time and will in time come
to an end" (Stewart and Tait, 1890:128).

The authors reflected upon how

this conclusion affected the materialistic position.

They said (1890:

92-93):
Let us next briefly allude to the position of the extreme school
of science. Ignoring all but the visible universe, and applying
the principle of Continuity /conservationT" to its phenomena, the
members of this school were indubitably led to most important
generalisations regarding the method of working of that great
system. So far the Genius whom they had summoned up appeared to
be the very principle of order. But things wore a different com
plexion as time went on. It was fancied that historical Chris
tianity must disappear, and that the belief in the reality of a
future state must follow after it. They were surrendered. But
it was extremely startling when the Genius invoked, not content
with what he had already devoured, broadly hinted that the whole
visible universe would furnish an acceptable sacrifice, -- then
even the most extreme partisans of the school began at length to
be alarmed. It was too much to be borne, that a Genius summoned
up in the very name of order should turn out to be a demon so
5some thought the book had been authored by Kelvin. Thompson
has related that Kelvin disliked the book, but did not trouble himself
to deny authorship.

97
insatiate as this: Must the whole visible universe, indeed,
arrive at such a state as to be totally unfit for the habitation
of living beings? The individual they were content to sacrifice,
perhaps even the race, but they would spare the universe. Un
doubtedly, if it be possible to pity men who could so easily dis
pense with Christianity and immortality, they had at length got
themselves into a deplorable dilemma. For the principle they had
invoked was absolutely without pity, and in the most heartless
manner continued to point towards the sacrifice of the visible
universe. This, they were told, was only a huge fire, and must
ultimately b u m itself out. Nothing would be left but the ashes,
— the dead and worthless body of the present system.
Stewart and Tait used the second law as a weapon against material
ism.

They went further.

Not content with the future prediction of the

second law, they went on to derail conservation as a material principle,
saying (l890:l{?7)> "We may now perhaps imagine, that as a separate exis
tence itself the visible universe will ultimately disappear. . . . ”
How was this accomplished from the standpoint of physical theory?
Recollect (Chapter IV) that Kelvin had advanced the vortex-atom idea,
whereby material atoms were no more than vortexes set spinning in a per
fect or frictionless fluid, the ether.

Tait, who had been experimenting

with metal discs spun in vacuum, noticed that the discs heated up.

He

thought that he had found the ether-drag, or ether friction, posited by
Whewell.

(Actually, his vacuum had not been all that good; he was getting

air resistance).
vortex theory.

However, he utilized his findings to modify Kelvin’s
In Tait’s view, Kelvin’s vortex atoms were spinning in

an imperfect fluid, and thus would eventually die out.

Conservation (or

as they called it, continuity) became metaphysical, applying to the non
material or "invisible universe".

Stewart and Tait stated (1890:1^6-7):

We cannot, in fact, if we agree to hold at the same time the prin
ciple of unbroken continuity and the vortex-ring theory of forma
tion of the visible universe, regard the material whose rotating
parts are ordinary matter as an absolutely perfect fluid. • • •
But if the visible universe be developed from a material which is
not a perfect fluid, then the argument deduced by Sir W. Thomson
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in favour of the eternity of ordinary matter disappears, since
this eternity depends upon the perfect fluidity of that out of
which it was developed. In fine, if we suppose the material uni
verse to be composed of a series of vortex-rings developed from
something which is not a perfect fluid, it will be ephemeral,
just as the smoke-ring which we develop from air, or that which
we develop from water, is ephemeral, the only difference being in
duration, these lasting only for a few seconds, and the others it
may be for billions of years.
The authors continued (1890:191].):
Indeed we can hardly escape from the conclusion that the visible
■universe must in matter, as well as in transformable energy, come
to an end. But the principle of Continuity upon which all such
arguments are based still demanding a continuance of the universe,
we are forced to believe that there is something beyond that which
is visible, or that, to use the words of an old writer (which we
have inscribed on our title-page), — ’the things which are seen
are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.*
In their final chapter, the authors speculated on whether evil
was eternal and whether it would survive the dissolution of this material
universe.

They concluded on scriptural authority that ”We are drawn, if

not forced, to surmise that the dark thread known as evil is one which is
very deeply woven into that garment of God which is called the Universe
• . . we are led to surmise that evil is eternal, and therefore we cannot
easily imagine the Universe without its Ghenna, where the worm dieth not,
and the fire is not quenched” (1890:268).
William K . Clifford’s Reaction
William K. Clifford, a professor of mathematics and mechanics at
University College, London, and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge,
(who was a personal friend of Tait's) commented in the Fortnightly Review
(Clifford, Vol. I, 1901:268ff):
°Kelvin used the vortex atom theory to argue for creation, not
the eternity of matter. Others used the ’’perfection’’ of the atom as an
argument for its eternity.
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This sleepless vengance of fire upon them that have not seen
and have not believed, what has it to do with the gentle patience
of the investigator • • . that will ask only consideration and
not belief. . .?
That which you keep in your hearts, my brothers, is the slen
der remnant of a system which has made its red mark on history,
and still lives to threaten mankind. The grotesque forms of its
intellectual belief have survived the discredit of its moral teach
ing . . . Take heed lest you have given soil and shelter to the
seed of that awful plague which has destroyed two civilisations,
and but barely failed to slay such promise of good as is now
straggling to live among men.
Clifford, religious in his youth, had by the time of that comment
become an agnostic.

Other reactions to The Unseen Universe were diverse.

Knott, Tait's biographer relates (1911:239)•
Truly the reviews and critiques of The Unseen Universe were as
varied as the religious and irreligious views of the critics who
wrote them. To one it was a "masterly treatise," to another it was
full of "the most hardened and impenitent nonsense that ever called
itself original speculation." . . . One critic there was, the ver
satile and brilliant Clifford, who knowing these truths in all their
purely physical significance, gave the authors a terrible trouncing.
Clifford’s views on the second law were given in his essay "First and
Last Catastrophy" (Vol. I, 1901:222ff), initially delivered before the
Sunday Lecture Society in London, I87 I+.

"I propose in this lecture," he.

said, "to consider speculations of quite recent days about the beginning
and the end of the world."

He went forward into a detailed examination

of what he felt the Fourier equations (which were at the heart of Kelvin's
theory) implied and did not imply.

His argument makes a lengthy quotation,

but it is one of the most lucid criticisms of the cosmological application
of the second law that has been given, striking not at the Fourier equa
tions, but the manner of their use.

Clifford said:

A remark was made about thirty years ago by Sir William Thomson
upon the nature of certain problems in the conduction of heat.
These problems had been solved by Fourier many years before in a
beautiful treatise., The theory was that if you knew the degree of
warmth of a body, then you could find what would happen to it
afterwards; you would find how the body would gradually cool.
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Suppose you put the end of a poker in the fire and make it red
hot, that end is very much hotter than the other end; hut if you
take it out and let it cool, you will find that heat is travel
ling from the hot end to the cool end; and the amount of this
travelling, and the temperature at either end of the poker, can
he calculated with great accuracy. This comes out of Fourier’s
theory. Now suppose you try to go backwards in time, and take
the poker at any instant when it is ahout half cool, and say:
’’hoes this equation give me the means of finding out what was
happening before this time, in so far as the present state of
things has been produced by cooling?’’ You will find the equa
tion will give you an account of the state of the poker before
the time when it came into your hands, with great accuracy up
to a certain point; but beyond that point it refuses to give you
any more information, and it begins to talk nonsense. It is in
the nature of a problem of the conduction of heat that it allows
you to trace the forward history of it to any extent you like;
but it will not allow you to trace the history of it backward
beyond a certain point. • . .
If we apply that same consideration to the case of the poker,
and try to trace back its history, you will find that the point
where the equation begins to talk nonsense is the point where
you took it out of the fire. . . .
/Yet, he said/ Upon this remark of Sir William Thomson's
/concerning the Fourier equations/. . • a most singular doctrine
has been founded • . • your speculator comes; he reads a sentence,
and says: ’’Here is an opportunity for me to have my fling.” And
he has his fling, and makes a purely baseless theory about the
necessary origin of the present order of nature at some definite
point of time which might be calculated. But, if we consider
the matter, we shall see that this is not in any way a consequence
of the theory of the conduction of heat; because the, conduction of
heat is not the only process that goes on in the universe.
According to Clifford, then, the cosmological model of the second law was
essentially a speculation, constructed from concepts which, in themselves,
did not necessarily lead in that direction.
Returning for a moment to The Unseen Universe of Stewart and Tait,
it may be said that their particular arguments for the Creation, and 'ul
timate dematerialization of the physical world have long since passed
into oblivion.

However, the direction of their thought has remained.

Eddington, for example, gave a very ’’dematerializing” model of the uni
verse when, in 193U> he said (1959*71 )•
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It has been widely supposed that the ultimate fate of protons
and electrons is to annihilate one another, and release the energy
of their constitution in the form of radiation. If so it would
seem that the universe will finally become a ball of radiation,
becoming more and more rarified . . . About every 1,500 million
years this ball of radio waves will double its diameter; it will
go on expanding in geometrical progression forever.
A future visitor to that universe would find little but a void.

This

theoretical position on the physical world, which seems to embrace the
desire that it finally vanish, is also found in the cosmology of Pierre
Teilhard de Ghardin.

In his Phenomenon of Man (l959i271ff) he recognizes

ever-increasing entropy, and advances the idea that only the soul "escapes
and is liberated from it.
turning back to Omega:

We come /he said^ to escape from entropy by

the hominisation of death itself."

He continues:

"Thus from the grains of thought forming the veritable and indistructable
atoms of its stuff, the (spiritual) universe —
in the outcome —

a well defined universe

goes on building itself above our heads in the inverse

direction of matter which vanishes."
If such a world-prospect is comforting to the believer, it can
produce an entirely different reaction in one who is not.

Bertrand

Russell, faced with the entropic model of the universe, and also adhering
to the essentially materialist faith, penned, in 1923>

Free Man’s Wor

ship" (I9 7 2 :110 ff):
. . . That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of
the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his
hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome
of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no
intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life
beyond the grave; that all the labor of the ages, all the devo
tion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human
genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar
system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must in
evitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins —
all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly
certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.
Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm
foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation hence
forth be safely built.
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In the above words, Russell spoke the mood of others shortly
after the turn of the century.

Reflecting upon the growing certainty

of the cosmological model of the second law, Eddington in 1927 said:
The law that entropy always increases — the second law of
thermodynamics — holds, I think, the supreme position among the
laws of nature. If someone points out to you that your pet
theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s equations—
then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to
be contradicted by observation — well, these experimentalists do
bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be
against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope;
there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.
By 1961* Jacques Barzun could comment (l961*:117), " M o d e m physics
. . . is no longer sure of the 'heat death1 of the universe so popular
with nineteenth-century scientists and so lowering to the spirits of
their audiences.

But . . .

I have nowhere seen any acknowledgement that

it was an historical calamity to have saddened, precisely with the 'heat
death' story, the three generations of men spanned by the lives of Tenny
son and Henry Adams.

Mental suffering is a fact, as important sometimes

as the physical. . . . "

James Clerk Maxwell
Maxwell was "fey" —
biography of Einstein.
side of things.
career.

or so says Ronald Clark somewhere in his

Gentle, poetic, he seemed able to touch the in

He died at the age of 1*7, his work cut short in mid

As a young man of 22 he had written "Reflections from Various

surfaces."

A scrap from it reads (Cambell, 1882:593 )•
Oft in yonder rocky dell
Heath the birches' shadow seated,
I have watched the darksome well,
Where my stooping form, repeated,
Now advanced and now retreated
With the spring's alternate swell,
Till destroyed before completed
As the big drops grew and fell.
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He walked a path closer to nature than man.

Much of his

thought por

tended what has been best in physics since;

among other things it may be

said that his equations on light, equations

which Kelvin

begrudged him,

have stood unchanged by relativity and everything else.
He took a poet's rapture in nature, and an understanding of his
feelings aids appreciation of his physical thought.
him to depart —
ence around him.

and that, strongly —

His feelings caused

from the tradition in English sci

That tradition involved am intensely competitive train

ing toward mastery of objective concepts, expressed if not contained in
mathematical calculation and argued with polish through the upper stages
of education.

Kelvin, who tended to see mathematics as "the only true

metaphysics;" who thrashed every concept into a mechanical form, mathe
matically expressed, was a wholehearted product of that tradition.

Max

well transcended it.
In the same year that Kelvin stated with mathematical virtuosity,
his principle of dissipation, Maxwell wrote "A Vision of a Wrangler, of a
University, of Pedantry, and of Philosophy."

In it he relates being

visited by a hag, embodying the physics taught him:
Angular in form and feature,
Unlike any earthly creature,
She had properties to meet your
Eye whatever you might view.
Hair of pens and skin of paper;
Breath, not breath but chemic vapour;
Dress, — such dress as College Draper
Fashions with precision due.
The voice (he said) the spectre spoke in,
Might be known by many a token
To proceed from metal, broken
When acoustic tricks were tried.
The hag proceeded to call down an unwanted blessing upon him:
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"Powers]" she cried, with horse devotion,
"Give my son the clearest notion
How to compass sure promotion,
And take care of Humber One...
...Mathematics always pays.
Suddenly, (he said) my head inclining,
I beheld a light form shining;
And the withered beldam, whining,
Saw the same and sunk away.
Of this shining light, he said:
I could never finish telling
You of her that has her dwelling
"Where those springs of truth are welling,
Whence all streams of beauty run.
She has taught me that creation
Bears the test of calculation
But that man forgets his station
If he stops when that is done.
Is our algebra the measure
Of that unexhausted treasure
That affords the purest pleasure,
Ever found when it is sought?
Let us rather, realizing
The conclusions thence arising
Nature more than symbols prizing,
Learn to worship as we ought.
(from Campbell, l882:6l2ff.)
Maxwell would submit to neither a mechanical or mathematical
straight jacket; it is somewhat ironic that his equations on light quite
went beyond Kelvin's appreciation (Gray, 1973 005; Thompson, 1910:10l5ff •)
Like Kelvin, Maxwell was a deeply Sincere Christian.

However,

where Kelvin's devotion was traditional and orthodox, Maxwell's was more
theistic and optimistic; God and truth were present in nature.
"Student's Evening Hymn," (l853» Campbell, 1882:595) he said:
Through the creatures Thou has made
Show the brightness of Thy glory,
Be eternal Truth displayed
In their substance transitory,
Till green Earth and Ocean hoary,
Massy rock and tender blade
Tell the same unending story—
We are Truth in form arrayed.

In his

Maxwell did not care much for the second law, and a good bit of
his thought on the subject went toward ways of transcending it.

In a

letter to Peter Tait in 1876 (Knott, 1911:222) he referred to the second
law as an "indignity."

In his review in Nature magazine of "Tait’s

Thermodynamics" (Niven, Vol. II, 1965:660ff) he commented of the second
law, ". . . we have reason to believe that though true, its truth is not
of the same order as that of the first law . . . the second law of thermo
dynamics is continually being violated, and that to a considerable extent
in any sufficiently small group of molecules belonging to a real body. •
In order to take advantage of molecular fluctuations, he conceived of
"small but lively intelligent beings," capable of sorting slow from fast
molecules and thus restoring macroscopic temperature and pressure differ
ences.
Kelvin nicknamed them "demons" and in a paper for Nature magazine
(April 9, l87l+:14i.lf£) entitled "Kinetic Theory of the Dissipation of
Energy," he called up an army of them, all wielding cricket bats, to
fight the advance of energy dissipation.

In so doing, Kelvin anthropo

morphized them, and then dismissed them.

"If," he said, "no selective

influence, such as that of the ideal "demon", guides individual molecules
the average result of their free motions and collisions must be to equal
ize the distribution of energy. . . . "
In an undated letter to Tait (Knott, 1911:211+) Maxwell grumbled,
"Concerning Demons.

Who gave them this name?

suggest the demon as a valve.

Thomson."

He went on to

"As such," he said, "value him.

Call him

no more a demon but a valve like that of the hydraulic ram, suppose."
Maxwell's Demon has been batted around sporadically in physics
literature ever since.

Most treatments (see for example Bent, 196£:72ff.
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and Feynman, Vol. I, 1963 :l+6-lff) in one way or another dismiss him.
But he refuses to quite go away.

Bridgman (1969:5-6) has commented-"Max

well and his demon (were) met by the pious hope that for some inscrutable
reason no demon would ever be able to crash the gate of our laboratories.
But today, when it is so easy to conjure the capricious happenings of the
atomic world up into the control of events on the scale of daily life.. . •
I believe that many physicists honestly do not know whether or not to
think that a sufficiently ingenious combination of means now in our con
trol might violate the second law on a commercially profitable scale."
Maxwell argued for Creation, but he argued his own way and ignored
the second law in this respect.

In a manner consistent with his poetic

muse, he held that the unchangability and perfection of the atom indicated
its creation at the hands of God.

He argued this in his inaugural address

as president of the British Association in 1873*

Tyndall jumped him on

that conclusion, in his own inaugural address the following year.

The

positions of the two men are pure cases; the theist arguing that the phy
sical perfection of the world implies its creation, the materialist fol
lowing as devil’s advocate with the point that a "perfect" physical world
needs, after all, no Creator.

Maxwell had begun his argument with the

Lucretian concept of the eternity of the atom (Niven, Vol. II, 1965:373^*)*
He said:
In his dream of nature, as Tennyson tells us, he (Lucretius)
"Saw the flaring atom-streams
And torrents of her myriad universe,
Huining along the illimitable inane,
Fly on to clash together again, and make
Another and another frame of things
For ever.
Against this Maxwell advanced his inference of Creation:
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No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the simi
larity of molecules, for evolution necessarily implies continuous
change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of gen
eration or destruction.
None of the processes of Nature, since the time when Nature
began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties
of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the
existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to
the operation of any of the causes which we call natural.
On the other hand, the exact equality of each molecule to all
others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well
said, the essential character of a manufactured article,7 and pre
cludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. . . .
Science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand,
that the molecule has been made, and on the other, that it has not
been made by any of the processes we call natural. . . . We have
reached the utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have
admitted that because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent
it must have been created. . . • molecules . . . the foundation
stones of the material universe — remain unbroken and unworn.
They continue this day as they were created — perfect in num
ber and measure and weight, and from the ineffaceable characters
impressed on them we may learn that those aspirations after accur
acy in measurement, truth in statement, and justice in action,
which we reckon among our noblest attributes as men, are ours be
cause they are essential constituents of the image of Him who in
the beginning created, not only the heaven and the earth, but the
materials of which heaven and earth consist.
,f— I doubt,” rejoined Tyndall in his own address, '"'the legitimacy
of Maxwell's logic, but it is impossible not to feel the ethic glow with
which his lecture concludes" (Nature, August 20, 1874:312).
Maxwell was incapable of defending himself with the "argument
from perfection" which he had assumed.

All he could do was write, in

7C. J. Munro, in a letter to Nature magazine (October l£, 1874>
p. 4£l) sniped, "There are precidents to justify a hope that it would be
no extension beyond the province of Nature, if somebody who knows that
molecules possess the essential character of a manufactured article were
kindly to explain how he knows a manufactured article when he sees it..."
M. Wurtz, in his inaugural address as president of the French Association
for the Advancement of Science in 1874> paralleled Maxwell's address of
the preceeding year. Wurtz concluded (ambivalently), "It is in vain
that science has revealed to it the structure of the world and the order
of all the phenomena; it wishes to mount higher, and in the conviction
that things have not in themselves their own 'raison d'etre,' their sup
port and their origin, it is led to subject them to a first cause —
unique, universal God" (Nature, Vol. 10, August 27, l$7ht P* 3?0)*
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frustration, several poems.

In one, "Notes of the President's address"

(l87i|-» from Campbell, l882:637£f») he mused:
There is nothing but atoms and void, all else
is mere whims out of dateI
Then why should a man curry favour with beings
who cannot exist,
To compass some petty promotion in nebulous
kingdoms of mist?
In "Song of the Cub," written the same evening of Tyndall's address, he
said:
0 where are those high feasts of Science?
0 where are those words of the wise?
1 hear but the roar of Red Lions,”
1 eat what their Jackal supplies.
The next day, in "Molecular evolution" he penned:
Yield, then, ye rules of rigid reason!
Dissolve, thou too, too solid sense!
Melt into nonsense for a season,
Then in some nobler form condense.
Who was closer to the truth, Tyndall or Maxwell?

Nothing but a

pure faith (as Aquinas held) can decide, within the. scope of the argument
from perfection.

If one wanted a "muscle" argument, one resorted to Kel

vin's law of dissipation, but Maxwell would not use that; he remained
aloof.
Perhaps his most gentle, yet telling caution concerning Kelvin's
derivation of universal "dissipation" from the Fourier equations was
given in his "Address to the Mathematical and Physical Sections of the
British Association," September 15» 1870 (Niven, Vol. II, 1965:22£ff.).
After having given all of Kelvin's arguments for the second law from the
Fourier equations, he said,

^Red Lions: another name for the British Association, used when
the association congregated informally for drink and conversation.
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But the mind of man is not,, like Fourier1s heated body, con
tinually settling down into an ultimate state of quiet uniformity,
the character of which we can already predict; it is rather like
a tree, shooting out branches which adapt themselves to the new
aspects of the sky towards which they climb, and roots which con
tort themselves among the strange strata of the earth into which
they delve, To_ us_ who breathe only the spirit of our own age, and
know only the characteristics of contemporary thought, it is as
impossible to predict the general tone of the science of the future
as it is to anticipate the particular discoveries which it will
make.
Physical research is continually revealing to us new features
of natural processes, and we are thus compelled to search for new
forms of thought appropriate to these features. Hence the impor
tance of a careful study of those relations between Mathematics and
Physics which determine the conditions under which the ideas derived
from one department of physics may be safely used in forming ideas
to be employed in a new department.
(Enphasis added)
If one wants hard physical evidence to stand upon, there is none
in the above.

There is only a caution about the use of the Fourier equa

tions, and a metaphor about man’s mind, trees, and growth (Tyndall had
used the same metaphor).

A. N. Whithead, whose thought we shall come to

in Chapter VII, picked up the same thread, and in The Function of Reason
(1 9 2 9 ) continued it with respect to the second law.

CHAPTER

DEVELOPMENTS

ON

VI

THE

CONTINENT

The scope of this thesis does not permit an extensive treatment
of continental thought on the second law.

However, the contributions of

Clausius, Planck, and Boltzmann in particular are essential to the inter
pretation of the second law today, and must he included.
Clausius
Clausius developed the second law in Germany over virtually the
same time period that Kelvin developed it in England.

The two men had

some correspondence, and in certain ways the thought of each influenced
the other.

The mathematical measure of dissipated (or unavailable) energy

Clausius called "entropy;M the term is in universal use today.

In his

"Ninth Memoir" (Poggendorff’s Annalen, 186 £, in Cardwell, 1971s273)>
Clausius stated:
If for the entire universe we conceive the same magnitude to be
determined consistently and with due regard to all the circum
stances, which for a single body I have called the entropy, and
if at the same time we introduce the other and simpler conception
of energy, we may express in the following manner the fundamental
laws of the universe which correspond to the two fundamental
theorems of the mechanical theory of heat.
(1) The energy of the universe is constant
(2 ) The entropy of the universe tends to a maximum.
What were Clausius’ philosophical thoughts on ever-increasing
entropy as a law of the universe?
cal records are silent.

Unfortunately, the surviving histori

Dr. E. Daub, one of Clausius’ recent biographers,
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Ill
has related that Clausius appears to have seen the second law as "consis
tent with the historical p r o c e s s * O f Clausius1 statement in the Ninth
Memoir, Cardwell has commented (1971:273)*
This is not a balanced, symmetrical, self-perpetuating universe,
as the development of rational mechanics, building on the founda
tions of Newton’s System of the world, seemed so confidently to
indicate. It is a universe tending inexorably to doom, to the
atrophy of a ’heat death’, in which no energy at all will be
available although none will have been destroyed; and the com
plementary condition is that the entropy of the universe will be
at its maximum.
Historical data on Clausius is frustratingly scanty.

In his

biography of Clausius (in Gillispie, Vol. Ill, 1971:303DD«) Daub states
that Clausius received " . . . his early education at a small private
school that his father had established and was serving as pastor and
principal."

However, neither the denomination of the school, nor Claus

ius’ religious affiliation is known.
which means "God with us."
p
Lutheran.

Clausius’ middle name is Immanuel,

Dr. Daub has speculated that he may have been

The first half of Clausius1 life was professionally the most pro
ductive.

A leg wound during the Franco-Prussian War, and later family

tragedy curtailed his productive work.

In his biography of Clausius,

Daub (Gillispie, Vol. Ill, 1971:310) concludes:
Clausius’ great legacy to physics is undoubtedly his idea of the
irreversible increase in entropy, and yet we find no indication of
interest in Josiah Gibb's work on chemical equilibrium or Boltz
mann’s views on thermodynamics and probability, both of which were
utterly dependent on his idea. It is strange that he himself
showed no inclination to seek a molecular understanding of irrevers
ible entropy or to find further applications of the idea; it is
stranger yet, and even tragic, that he expressed no concern for
the work of his contemporaries who were accomplishing those very
tasks.
iGiven in personal conversation.
2Ibid.
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Max Planck
In his Scientific Autobiography

, Max Planck relates

that Clausius’ "lucic style and enlightening clarity of reasoning made
an enormous impression” on him.

Planck considered the second law to he

of fundamental significance, and in his Doctoral Dissertation he went on
to develop the concept of irreversibility.

Elsewhere, Planck has expressed

the view that ". . . nature is ruled by a rational, purposive will,” in
corporating both a "causa efficiens" and a "causa finalis” (Planck, 19U9s
I77 -I8 O).

His idea of the importance of irreversibility in thermodynamic

processes is harmonious with that outlook.

Planck relates his views on

the second law and irreversibility as follows (l9i+9!l6ff.):
Clausius deduced his proof of the Second Law of Thermodynamics
from the hypothesis that "heat will not pass spontaneously from a
colder to a hotter body." But this hypothesis must be supplemented
by a clarifying explanation. For it is meant to express not only
that heat will not pass directly from a colder into a warmer body,
but also that it is impossible to transmit, by any means, heat from
a colder into a hotter body without there remaining in nature some
change to serve as compensation.
In my endeavor to clarify this point as fully as possible, I
discovered a way to express this hypothesis in a form which I con
sidered to be simpler and more convenient, namely: "The process
of heat conduction cannot be completely reversed by any means."
This expresses the same idea as the wording of Clausius, but with
out requiring an additional clarifying explanation. A process
which in no manner can be completely reversed I called a "natural"
one. The term for it in universal use today is: "Irreversible."
Yet, it seems impossible to eradicate an error which arises
out of an all too narrow interpretation of Clausius' law, an error
against which I have fought untiringly all my life. To this very
day, instead of the definition I just mentioned, one often finds
irreversibility defined as "An irreversible process is one which
cannot take place in the opposite direction." This formulation is
insufficient. For it is quite possible to conceive of a process
which cannot take place in the opposite direction but which can in
some fashion be completely reversed.
. . . in the case of an irreversible process the terminal state
is in a certain sense more important than the initial state — as
if, so to speak, Nature "preferred" it to the latter. I saw a meas
ure of this "preference" in Clausius’ entropy. . . . I worked out
these ideas in my doctoral dissertation at the University of Munich,
which I completed in 1879*
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Planck's dissertation had a varying reception.
"Helmholtz probably did not even read my paper at all.
pressly disapproved of its contents . . .
Clausius.

He comments that,
Kirchhoff ex

I did not succeed in reaching

He did not answer my letters, and I did not find him at home

when I tried to see him in person. . ." (191+9:19) •
Planck relates that for a long time he was opposed to atomism
(and the existence of atoms); and that in his later contacts with Boltz
mann, who brilliantly developed atomic theory, " . . . Boltzmann assumed
that ill-tempered tone which he continued to exhibit toward me . . . It
was only in the last years of his life, when I informed him of the atom
istic foundation for my radiation law, that he assumed a friendlier atti
tude" (191+9:33)»

Planck's experiences finally led him to advance a rather

biting theory of scientific advance —

"a remarkable one," in his view:

"A new scientific truth does not. triumph by convincing its opponents and
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."
Planck held definite religious-scientific views.

He maintained

that "Science and religion, in their ultimate effects, are headed for
the same goal, the recognition of an omnipotent intellect ruling the uni
verse . . .

The victory of atheism would not only destroy the most valu

able treasures of our civilization, but —

what is even worse —

annihilate the very hope for a better life" (191+9:76, 15>6).

would

"Religion

and natural science," he held, "are fighting a joint battle in an inces
sant, never relaxing crusade against skepticism and against dogmatism,
against disbelief and against superstition, and the rallying cry in this
crusade has always been, and always will be: f0n to GodI'" (191+9:187)*

Ludwig Boltzmann
To a greater extent than anyone else on the continent, Ludwig
Boltzmann is credited with the reduction of the classical, macroscopic
statement of the second law to statistical-mechanical, atomic assumptions.
Boltzmann, working in Vienna in the latter quarter of the nineteenth cen
tury, championed atomic theory through the period when it was under
heavy attack.
was . . .

Brush relates (l961+:12) that during this period, "There

a growing reaction against 'scientific materialism,' and a

movement to replace atomic theories by purely descriptive theories based
only on macroscopic variables."

As a result, Boltzmann's last and most

thorough treatment of the subject, his Lectures on Gas Theory (1 8 9 8 ) held
a polemic flavor.

He said (S. Brush, tr., 1961+:2l6), "In my opinion, it

would be a great tragedy for science if the theory of gases were tempor
arily thrown into oblivion because of a momentarily hostile attitude to
it . . .

I am conscious of being only an individual struggling weakly

against the stream of time.

But it still remains in my power to contri

bute in such a way that, when the theory of gases is again revived, not
too much will have to be rediscovered*" Boltzmann's Lectures on Gas
Theory are, comments Brush, ". . . a n acknowledged masterpiece of theore3
tical physics."
In it he gave his final reflections on entropy, postu
lating an entropy-symmetrical universe.
Was Boltzmann a materialist?

V. I. Lenin (Vol. XIII, 1927:21+5)

has commented that "Boltzmann was, of course, afraid to call himself a
^Sadly, Brush relates (l961+:17)> "Boltzmann's pessimism about the
future of the kinetic theory • . . deepened in the following years, and
led to fits of severe depression, culminating in his suicide in 1 9 0 6 .
This suicide must be ranked as one of the great tragedies in the history
of science, made all the more ironic by the fact that the scientific
world made a complete turnaround in the next few years, and accepted the
existence of atoms. . . ."
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materialist and even made it plain that he had nothing against the Divine
Being.

But his theory of knowledge is essentially materialistic. . . . "

"Consequently," comments Brush (1961+: 11+), "Boltzmann now has the dubious
distinction of being a hero of scientific materialism in the eyes of the
Marxists."

Yet Boltzmann himself does not quite seem to fit that mold.

In his foreword to Part I of his Lectures, he gives the keynote statement
1+
"Alles Vergangliche 1st nur ein Gleichness!" — which, translated rough
ly, "means that all transitory (i.e., earthly) things are only symbols
or reflections (of reality)" (Brush, 1961+:2l).

The keynote of the fore

word to his Part II (196!+:215) reads, "The impossibility of an incompen5
sated decrease of entropy seems to be reduced to an improbability."
Boltzmann did not care for the heat death idea advanced upon the
theory of ever-increasing entropy.

Of it he said (1961+;1+1+6), "With all

due recognition to the caution which must be observed in going beyond
the direct consequences of experience, it must be granted that these
consequences (of the second law) are hardly satisfactory, and the dis
covery of a satisfactory way of avoiding them would be very desirable. . ."
He proceeded to offer the following model of the universe (1961+:l+l|.6 ff.):
Application to the universe.
Is the apparent irreversibility of all known natural processes
consistent with the idea that all natural events are possible with
out restriction? Is the apparent unidirectionality of time consis
tent with the infinite extent or cyclic nature of time? He who
tries to answer these questions in the affirmative sense must use
as a model of the world a system whose temporal variation is deter
mined by equations in which the positive and negative directions of
time are equivalent, and by means of which the appearance of irre
versibility over long periods of time is explicable by some special
^From Goethe, Faust, Part II, Act V, final "Chorus Mysticus."
^From J. Willard Gibbs (Trans. Conn. Acad. 3> 229, 1875:198 in>
Ostwald's German edition).
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assumption. But this is precisely what happens in the atomic view
of the world.
One can think of the world as a mechanical system of an enorm
ously large number of constituents, and of an immensely long period
of time, so that the dimensions of that part containing our own
"fixed stars" are minute compared to the extension of the universe;
and times that we call eons are likewise minute compared to such a
period. Then in the universe, which is in thermal equilibrium
throughout and therefore dead, there will occur here and there
relatively small regions of the same size as our galaxy (we call
them single worlds) which, during the relative short time of eons,
fluctuate noticeably from thermal equilibrium, and indeed the state
probability in such cases will be equally likely to increase or
decrease . . . By virtue of this terminology, such small isolated
regions of the universe will always find themselves "initially" in
an improbable state. This method seems to me to be the only way in
which one can understand the second law — the heat death of each
single world — without a unidirectional change of the entire uni
verse from a definite initial state to a final state. . . •
Phillip Frank (l9M>:2l+ff.), considering Boltzmann’s interpreta
tion of entropy fluctuation, has commented in the following way:
The sequence "rare state-frequent state" happens as often as
"frequent state-rate state". This means that the universe has al
ready traversed a great many, cycles. All the rare states have
appeared and disappeared and will reappear again. This universe
is, in the sense of ancient philosophy, an Epicurean universe.
The origin of the sun, the earth, the elements, and even of our
own human race is due to the law of chance. . . .
These considerations are pertinent for the attitude of philo
sophers toward the principles of thermodynamics. A great many
philosophic interpretations of physics have made use of the prin
ciple of increasing entropy to bolster up an anti-mechanistic
teleological view of the universe which invokes a tendency, a
direction toward a certain end, instead of a causal chain of
events. Unfortunately, the trend of events, if we take thermo
dynamics for granted, tends toward destruction of the universe.
If we, on the other hand, replace pure thermodynamics by the kine
tic theory of heat (laws of motion + statistical hypotheses) we
. . . accept the Epicurean view that every tendency toward an end
is an illusion and the real actor in the evolution of the world is
a play of chances and the survival of the fittest. There is no
real irrecoverability.
On the other hand, Henry Bent, in his book The Second Law (l96$:
13 £ff.), edits the idea of entropy fluctuations from his presentation of

Boltzmann;

gives Boltzmann’s measure of entropy together with the state

ment that it "always increases in a spontaneous process (and) is never
negative" (1 9 6 5 :1 3 8 );

draws no philosophical conclusions.

Bent himself presents an "Obituary" on Maxwell's Demon (1965:76)
and elsewhere (1 9 6 5 :5 2 ) comments:
Complete conversion of thermal energy to work is virtually impos
sible; it is . . . about as likely as the transcription of Shake
speare's complete works by a tribe of wild monkeys punching ran
domly on a set of typewriters. In all likelihood no one will wit
ness either event; moreover, as once noted, were someone to see
thermal energy completely converted to work, or monkey-business
turn out Shakespeare, he probably would not believe it. . . .
Bent has taken a definite stance regarding entropy decreases.
His views represent the position taken since the turn of the century by
other physicists.

In her 1959 introduction to The Conceptual Foundations

c
°In the passage which Bent quotes, Boltzmann had been introducing
his entropy-fluctuating cosmos, and contrasting it with the entropyincreasing model from general .thermodynamics. Boltzmann's comment is
given below; Bent's selection is underlined.
If therefore we conceive of the world as an enormously large
mechanical system composed of an enormously large number of atoms,
which starts from a completely ordered initial state, and even at
present is still in a substantially ordered state, then we obtain
consequences which actually agree with the observed facts; al
though this conception involves from a purely theoretical — I
might say philosophical — standpoint, certain new aspects which
contradict general thermodynamics based on a purely phenomenologi
cal viewpoint. General thermo dynamics proceeds from the fact that
as far as we can tell from our experience up to now, all natural
processes are irreversible. Hence according to the principles of
phenomenol ogy, the general thermodynamics of the second law if
formulated in such a way that the unconditional irreversibility of
all natural processes is asserted as a so-called axiom . . .
general thermodynamics~7 ~without prejudice to its unshakable impor
tance) also requires the cultivation of mechanical models repre
senting it, in order to deepen our knowledge of nature — not in
spite of, but rather precisely because these models do not always
cover the same ground as general thermodynamics, but instead offer
a glimpse of a_ new viewpoint.
(The new viewpoint leads directly to the quotation from Boltzmann given
on pages 1 1 5 -1 1 6 of this chapter.)
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of The Statistical Method in Mechanics (Leipzig, 1912; N.Y., 1959:x)
Tatiana Eherenfest comments, ". . . even today many physicists are still
following Clausius, and for them the second law of thermodynamics is
still identical with the statement that the entropy can only increase."
In the hook, she and Paul Eherenfest comment (l9$9:79)s
Boltzmann . . . explicitly admits cases where the entropy
spontaneously decreases. Planck, on the other hand, decides in
the opposite way in connection with the same case and, generaliz
ing, emphases the following. The physicist is free to exclude by
a special physical hypothesis those deviations which would result
in the violation of the uniqueness which is admitted for the macro
scopic changes (in time) of a physical phenomenon. Usually the
physicist will avoid making a definite decision. He is inclined
simply to disregard the strong deviations from the most probable
on the basis of their being so "enormously improbable." Or, even
more generally, he will refuse to discuss such distant consequences
of a physical theory.
This comment may be taken as characterizing orthodox physics since the
turn of the century.

Entropy decrease has seemed impossible to many.

Yet, within a mere handful of years, the whole question has been
reopened by black hole theory and the virtual confirmation of a black
hole in Cygnus X-l last year.

It seems almost embarrassing.

The black

hole, in believable if non-relativistic theoretical form, has been on
n
our back shelf since it was advanced by Laplace in 1796.

?Refer back to pp. 1 0 -1 2 and p. 18 of the introduction for dis
cuss ion♦
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Introduction
We have covered, in some cases briefly, in others at length, the
position of many thinkers on the second law.

From the time of Newton on

ward, British thought has stood forward, making a unique contribution to
the dialogue surrounding the law.

Particularly is this so with regard

to the philosophical foundations of the law, and in this final chapter we
will focus on the British tradition, following out some of the reflections
of A. N. Whitehead and C. P. Snow.
The Summarizing Table
To begin, let us summarize and locate in tabular form the posi
tions of the writers we have looked at.

The table is given on page 120.

The writers are located with reference to two conceptual dimensions:
(l) belief concerning the objective truth of the second law as a univer
sal principle, and (2) adherence to a particular philosophical-religious
outlook.

In the table, positions on the second law are given as pro,

open and con.

These positions are to a degree mutually exclusive, but

may be regarded as close to a continuum.

The philosophical-religious

categories are traditional Christian, optimistic Christian, and material
ist.

These three terms actually cover a number of possible distinctions.
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The term materialism is used here to cover a range of outlooks which cen
ter around the belief that matter is the real and sufficient substrate
of the world.

The two religious distinctions are more complex.

Gener

ally, the term "traditional Christian" implies personal devotion directed
toward a personal God defined by Biblical revelation.

The Bible states

in addition a specific cosmology (see pp. 3^-38) which provides the foun
dation for the traditional outlook.

The term "optimistic Christian" in

cludes a variety of beliefs which share the common concept that the
Divine essence sustains the universe in a continuing manner (see particu
larly p. Uo).
The pre-Christian philosophers whom we have considered —
Aristotle and Democritus —

Plato,

have been omitted from the table, as the set

of ideas underlying discussion of the second law since the start of the
Christian era —

those of an absolute beginning and an absolute end of

the physical universe, with a linear historical path in between —
absent from their concepts.

were

Though these men are omitted from the table,

it must be said that their thoughts were influential with respect to most
of the writers included.
scientific materialism.

Democritus is considered to be a founder of
Plato has powerfully influenced both the tradi

tional and the optimistic strains of Christianity, each strain picking
up the mood of the man most congruent with its own outlook.

Aristotle

stands between these two other philosophers, at least with respect to the
passages which were chosen from him.
Two men, Dampier and Whitehead, have been located on the table in
anticipation of their views to be given in this chapter.
been located with a question mark after his name.

Clausius has

The men included in

the table are listed alphabetically under each philosophical-religious

122
category.
gories.

The positions of certain men border upon or cut across cate
The positions of Newton and Russell deserve special comment in

this regard.

Newton, while an orthodox or traditional Christian in many

ways, held to the personal outlook that the Lord God was a presently
active entity in the -universe.

As a result, although he was sensitive

to the possibility of a "heat death," he in no way advanced it.

Russell

presents the picture of a man subscribing to philosophical materialism
and the second law at the same time.

He was not, however, a man advo

cating the truth of the second law but a man groaning over it.
Discussion of the Table
The first conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the posi
tions of the writers on the objective truth of the second law as a uni
versal principle varied considerably, being predominantly consistent with
their religious and philosophical outlook.

The professional physicists

were no different than the other writers in this respect.
is interesting.

This finding

Presumably, the physicists would be more oriented than

the other writers toward the body of factual evidence relevant to the
truth or falsity of the second law.

The evidence being roughly the same

for all, particularly from the 18£0's onward, one might expect some con
vergence of views.

Yet the views of the physicists did not converge.

Instead they varied with philosophical and religious outlook.

Does this

variation indicate that the philosophical and religious positions of
these men led their physics?
In some sense this appears to be the case.

The statements of the

physicists on the second law, and here we refer most directly to Kelvin,
Tyndall, Clifford, Maxwell, Stewart and Tait (all of whom knew each other
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personally), were in few ways similar to m o d e m textbook statements on
the second law.

In the textbook tradition, theory is related to empiric

facts and little else.

Yet, Kelvin talked less of facts and more of

mathematical metaphysics, seeing in the Fourier equations Creation it
self.

Tyndall snorted about a clockmaker God and propounded Democritean

philosophy.

Clifford tore into Christianity and misuse of the Fourier

equations alike.

Maxwell talked of trees, demons, and the mind of man.

Stewart and Tait endorsed "dissipation" and tried to replace physical
conservation with metaphysical continuity.

The statements of these

writers hardly fit the textbook model of "doing" physics.

The same thing

may be said with regard to the thoughts of Newton, Whewell, Boltzmann and
Planck.

It is of interest to inquire why this is the case.

For one thing,

these men were from the outset interested in a great deal more than facts
in hand.

They were concerned rather with the overall character of the

universe.
prove? —

In this task the question was not —
but rather, what do they intimate?

what do the facts in hand

Philosophy and religion

provided alternative conceptual frameworks within which the same facts
could suggest different conclusions.

The conclusion of each man, con

sidered singly, may appear extreme.

Stewart and Tait are a particular

case in point.
—

In light of such extremity, the textbook model of science

physics sans philosophy, may appear safer, better.

Yet it may be

asked whether the philosophical-physical statements of these men might
not, when taken as a unified dialogue, be superior to a more astringent
empiricism.

This last question leads to a consideration of the tradi

tion of philosophical debate in science which historically existed in
Britain; its use through the 1880’s, its effective demise at the turn of
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the century, and the efforts of Whithead and Snow in particular to re
store it.

We will find these men concerned to re-establish a full and

rounded dialogue in science; at the same time, we will find them drawn
as if by a magnet to the second law.

We shall finally ask:

is the

second law the finished product presented in modem texts, or is it a
great and unresolved puzzle, incapable of reformulation without the re
union of philosophy and physics?
The British Tradition
No short exposition, such as this one must be, can properly treat
the subject next to hand.

A brief view of certain aspects, a few exam

ples to help the imagination —

these must suffice to reconstruct in the

reader’s eye "an heroic age in science" (Eiseley, 1961:20).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century England had, with re
spect to science, two cultures:

one to be found in the country at large,

the other shared by a relative handful of highly trained (if parsimoni
ously supported) men, cloistered in the universities.

England had begun,

to industrialize, but she was virtually unaware of the need for a largescale science to undergird these efforts.

In the early part of the cen

tury, the British men of science started to do something extraordinary
about that situation.

They organized to sell an entire nation —

merely on science, but on scientific thought as a way of life.

not

To a

significant degree, they succeeded, and it is of interest to discover the
elements leading to that success.
The type of education which these men received was one element.
They were drilled in Greek, Latin and the classics, and were acquainted
with the great philosophical and religious systems of history.

On the
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other hand, mathematics was undergoing development, and a complex, mathe
matical dialogue in physics was emerging.
ing emphasis.

Empirical enquiry was receiv

Mathematics and empirics combined to produce an increas

ingly technical science.

More and more such science required speciali

zation, more and more it seemed to auger the later split between what are
now called the humanities and the sciences.
occurred.

But the split had not yet

Physical science was still 'natural philosophy.'

Education was grueling, being as much a contest in sheer endur
ance, in ability to overcome the insatiate demands of the "angry bell" as
anything else.

While a Cambridge student, Maxwell wrote exhaustedly

(Campbell, 1882:63l):
Late to bed and early rising,
Ever luxury despising,
Ever training, never "sizing,"
I have suffered with the rest. . .
In class, s t e m discipline presided over a competitive format.

The

classes which Kelvin himself taught are illuminating in this regard.
Gray (1908:95) relates that Kelvin felt "oral examination and the train
ing of individual students in the art of clear and ready expression" to
be essential.'*’ Kelvin had, in his turn, undergone "oral examination" in

■^Gray, himself a student of Kelvin's relates some memories on
this point (l908:28lff.):
The writer will never forget the lecture-room when he first
beheld it, from his place on Bench VIII, a few days after the
beginning of session 1874-5* Sir William Thomson, with activity
emphasised rather than otherwise by his lameness, came in with the
students, passed behind the table, and, putting up his eye-glass,
surveyed the apparatus set out. Then, as the students poured in,
an increasing stream, the alarm weight was released by the bellringer, and fell slowly some four or five feet, from the top of the
clock to a platform below. By the time the weight had descended
the students were in their places, and then, as Thomson advanced to
the table, all rose to their feet, and he recited the third Collect
from the Morning Service of the Church of England. • . •
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his father's class, and it was a training to think on one's feet, under
adverse and searching query.

Such thinking involved not only facts and

mathematics, but broadly philosophical theory as well.

Kelvin felt

that " . . . in science there were two stages of progress —

a natural

history stage and a natural philosophy stage" (Gray, 1908:88).

In the

latter stage comprehensive theory was developed, and he placed few stric
tures on such development.

"Science is bound," Kelvin said, "by the

everlasting law of honour, to face fearlessly every problem that can
fairly be presented to it" (Thompson, Vol. II, 1910:1011).
To Kelvin, theoretical debate was meat and drink.
he would "brainstorm" at top speed.

Stimulated,

Gray relates that he was "inspiring

Then the Professor began his lecture, generally with the exam
ination of one of the students, who rose in his place when his
name was called. . . . The names of the students to be questioned
were selected at random from the class register, or by a kind of
lottery, carried out by placing a small card for each student in a
box on the table, and drawing a name whenever a member of the class
was to be examined. The interest in the drawing each day was in
tense, for there was a glorious uncertainty as to what might be the
line of examination adopted. Sometimes in the midst of a criticism
of an answer, an idea would suddenly occur to the Professor, and
he would enlarge upon it, until the forgotten examinee slipped
quietly back into his seat, to be no more disturbed at least for
that day! And how great the relief if the ordeal was well passed
and the card was placed in that receptacle of the blessed, the
compartment reserved for those who had been called and duly passed
the assize! But there was a third compartment reserved for the
cards of those unfortunates who failed to satisfy the judge! The
reader may have anticipated the fact that the three divisions of
this fateful box were commonly known to students by the names of
the three great habitations of spirits described in the Divina
Commedia of Dante. • • . The ordeal was dreaded by backward stu
dents, whom Thomson found, as he said, aphasic, when called on to
answer in examination, but who certainly were anything but aphasic
in more congenial circumstances. Occasionally they abstained from
responding to their names, modestly seeking the seclusion of the
crowd, and some little time would be spent in ascertaining whether
the examinee-designate was present. When at last he was discovered,
he generally rose with a fervent appeal to his fellows on either
side to help him in his need.

to the best students . . . his enthusiasm infectious.
ordinary student . . . he was not so successful.

But with the

He saw too much while

he spoke; new ideas or novel modes of viewing old ones presented them
selves unexpectedly, associations crowded upon his mind, and he was apt
to be discursive, to the perplexity of all except those whose minds were
endued also with something of the same kind of physical instinct or per
ception" (1908:311).

But Kelvin had little time for the ordinary student.

He, like the system of education around him, was concerned with training
that small group of greatest ability.
If Kelvin was the autocrat of his classroom,

2

he held his stu

dents in a sense of nervous excitement and dramatic stimulation.

He

passed strong judgment on both people and ideas, and his demonstrations
tended to be attention-getters.

One demonstration involved discharging

a Jacob (big game) rifle in the classroom.

Gray comments (1908:288),

^Gray relates (1908:287):
On one occasion, after working out part of a calculation on
the long fixed blackboard on the wall behind the table, his chalk
gave out, and he dropped his hand down to the long ledge which pro
jected from the bottom of the board to find another piece. Hone
was just there; and he had to walk a step or two to obtain one.
So he enjoined McFarlane, his assistant, who was always in atten
dance, to have a sufficient number of pieces on the ledge in future,
to enable him to find one handy wherever he might need it. Mc
Farland forgot the injunction, or could not obtain more chalk at
the time, and the same thing happened next day. So the command was
issued, "McFarlane, I told you to get plenty of chalk, and you
haven't done it. How have a hundred pieces of chalk on this ledge
to-morrow; remember, a hundred pieces; I will count them!" McFar
lane, afraid to be caught napping again, sent that afternoon for
several boxes of chalk, and carefully laid the new shining white
sticks on the shelf, all neatly parallel at an angle to the edge.
The shelf was about sixteen feet long, so that there was one piece
of chalk for every two inches, and the effect was very fine. The
class next morning was delighted, and very appreciative of McFar
lane^ diligence. Thomson came in, put up his eye-glass, looked
at the display, smiled sweetly, and, turning to the applauding stu
dents, began his lecture.
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"The front bench students were always in a state of excitement, mingled
in some cases perhaps with a little trepidation.

For the target was very

near them . . . the solemn stillness with which the aiming and adjust
ments had been witnessed was succeeded by vociferous applause."

In

another favorite demonstration, the "dew Drop," Kelvin slowly filled a
rubber membrane with water, until it grew quite large.

He would lecture

on surface tension while it grew ever larger, nudging it gently with a
pointer the while.

It finally burst.

Gray notes (1908:291), "A large

tub had been placed below to receive the water, but the deluge always
extended over the whole floor space behind the table, and was greeted
with rapturous applause."
These nostalgic tales of Gray's illustrate a point of importance.
Kelvin placed a premium on capacity for "clear and ready expression" by
a student under fire.
popping demonstrations.

He was a keen theorist, and he gave eye (and ear)
As well as being a mathematical empiricist,

Kelvin was a natural philosopher, a debator, and a dramatic showman.
These latter talents would become vital in selling science to the nation
as a whole.
Kelvin was not alone among the British men of science in holding
and exercising, such talents.

The educational tradition of the British
A

men of science virtually ensured that there would be a well-rounded "top"
group, which thrived on strong debate.

(Competition for the positions

of first and second wrangler in the tripos, or final examinations, served
to emphasize that debating outlook. )

^Throughout his life, Kelvin rankled over having come out second
wrangler.
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Kelvin, Tyndall, Tait, Stewart, Clifford, Huxley, and many others
were men of the above tradition.

(Maxwell was less inclined to strong

debate, being more the gentle poet.)

Now this training and orientation

might have produced no more than some brilliant "pedantry" as Maxwell
called it, in small circles behind college walls.
in fact it did, with respect to the tripos.

It has been held that

However, beginning in the

1820's a further ingredient was infused into the situation.

The scien

tists began to claim, and increasingly gained, the attention of the British
nation.

This audience in thrn afffected the scientists.
In the 1830 rs the British Association for the Advancement of

Science was founded.

Shortly thereafter, Nature nagazine was started,

and it served as the mouthpiece of the Association.
unique.

The magazine was

It provided a "round table" for discussion and contribution by

professional and amateur alike. • The magazine carried full reports of the
meetings and addresses of the Association, the special nature walks, lec
tures and outings which they sponsored, and the comments —
humorous, and personal —

that came in from all quarters.

scientific,
For instance,

a ladies' garden club noticed and wrote in to the magazine about a rare
double rainbow they had seen; Maxwell had seen it from another place,
and he wrote the following week in response.

When Kelvin put forth his

"meteoric" theory about how life had developed on earth (in his I87 I
Presidential address to the Association), all types of comment appeared
in the magazine.

One fellow, identifying himself only as G. E. D.

(Nature, August 17> 1871:30£)> snapped at Kelvin ". . .we know all about
you, old boy, and the British Association; and we don't think much about
you, either."

Maxwell contributed a poem kidding Kelvin (Nature, August

10, 1 8 7 1 2 2 9 1 ), whom he called'h swell profound."

The poem reads in part:
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THE BRITISH ASS
(Sung By a Cub at the Red Lions * Feed, Edinburgh, August J.t l§2l)
Air: "THE BRITISH GRENADIERS"
Some men go in for Science,
And some go in for Shams,
Some roar like hungry Lions,
And others bleat like lambs;
But there's a Beast that at this Feast
Demands a special glass,
So let us bray, that long we may
Admire the British Ass!
With a tow, row, row, &c, &c.
On Grecian senses charming
Fell the music of the spheres,
But voices more alarming
Salute our longer ear.
A swell profound doth now propound
How life did come to pass,
From world to world the seeds were hurled,
Whence sprung the British Ass!
In our wandering through Creation
We meet these burning stones,
That bring for propagation
The germs of flesh and bones
And is it not a thrilling thought
That a huge misguided mass
Will come some day to sweep away
Our dear old British Ass!
The child who knows his father
Has aye been reckoned wise,
But some of us would rather
Be saved that sweet surprise,
If it be true that when we view
A comely lad or lass,
We find the trace of the monkey's face
In the gaze of the British Ass!
The "British Ass," as Maxwell dubbed it, became unique.

It

courted Lord, lady and labourer alike.

The men of the Association came
£
to see it as a duty to lecture to the working men in the mills, and they
l;The "British Ass" was Maxwell's term for the British Association.
^Eiseley comments (1967:12): "In their day science, if it was
to receive public acceptance and support, could not afford the luxury of
the cloister or the aloof arrogance of an institutionalized bureaucracy.
Men had to speak to men."
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invited them along with dignitaries, captains of industry and "swells"
to attend the meetings and activities of the Association.

As we noted

in the last chapter, over 1,800 people (of them, 600 ladies, gloated a
reporter in Nature) attended Tyndall's I87 I+ address to the Association.
Such attendance became typical; the whole movement became a social
phenomenon'.
All this was bound to have effects.
mode of British science itself.

The first effect was on the

Mathematics and professional expertise

was in it, but at the same time this science had to be expressed in the
literate mode.

The British men of science rose to the occasion.

As

Barzun (l9l+l:7W comments, "A new beauty was being given man to enjoy —
scientific eloquence, of which ,Huxley and Tyndall were in English the
two great creators."

Huxley, comments Eiseley (1 9 6 7 :1 0 ), " . . . remarked

that literature and science were not two separate things but rather the
two sides of a single coin."

With the literate mode joined to the scien

tific, a further fusion developed.

History and philosophy were related

to the burning issues of the present.
On the stage of the British Association, and before a mounting
public, the British men of science debated those issues in earnest.
results came of the debates.

Many

Before the turn of the century science as

a way of life had gained wide acceptance, and British scientists won
greatly increased financial support.
to be changed forever.
also tragedy.

The philosophy of many people came

But if there was progress, it appears there was

For it happened upon the stage erected by the British

Association, that scientific materialism and traditional Christianity
strode forward, and in full view of everyone nearly killed each other.
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The issue turned upon evolution.

It is a story we cannot tell

here, but certain elements of the matter must be looked at.

It was not

evolution per se which caused heartache, but rather the idea that random
genetic variations were selected for survival by the operation of mind
less natural forces.

In this view, as Bertrand Russell later commented,

"Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they
were achieving."

To men who believed they had been fashioned by divine

intelligence, and who therefore existed for some ultimate reason and
purpose, the idea was disastrous.

"Did I not believe," related a friend

to Tyndall, "that an Intelligence is at the heart of things, my life on
earth would be intollerable" (Nature, August 20, l87lj.:310)»

Yet Darwin

had developed so many lines of evidence that the intolerable conclusion
seemed certain.

T. H. Huxley, "Darwin's bulldog," drove the idea for

ward relentlessly.

Man, no longer child of the divine, one again was

thrust from the garden, this time to become merely an animal among ani
mals.

What sort of morality dominated an animal world?

In "The Struggle

for Existance in Human Society" (l8 8 8 , in Kropotkin, 19lU:329) Huxley
stated,
From the point of view of the moralist the animal world is on
about the same level as a gladiator's show. The creatures are
fairly well treated, and set to fight — whereby the strongest,
the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The
spectator has no need to turn his thumbs down, as no quarter is
given. He must admit that the skill and training displayed are
wonderful. But he must shut his eyes if he would not see that
more or less enduring suffering is the mead of both vanquished and
victor. And since the great game is going on in every comer of
the world, thousands of times a minute; since, were our ears sharp
enough, we need not descent to the gates of hell to hear ■—
sospiri, pianti, ed alti guai.
Voci alte e finoche, e suon di man con elle
— it seems to follow that, if the world is governed by benevolence,^
it must be a different sort of benevolence from that of John Howard.
6 J o h n Howard:

a British reformer of the period.
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Men seemed plunged irrevocably into a world which the church
had taught for centuries to be corrupt.

Newtonian physics was begin

ning to build a different picture of the world —

but it was, we know

now, a bare beginning, treating only of mass, force, motion and space.
It demonstrated only mechanism and efficient cause, power and force.
It was no substitute for the higher visions of the religious mind, or
even the higher visions of the materialist.
been foreseen.

What resulted might have

Barzun (1941:100) writes:

While some of the best minds were whirling round and round
in this vicious circle, it was not noticed that the words Matter
and Force, particularly when applied to human beings, might find
in daily life some dangerously simple applications. No one can
continue preaching the sole reality of these "bare facts" without
encountering someone who will take him literally. And when the
idea of force is embodied in the notions of Struggle and Survival
of the Fittest, it should be expected that men will use these
revelations of science as justifications for their own acts. Dar
win did not invent the Machiavellian image that the world is the
playground of the lion and the fox, but thousands discovered that
he had transformed political science. Their own tendencies to act
like lions and foxes thereby became irresistible "laws of nature"
and "factors of progress," while moral arguments against them were
dubbed "pre-scientific." The only text they would heed was "Go to
the ant, thou sluggard," because ants waged wars.
War became the symbol, the image, the inducement, the reason,
and the language of all human doings on the planet. No one who
has not waded through some sizable part of the literature of the
period 1 8 7 0 -1 9 1 4 has any conception of the extent to which it is
one long call for blood, nor of the variety of parties, classes,
nations, and races whose blood was separately and contradictorily .
clamored for by the enlightened citizens of the ancient civiliza
tion of Europe.
It is a sad fact, but when man discovered himself to be a child
of nature, he did not revise his opinion of nature upward.
the other way.

Revision went

Could things have been different? As a youth of twenty-

eight, Darwin had written (Eiseley, 1961:352):
If we choose to let conjecture run wild, then animals, our
fellow brethren in pain, disease, suffering and famine — our
slaves in the most laborious works, our companions in our amuse
ments — they may partake of our origin in one common ancestor —
we may be all melted together.
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That might have been the message of evolution; instead came bloody mon
key business.
In the face of reductionistic materialism, Tyndall asked (Vol.
II, 1902:97)> " . . . had we not better recast our definitions of matter
and force; for, if life and thought be the very flower of both, any
definition which omits life and thought must be inadequate, if not un
true.

Are questions like these warranted?

Why not?"

Tyndall, Darwin and Huxley came to agonize over the deadly fall
out of their ideas.

In his Romanes Lecture on Evolution at Oxford in

1894, Huxley held that "Capital and labor, nation and nation, race and
race, must live otherwise than as the ants.

Co-operation and love, the

Sermon on the Mount, were the more successful, the more Scientific1 ways
of life" (Barzun, 194l:llH,f•)•
the public mind.

Bu^ his earlier ideas had settled in

Barzun comments, "His speech was taken by some as a

1senile recantation.1"

The materialistic reductionism that emerged in that century verges
on the incredible.

All the more does this seem so if one goes back to

Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius.

Their "materialism" was hardly the

materialism of the nineteenth century; for while there were only 1atoms
and the void1, there were also special atoms of which the soul was com
posed, with the capacity for making ^ree swerves1 (Reese and Freeman,
eds., 1964:393^* )•

Th© idea may seem strange to us today.

Yet its

intent should be clear enough; for those philosophers mind, freedom, pur
pose were as fully in the world as matter itself.

Yet the mechanical

materialism of the nineteenth century repudiated such equal presence.
The mind and its qualities became a mere "epiphenomenon" of determinate
matter.

It is curious; Diogenes Laertius, writing of Epicurus1 materialism

had said (Reese and Freeman, eds., 1964:3^9):
Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things,
he /ppicurus/ laughs to scorn, affirming that some things happen
of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency.
For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance
or fortune is inconsistant; whereas our own actions are free, and
it is to them that praise or blame naturally attach. It were bet
ter, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath
that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed.
The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape it if we
honour the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf
to all entreaties.
That statement might have been addressed to the Nineteenth century.
Between the materialism of that time and Christian belief, "It were bet
ter, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods. . . . "
Kelvin and Maxwell, for example, looked from nature to God as
the source of life and its unique qualities.
ity —
for

To Kelvin, material real

"the fortuitous concourse of atoms" — - was "powerless to account
the directed operations of living matter, /and/ thedemonstrated

daily miracle of

our human free-will" (Thompson, Vol. II, 1910:1093).

Maxwell was similarly unable to see freedom and purpose as products of
matter.

Of Lucretius’ atomic universe, held fast by fate, "Ruining along

the illimitable inane," he said (Niven, ed., Vol. II, 1965:373):
It is no wonder that he /Lucretius/ should have attempted to
burst the bonds of fate by making his atoms deviate from their
courses at quite uncertain times and places, thus attributing to
them a kind of irrational free will, which on his materialistic
theory is the only explanation of that power of voluntary action
of which we ourselves are conscious.
Kelvin’s and Maxwell’s views illustrate the dilemma of many sincere
Christians of that period.

Taught, as Tyndall said, to "scorn the earth,"

and value the gifts of life as coming uniquely from God, it was simply
impossible to accept those same gifts from nature.

Traditional Christian

ity had insisted too long that nature’s impotence argued God’s existence.
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And so, when men were driven towards materialism, they found no place
for their most cherished values.

Over centuries, the dualistic teaching

of the church had "reduced” materialism, thereby hobbling it.

Similarly,

in the nineteenth century, scientific materialism crippled the belief
system of traditional Christianity.
field of battle on crutches.

Church dogma left the evolutionary

Speaking of this period, Lynn White, Jr.,

writes (1968:49):
The new biology destroyed the symmetry of Christian history
which had been designed by the devout to explain the Incarnation.
Consequently, in the opinion of many men, the entire structure
collapsed, and faith in the singleness and purpose of the time
process waned. Under the aging Victoria, there occurred a shift
in the world outlook of Europe and America more important than
any since the days of Constantine. If the latter marked the
beginning of the middle ages, historians of the future, gifted
with a perspective denied us today, may well conclude that the for
mer marks their true end.
What happened to the great philosophical-scientific debates promul
gated by the British Association?
istic Darwinism —
faded slowly away.

Having berthed an infant —

determin

which some today might call 'Rosemary’s baby’, they
And, it might be added, during just that period when

their continuation was most needed.

A new and less reductionistic syn

thesis could have emerged, but it was not to be at that time.
in the l880's a reaction to scientific materialism set in.
time physical scientists had achieved increased funding.

Starting

Also, by this
Suddenly, there

were a host of new 'facts * which could be chased, and what Kelvin called
the "first stage" of science blossomed.
to Dickens' Hard Times —
priate.

"Now, what I want is, Facts" —

Empiricism and positivism grew.

to be neuter.

More than ever, the opening words
seemed appro

Philosophically, they attempted

Touch a positivist with philosophy and he fairly shrieked.

Numbers of philosophers sat around and analyzed the meaning of words.
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Certain men, such as A. N. Whitehead and more recently, C. P. Snow in
England have tried to put Humpty Dumpty together again, and we shall
look at some of their thoughts shortly.

Certain of their writings pos

sess an almost desperate urgency, as if they saw us to "be in a race
which might be lost.

Perhaps they have been haunted by Plato's ghost.

Or, perhaps, Huxley's.
In 1895> as president of the Royal Society, Kelvin spoke of the
death of Huxley.

The two men had been almost diametrically opposed,

philosophically.

One might expect a certain feeling in Kelvin's words.

He said (Thompson, Vol. II, 1910:1088):
Even those purely scientific papers /of Huxley's/ contain ample
evidence that Huxley's mind did not rest with the mere recording
of results discovered by observation and experiment: in them, and
in the nine volumes of collected essays which he has left us, we
find everywhere traces of acute and profound philosophic thought.
When he introduced the word agnostic to describe his own feeling
with reference to the origin.and continuance of life, he confessed
himself to be in the presence of mysteries on which science had
not been strong enough to enlighten us; and he chose the word wise
ly and well. It is a word which, even though negative in character,
may be helpful to all philosophers and theologians. If religion
means strenuousness in doing right and trying to do right, who has
earned the title of a religious man better than Huxley?
Reflections on the British Tradition
T. H. Huxley did more perhaps than any other man to strike at the
religious viewpoint which Kelvin held dear.

Yet in the end Kelvin spoke

of his 'doing right and trying to do right,' and called him a religious
man.

Kelvin's statement about Huxley reveals the relationship between

certain men of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in
that age.

Those men used uncompromising words in criticizing each others

scientific views.
tion.

Recall Tyndall's rejection of Maxwell's theory of crea

Recall Kelvin's propensity for unsparing comments.

Recollect
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Maxwell's poem joshing Kelvin and his discomfort ,over evolution.

Remem

ber Clifford's dreadfully blunt response to Tait's position in The Unseen
Universe.

Yet, Tait and Clifford were personal friends and remained so.

Something of a similar nature can be said about other men in the Associa
tion.

While hard debators, they were joined in something which went

beyond debate.
In casting about for some analogy to the relationship of these
men, a chapter from a novel comes to mind.
Once and Future King."

It is in T. H. White's "The

Let us look on with the Wart (King Arthur as a

boy) as he observes, through Merlin's magic, a battle between King Pellinore and Sir Grummore Grummursum (White, 1966:£9ff •):
"How-de-do?" inquired Sir Grummore.
"Hail," said King Pellinore. "No, I mean it won't hail, will
it?"
"Nice day," said Sir Grummore.
"Yes, it is nice, isn't it, what?" . . .
"Been questin' today?"
"Oh, yes, thank you. Always am questing, you know. After the
Questing Beast."
"Interestin' job, that, very."
„
"Yes, it is interesting. Would you like to see some fewmets?"
"By Jove, yes. Like to see some fewmets."
"I have some better ones at home, but these are quite good,
really."
"Bless my soul. So these are her fewmets."
"Yes, these are her fewmets."
"Interestin' fewmets."
"Yes, they are interesting, aren't they? Only you get tired of
them," added King Pellinore.
"Well, well. It's a fine day, isn't it?"
"Yes, it is rather fine."
"Suppose we'd better have a joust, eh, what?"
"Yes, I suppose we had better," said King Pellinore, "really."
"What shall we have it for?"
"Oh, the usual thing, I suppose. Would one of you kindly help
me on with my helm?" . . .
fka. awful battle ensued. The two knights finally unhorsed each
other and came to stand face to f ace^
7

'Fewmets: droppings.
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"Defend thee," cried King Pellinore.
"God save thee," cried Sir Grummore.
With this they drew their swords and rushed together with such
ferocity that each, after dealing the other a dint on the helm, sat
down suddenly "backwards.
"Bah!" cried King Pellinore.
"Booh!" cried Sir Grummore, also sitting down.
"Mercy," exclaimed the Wart. "What a combat!"
. . . The trees shook, the forest rang. Blackbirds and squirrels
cursed and wood-pigeons flew out of their leafy perches half a mile
away. The two knights stood to attention while one could count three.
Then, with a last unanimous melodious clang, they both fell prostrate
on the fatal sward.
"Stunned," said Merlyn, "I should think."
"Oh, dear," said the Wart. "Ought we to get down and help them?"
"We could pour water on their heads," said Merlyn reflectively,
"if there was any water. But I don't suppose they would thank us
for making their armour rusty. They will be all right. Besides, it
is time that we were home."
"But they might be dead!"
"They are not dead, I know. In a minute or two they will come
round and go off home to dinner."
"Poor King Pellinore has not got a home."
"Then Sir Grummore will invite him to stay the night. They will
be the best of friends when they come to. They always are."
"Do you think so?"
"My dear boy, I know so. Shut your eyes and we will be off."
Echoes of Arthur's Court ring through the scientific debates of
the nineteenth century; a bit of Sir Grummore and King Pellinore were in
the men of that time.
ence.

As Eiseley remarked, it was an heroic age in sci

Many of the scientists were, like Pellinore, "After the Questing

Beast."

They had fewmets, evidence to show, and there were always "bet

ter ones at home."

But it was the strife of great debate that irresist

ibly attracted them, and with jousting stance they battled back and forth
before the British public.
Considering Kelvin's statement of the second law in relation to
the social pattern of science at that time, it appears to have been an
intellectual weapon, sharpened for use in the lists of Christianity.
Kelvin had used the extraordinary term "impossible" in stating the second
law.

In virtually the same breath, he added qualifiers such as "known"
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facts, "unles operations have been, or are to be performed. . ." and so
forth.

Kelvin's statement of the second law was dramatic.

Rather than

quietly saying, "Here is an hypothesis. . ."he said, "this is impossible,
unless. . ."

What has happened since his time?

Where Kelvin is quoted

in the m o d e m physics text, only the term "impossible" survives.

Hot only

is Kelvin mis-quoted by omission, so that his religious ideas are obscured,
he is quoted without reference to the debates of his times.

He seems to

be taken as speaking in a pure (if scientific) vacuum.
It can be said of that period, what got picked out of Darwin was
not quite Darwin; what got abstracted out of Huxley was not quite Huxley,
nor was that which was taken out of Tyndall —
holds for Kelvin.

quite Tyndall.

The same

Only those points most sharpened for debate seemed to

hang in the hide of the audience.
done, the show got closed.

Then, before the damage could be un

If anything comes out of reading history on

this matter, it is that the statements of debators should be taken within
the context of their dialogues.

(Can one reach a good conclusion on a

legal case by reading only the defense, or the prosecution?)

The second

law, as stated in the 18 ^0 's, must be considered in terms of the contribu
tions of Clifford, Tyndall, Maxwell —
as Kelvin.

and yes, Tait and Stewart, as well

In such manner a rounded picture of the law's strength and

weakness emerges.

Yet, by the start of the twentieth century only a

rather truncated version of Kelvin's statements had become dominant.
That version was incorporated into the cosmology of Jeans and Eddington.
Was this really warranted?

Dampier, writing in 1929 commented (19^9:300)*

The application of the
theories, at all events on
doubtful validity. It was
results inferred from such

principles of thermodynamics to cosmic
nineteenth-century evidence, was of
unjustifiable to extend to the universe
limited instances, even though they had
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been successfully used to predict the behavior of finite isolated
or isothermal systems.
How is it that a philosophically and religiously inspired hypothesis,
which far outran (and continues to outrun) the evidence in hand, came to
be set as the inevitable and only conclusion to be drawn from that evi
dence?
We have said that the British Association experienced a tragedy
toward the close of the nineteenth century.
in Camelot.

There had also been tragedy

The tradition of the round table did not hold, and its power

was scattered.

In the case of late nineteenth-century science, when the

breakup came, mathematical empiricism went one way while literature, his
tory and philosophy went another.

Empiric science, in turn, was embar

rassed to point to anything other than its gathered fewmets as the basis
of its conclusions.

As a result, not just the second law, but other

scientific theories were paraded as the inevitable conclusion of fact
while their philosophical roots, which could have been examined and
challenged, went unnoticed.
In his Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1927>
Eddington had announced that the second law held "the supreme position
among the laws of Nature" (Eddington, 1963:7U)»

In his Vanuxem Founda

tion lectures at Princeton in 1929 (since reprinted as The Function of
Reason), A. N. Whithead launched an attack on both the separation of
philosophy and science, and the second law as a universal principle.
o

In evaluating Dampier's position on the second law, it must be
noted that he rejects both materialism and traditional orthodoxy in
science. He sees God's action as continuing: "Creation must be regarded
as a continuous process • . . There is still room — indeed the whole
universe — for a sense of awe and mystery, still room for reverent in
quiry* for faith in things unseen. Instead of the childish story of the
six days, with their separate acts of creation, the real problem of
Being (arises) stupendous, overwhelming" (l9i+9s3H)«

With respect to the first subject he said reflectively (1 9 6 2 :50ff.):
The separation of philosophy and natural science . . . is indicated
by the division of science into Tmoral science' and 'natural sci
ence.' For example, the University of Cambridge has inherited the
term 'moral science' for its department of philosophic studies.
The notion is that philosophy is concerned with topics of the mind,
and that natural science takes care of topics concerning’ matter.
The whole conception of philosophy as concerned with the discipline
of the speculative Reason, to which nothing is alien, has vanished
. . . The modern doctrine, popular among scientists, is that science
is the mere description of things observed . . . . Thus the quest
of science is simplicity of description. The conclusion is that
science, thus defined, needs no metaphysics. We can then revert to
the naive doctrine of the University of Cambridge, and divide
knowledge into natural science and moral science, each irrelevant
to the other.
Speaking of the second law, he said (l962s.29ff •) s
This empirical fact constitutes one of the deepest unsolved
mysteries. . . . Science has always suffered from the vice of over
statement. In this way conclusions true within strict limitations
have been generalized dogmatically into a fallacious universality
. . . Our scientific formulation of physics displays a limited uni
verse in process of dissipation. We require a counter-agency to
explain the existence of a universe in dissipation within a finite
time. . . . We have omitted some general counter-agency.
In the operation of the human mind he found one of those agencies.

"Rea

son, " he said, "is the special embodiment in us of the disciplined counter
agency that saves the world."

Urging the use of a philosophically

trained speculative reason, he said (l962;$6), "It finally proceeds to
predict, on the basis of . . . the facts thus described, the observabil9
ity of occurrences generically different from any hitherto made."
White
head asked urgently for a reunion of philosophy and physics.

He all but

said that the second law was a bad problem left lying on the floor by
their separation, and suggested that the use of the speculative reason
would lead to the discovery of generically different phenomena.
^The publishers of the 1962 edition of The Function of Reason
note that it has been "Long out of print."

In 1959> C# P. Snow delivered the Rede Lecture at Cambridge,
which he entitled "The Two Cultures."

He argued that (1965:17)> 11• * •

our fanatical belief in specialization (has precipitated) two cultures
. . . already dangerously separate sixty years ago."
tures —

In "The Two Cul

A Second Look" (196 ^:6 0 ), Snow summarized his main points as

follows:
In our society (that is, advanced western society) we have
lost even the pretense of a common culture. Persons educated with
the greatest intensity we know can no longer communicate with each
other on the plane of their major intellectual concern. This is
serious for our creative, intellectual and, above all, our normal
life. It is leading us to interpret the past wrongly, to misjudge
the present, and to deny our hopes for the future. It is making it
difficult or impossible for us to take good action.
I gave the most pointed example of this lack of communication
in the shape of two groups of people, representing what I have
christened ’the two cultures. 1 One of these contained the scien
tists . • . the other contained the literary intellectuals . . .
between these two groups — the scientists and the literary intel
lectuals — there is little communication and, instead of fellowfeeling, something like hostility.
Snow continued (1965:71):
. . . I used as my test question about scientific literacy, What do
you know of the Second Law of Thermodynamics? It is, in fact, a
good question. Many physical scientists would agree that it is
perhaps the most pointed question. . • .
Snow reported that the response to this question "was cold; it was also
negative" (1 9 6 5 :1 5 ).
It is only accident that both men write about a split in the cul
ture —

Whitehead about the split between science and philosophy, Snow

about the split between science and the literate intellectual, and then
together turn to thoughts on the second law?

Might something important

have slipped betwixt the cup and the lip, these last eighty years?
the following section, which concludes this paper, I should like to
argue that it has.

In

Conclusion, and an Argument
from Clifford* s Corner
W. K. Clifford provided one of the most trenchant reasons ever
given for the limitation of the second law.

He was also an unsparing

critic of traditional Christianity (Vol. I, 1901:268ff.).

His position

has not been advanced lately, and so in the interest of stimulating dis
cussion, I am going to act as advocate of that position and give it a
modem development.

The statements I will make will be neither neutral,

nor necessarily true.

I frankly hope to arouse a debating spirit in

those who read this paper.
The first and second laws of thermodynamics, stating respectively
the conservation and the dissipation of energy, are considered by many to
be the two most fundamental laws of the universe.
be empirically derived.

Both laws are held to

Yet, upon reflection, it does not seem possible

to state, from the limited empiric evidence available, either proposition
as a universal law.
ment —

Another element appears to be involved in such state

religious and philosophical belief.

It has been held by many

writers that the two most influential streams of thought shaping the
modem world are the Greek and the Christian philosophies.

Conservation

was a fundamental principle of Greek philosophy, and it implied the eter
nity of the universe.

The second law, on the other hand, implied Creation

in time past, and appears overwhelmingly Christian in its inspiration.
Unbroken conservation on the one hand, and Creation, with steady
consequent dissipation on the other hand, are ultimately contradictory
postulates.

Yet both co-exist in the belief system of modem physics,

the contradictions having been swept under the carpet of the past.
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If we examine the conservation and the dissipation principles,
we find that they imply very different things about the character of the
universe.

Upon the conservation principle, it is possible to say that

the world is a self-sufficient material reality, devoid of all divinity.
It is equally possible to conclude that the God-principle provides un
broken and continuous support for the universe.
tain foundations for both inspirations;

There appear to be cer

the matter has not been brought

to a conclusion.
If we turn to the second law, a very different picture emerges.
The origin of the universe, through a creative act of God in the remote
past, comes to be shrouded in impenetrable mystery.

Its present opera

tion is seen to be less than self-sustaining, and its future is eternal
stagnation.

This is an unsatisfactory situation, just from the standpoint

of the religious outlook.

As Eddington, one of the champions of the

second law has said (1959:59):

"Even those who would welcome a proof of

the intervention of a Creator will probably consider that a single windingup (of the universe) at some remote epoch is not really the kind of rela
tion between God and his world that brings satisfaction to the mind."
If we look backwards from the Christian era to the time of archaic man,
we find something similar to the second law held as a belief.
was thought to be cyclical in nature.

The world

A tribal god or pantheon of gods

initiated each cycle through sacrifice or sexual union with the earth,
which in turn was viewed as passive. ^
cycle, the gods withdrew.

After initiation of the new

Degeneration, for example from the gold to the

^Today we still recognize the passivity of nature, and its in
completeness, through use of the term "mother nature" rather than father
nature. Consider, for example, the principle of the Yin and the Yang.
Also, see Eliade (1959:lJ+l+ff•) °n "the hierogamy between the Sky-God and
Mother Earth."
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iron age, occurred in the absence of the gods, who eventually returned
to end the old cycle and recreate a new one.

This precept of degenera

tion within each cycle is the first recognition of the second law.

Such

beliefs on the part of archaic man were usually accompanied by rituals
of worship and sacrifice, frequently human (Frazier, 1 9 6 6 ; Eliade, 1959)*
Against primitive worship and sacrifice the majority of the Greek philo
sophers developed their precepts.

Democritus and Epicurus, fully as

much as Plato, recoiled from popular superstition.

Their universe became

predominantly a world of principle, law and harmony, characterized by
conservation.

The most important aspect of it was ultimate unity. If a

divinity existed, it existed with and was a part of the cosmos.
In distinction to such ideas, Christianity reaffirmed the basic
dualism of a God who antedated and was separate from the world, and who
"Created" that world in time.

It held that (see p. 3 6 ):

God alone has no beginning but always is and always will be;
the eternal God is the one and only principle of all things, 'Creator
of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; by
His almighty power, at the beginning of time He created both orders
of creation alike out of nothing.
In this view, conservation is an attribute of God alone, and with this
view Christianity attacked the Greek philosophy of antiquity.

In Process

and Reality (1929:519-530) A. N. Whithead criticized this traditional
Christian view.

Holding that God is "not before all creation but with

all creation," he comments:
When the Western world accepted Christianity, Caesar conquered;
and the received text of Western theology was edited by his lawyers
. . . The brief Galilean vision of humility flickered throughout the
ages, uncertainly . . . But the deeper idolatry, of the fashioning
of God in the image of the Egyptian, Persian, and Roman imperial
rulers, was retained. The Church gave unto God the attributes which
belonged exclusively to Caesar.

11+7
An "imperial ruler" or Lord God, separate from the world, exist
ent before it and superior to it, seems to have remained the matrix of
traditional Christian belief.

Such a God shaped Newton's concepts, and

Whewell's and Kelvin's after him.

Although such concepts do not appear

in physical formulas, or in the direct description of empirical processes,
they are the very stuff of interpretation surrounding fact and formula.
In the case of the second law, traditional Christian belief appears to
have led, not to the justifiable statement that 'for these sets of phen
omena, entropy increases, ' but to the enthusiastic generalization that
'for the whole world entropy increases,' and that consequently " . . . all
motion except that of heat must have an end, unless it please God to
restore by an act of new creative power the dissipation of mechanical
effect that always goes on" (Lord Kelvin, quoted from Thompson, Vol. I,
1910:210.).

This generalization concerning universal dissipation states
afresh the dependence and incompleteness of a world without the immediate
presence of the Lord God.

It holds our entire modem technology in its

grasp, and it must be said, the most primitive superstitions are in
accord with its outlook.

Why is it that Maxwell's "Demon" is called,

against Maxwell's own wishes, a "Demon?"

Why, when he could do nothing

but aid our technological

efficiency, has the "Demon" been met with the

"pious hope that for some

inscrutable reason no demon would ever be able

to crash the gate of our laboratories?" (Bridgman, 1969:5)*

T*1® second

law is today increasingly challenged in the realm of astrophysics.

But,

where a breakthrough would really count, in the realm of technology, the
second law holds as strong a sway as ever, even though it would seem to
follow that, if the universal process is self-sustaining, our technology

should ultimately he able to make an arbitrarily close approach to such
operation.
There
dence for the

is no reason now, nor has there ever been, to take the evi
second law as forcing the conclusion that "entropy can

either remain constant or increase, but can never decrease."

In fact,

the evidence adduced in support of the second law may be taken together
with Newton's third law of motion —
and opposite reaction —

for every action there is an equal

as strongly suggesting the existence of what

Whitehead has called "generically different" and counterbalancing phenomena
Yet, there is reason to suppose that this alternative construction is un
likely to be adopted by a science oriented to facts and formula alone.
Such an alternative construction requires a gestalt shift of perception,
of the type which Thomas Kuhn says underlies most scientific revolutions
(1970:123).

The present paradigm or overall conceptual model of the uni

verse given by the second law militates against a gestalt switch to an
other paradigm, at least within the context of "normal scien c e . K u h n
comments (l9 7 0 :2 l|.):
Closely examined, whether historically or in the contemporary
laboratory, that enterprise (of normal science) seems an attempt to
force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that
the paradigm supplies. No part of the aim of normal science is to
call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not fit
the box are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists normally aim
to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those in
vented by others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed
to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the para
digm already supplies.
It would appear, in light of our growing ecological and energy problems,
which have been created by a dissipative technology under the guidance
of a dissipative law, that a paradigm switch to an entropy-symmetrical
hypothesis would be very desirable.

Such a change requires, I think,

the aid of philosophy, which alone can provide the critical examination
of our underlying assumptions.

Such examination involves, not merely

the ideas which most .immediately determine our technology, hut our deep
est religious and philosophical beliefs.

Lynn White, Jr. (1 9 6 8 i8.9ff.),

has put forth some interesting reflections in this regard.

He states:

The consistency with which scientists during the long formative
centuries of Western science said that the task and the reward of
the scientist were "to think God's thoughts after him" leads one to
believe that this was their real motivation. If so, then modem
Western science was cast in a matrix of Christian theology. . . .
As we now recognize, somewhat over a century ago science and tech
nology, hitherto quite separate activities, joined to give mankind
powers which, to judge by many of the ecological effects, are out of
control. If so, Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt.
I personally doubt that disastrous ecologic backlash can be
avoided simply by applying to our problems more science and more
technology . . . What we do about ecology depends on our ideas of
the man-nature relationship. More science and more technology are
not going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find
a new religion, or rethink our old one.
As remote from science and technology as it may seem, rethinking our old
religious and philosophical concepts may provide the first step towards a
new, and better technology.

I would like to close with two poems.

The

first, "Why Wait for Science?" by Robert Frost, gives the culmination of
a technology guided by the second law.

The other poem, "To the Air of

Lorelei,-" by James Clerk Maxwell, leads in a different direction.
ever direction we come to take lies, I think, with us.
I
Sarcastic science, she would
Like to know,
In her complacent ministry of fear,
How we propose to get away from
Here
When she has made things so we
have to go
Or be wiped out. . . .
— Robert Frost
(E.C. Latham, ed., 1969:210)

Which

igo
ii

I (hear) how all nature rejoices,
And moves with a musical flow.
0 ! strange! we are lost in delusion,
Our Ways and doings are wrong,
We are drowning in wilful confusion,
The notes of that wonderful song.
— J.C. Maxwell
(Campbell, 1882:602)
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